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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Shall We Give Away the Shore?
In the next century, the majority of America's publicly owned
tidal shorelines could be replaced by a wall, not because anyone de-
cided that this should happen but because no one decided that it
should not. Throughout the United States, housing developments are
being built just inland of the marshes, swamps, muddy shores, and
sandy beaches that collectively comprise the "public trust tidelands."
Because sea level is rising and most shores are eroding, the water will
eventually reach these houses unless either the houses are moved or
somehow the sea is held back.
The most common response has been to build a wall near the
boundary between the private dry land and the public tidelands, sav-
ing the former but allowing the latter to erode away. Most states tac-
itly reward riparian owners who build these walls with sole custody of
what had been the public shore, by allowing the owners to exclude the
public from the area inland from the wall, where there would have
been a public beach or wetland had the wall not been built. In Mary-
land alone, more than 300 miles of tidal shoreline have been armored
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in the last twenty years.' This trend will accelerate if the greenhouse
effect increases the rate of sea level rise.2
We should not, however, paint all coasts with a single brush, be-
cause America has two types of coast: the ocean and the bay. Along
the ocean, sandy public beaches dominate.3 Recognizing these
beaches to be their "crown jewels," coastal communities and states
protect them with a variety of policies that seem likely to ensure their
survival in all but a few locations.
Farther inland lies the hidden coast that comprises eighty per-
cent of our tidal shorelines. Part sand, part mud, and part vegetated
wetland, these shores have diverse uses. Unlike the open ocean coast,
our bay shores are gradually being replaced with walls of steel, stone,
concrete, and wood (hereinafter "bulkheads").' Where once a fisher-
man could walk on the public beach, there is no beach. In order to
walk along the bulkheads that replaced it, the fisherman must trespass
in the backyards of the property owners who built them. Unlike the
ocean resorts, where every block has a road leading to the beach,
bayfront developments usually provide no access to the shore.5 Envi-
ronmental regulations provide only temporary relief, having been
designed as if shorelines and sea level were stable.6 Effective strategies
for saving our natural shores apply to the open ocean-but not to the
hidden bay.
Why do we treat the ocean and bay coasts differently? Virtually
every state has made the policy decision to keep its ocean beaches and
1. See infra Appendix 2.
2. See JAMES G. TITUS & VIJAY K. NARAYANAN, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE
PROBABILITY OF SEA LEVEL RISE 145 (1995) [hereinafter EPA 1995] (estimating that along
the U.S. coast, there is a 10% chance that sea level will rise 40 cm by 2050, 85 cm by 2100,
and 230 cm by 2200); WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 381 (1996) [hereinafter IPCC
1995] (estimating that global sea level is likely to rise 20-86 cm by 2100).
3. Rocky coasts with occasional pocket beaches are more common in Maine, Washing-
ton, Oregon, and northern California. See infta note 23 and accompanying text.
4. Coastal engineers use many types of walls to hold back the sea. For simplicity, this
Article uses the term "bulkhead" to refer to all of those structures. See infra note 81 for
further discussion of these structures.
5. The potential for a constituency concerned about these trends is impeded in part
by the lack of roads leading all the way to the shore in new subdivisions. See KARL F. NORD-
STROM, ESTUARINE BEACHES 120 (1992) (describing the lack of access routes to beaches).
Hence, realistic public access is denied right from the start.
6. Cf Paul Klarin & Marc Hershman, Response of Coastal Zone Management Programs to
Sea Level Rise in the United States, 18 COASTAL MGMT. 143, 144 (1990) (stating that although
the federal government has studied sea level rise, it has not provided clear guidance or
policies to state and local governments).
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not to privatize ocean shores that are currently open to the public.7
Yet, policy makers have not addressed the loss of natural shores along
the hidden coast. The rising sea has placed riparian owners' rights to
protect their homes on a collision course with the public's ownership
of the intertidal wetlands and beaches. Some of the shore' has been
given away, and more will be given away as wetlands and beaches
erode.
Should we not decide which portions of our bay shores will re-
main public and in a natural condition? Ironically, land use planning
has provided state and local governments with a process for ensuring
that some of the privately owned farms and forests remain as open
space. Coastal states, however, have no process for deciding how
much of the publicly owned shore should remain in its natural condi-
tion, or even in public hands.
B. Organization and Summary
This Article examines land use planning options9 by which
coastal states might retain some of their public trust tidelands in
perpetuity---no matter how much the sea rises-at least in areas that
have not yet been developed. A key assumption of this analysis is that
policies should protect coastal property values. Any policy that fails to
do so is likely to be unfair and inefficient and to engender a well-
deserved opposition sufficient to prevent implementation on the scale
necessary to have a lasting effect. This analysis also assumes a prefer-
ence for policies that rely on the free market (where possible) and
that deal rationally with our inability to say how much the sea will rise.
Part 1I presents key background information. For example, a
four-foot rise in sea level would inundate 7000 square miles of dry
7. This policy is reflected both in the widespread use of beach nourishment and regu-
lations that prevent structures on the beach. See U.S. AREAW CoRPs oF ENG'RS, SHORELINE
PROTECTION AND BEACH EROSION CONTROL STUDY, PHASE I: CosT COMPARISON OF SHORE-
LINE PROTECTION PROJECTS OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 6, 42-46 (1994) (stating
that beach nourishment has attained broad acceptance as a substitute for fixed structures
and listing three-fourths of the states as employing beach nourishment); Paul Klarin &
Marc Hershman, State and Local Institutional Response to Sea Level Rise: An Evaluation of Cur-
rent Policies and Problems, in I CHANGING CLIMATE AND THE COAST 297, 303 (James G. Titus
ed., 1990) (noting that seven states have setbacks based on a multiple of the erosion rate).
8. This Article uses "shore" to refer to the land that is immediately adjacent to the sea.
In most states, the public owns the land below mean high tide-i.e., the shore is publicly
owned. See infta Part IV. But if the land below high tide is eliminated, then the privately
owned land above high tide is the shore. Therefore, by definition, the elimination of wet-
lands and beaches converts the shore to private ownership.
9. Soft engineering responses such as beach nourishment and artificial marsh build-
ing are worth analyzing as well, but are outside the scope of this Article.
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land in the contiguous United States-an area the size of Massachu-
setts.1° Although the sea is most likely to rise one foot every fifty years
for the next few centuries, it could rise at twice that rate-or more. 1'
Part II also outlines and analyzes three ways to protect tidelands:
(1) prevent development in vulnerable areas seaward of a "setback line,"
(2) defer action, and (3) create rolling easements, which allow develop-
ment but prohibit property owners from holding back the sea. Part II
also identifies some combinations of these approaches, as well as op-
tions for retaining public shorelines even where bulkheads are built.
Setbacks have been employed along bay shores to limit pollution
runoff and along ocean coasts to keep homes from being built in ar-
eas that are vulnerable to erosion or storms. In undeveloped areas
where all the low land is within a few hundred feet of the shore,
preventing or restricting development may be the best way to retain
the tidelands. But purchasing an area the size of Massachusetts would
be expensive, and regulations to prevent development in such a large
area would be inefficient, unfair, and politically infeasible. Moreover,
the need to draw a setback line on the map poses two practical diffi-
culties: (1) sea level rise is uncertain and, therefore, defining the ap-
propriate setback line would be difficult; and (2) eventually the shore
would retreat to any setback that is established, unless development
was prevented in an area much larger than the land that is at risk in
the next century. Deferring action will not save the tidelands unless
politicians in the future are willing to buy or order the abandonment
of this same land after it is developed.
Rolling easements seem more likely to succeed on a broad scale.
They do not require particular lines to be drawn on a map, and their
impact on current property values would generally be less than one
percent. Governments could afford to compensate riparian owners,
but even a failure to compensate them would impose only a minor
burden. Developers who deny that the sea will rise would view the
policy as costing them nothing. Unlike setbacks, rolling easements
allow landowners to decide how best to use their property between
now and whenever the land finally erodes. Nevertheless, enforcement
may be politically difficult. A combination of density restrictions, set-
backs, and rolling easements would probably be more successful than
relying on any single option.
Would these policies require compensation under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Part III examines that question,
10. See infta note 102 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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based on the assumption that property owners have the right to build
a home and protect it from the sea. In areas where the land has al-
ready been subdivided, development would often be the only econom-
ically productive use of the land. In such cases, preventing
development would require compensation. In areas that have not
been subdivided, however, preexisting land uses may be profitable. In
these cases, preventing development may not require compensation.
Deferring action and subsequently requiring people to abandon their
homes would involve a taking if the homeowner is willing and able to
protect the shore, assuming a right to hold back the sea. Rolling ease-
ments, by contrast, would probably not require compensation, given
their trivial impact on property values and the several decades that
would pass before they had any actual effect.
Part V suggests that shorefront owners do not have a right to hold
back the sea. For over a thousand years, the "law of erosion" has held
that the boundary between public and private land migrates inland as
the shore erodes, and there is no right to increase one's land at the
expense of a neighbor. Granted, it does not automatically follow that
there is no right to prevent a reduction in one's land at the expense of
a neighbor, but the theoretical justifications are the same.
Another ancient principle of property law, the public trust doc-
trine, provides independent support for this view. Although some
portions of this doctrine are controversial, no one disputes the rule
that a state does not lose ownership of the shore 2 unless it intends to
do so. It follows that the state is never required to allow bulkheads that
privatize the shoreline. Thus, rolling easements are a codification of
the expectations that generally prevailed under the common law.
This logic might apply to deferred action, but not if states waive their
property interests by telling property owners that they have a right to
hold back the sea. 1 3
Part V shows that the low cost of rolling easements allows govern-
ment to bypass the takings issue by simply purchasing the easements
from current landowners. This option is also available to developers
and conservancy groups, and may be feasible even in areas that are
already developed.
This Article concludes with recommendations for moving the is-
sue forward. Local master plans should explicitly indicate which areas
will retain natural shorelines. State legislatures should authorize tide-
12. In most states, the public owns the land below mean high water; in five states, the
public only owns the area seaward of mean low water. See infra Part IV.B.I.
13. Maryland has explicitly granted a right to hold back the sea, but has not waived this
public property right. See infra Part IV.C.1.d.
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land planning studies that recommend how much of the shore should
be given away. Conservancies and developers should challenge gov-
ernments by taking initiatives on their own. The federal government
may also have a role in its status as a coastal property owner.
Because land use is a state and local responsibility,' 4 this Article
does not focus on a federal regulatory solution to this problem. The
federal government has had a paramount role in efforts to stop peo-
ple from destroying coastal wetlands, because those wetlands are gen-
erally found within the ebb and flow of our coastal waters, where the
federal government has always had jurisdiction." The survival of our
coastal wetlands as the sea level rises, however, depends on how peo-
ple use land that is currently dry and, as such, outside federal jurisdic-
tion. Nevertheless, those who administer, interpret, or comply with
coastal wetland protection laws should stop ignoring the fact that the
sea level is rising. Everything that these laws have accomplished will
be for naught if the government fails to develop a strategy for allowing
wetlands to migrate inland-eventually the wetlands that these laws
are protecting will all be under water.
The time has come for Americans to decide how much of our
natural shoreline we intend to retain. If we wait until all our coastal
areas have been developed before we confront this problem, the solu-
tions will be more expensive, less likely to succeed, and more likely to
force a showdown between environmentalists and landowners-a
showdown that can be avoided by acting now when decades of lead
time make it possible for cooler heads to prevail.
II. ANALYSIS OF POLICIES TO SAVE THE TIDELANDS
A. Background
1. The Shores of the United States. -The coastal zone of the United
States includes portions of thirty states. 16 Because the Great Lakes are
not hydraulically connected to the sea, 7 the issues discussed in this
14. RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1201, at 430 (4th ed. 1991).
15. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 217-18 (1824) (holding that the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over commerce in the coastal waters); see also
infra note 311.
16. See 3 WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS 341 (Jane Hoehner ed., 8th ed.
1995) (presenting cartographically the political and geographical boundaries of the
United States).
17. Four of the Great Lakes are above Niagara Falls. See, e.g., GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE NATIONAL ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2-3, 6-7
(1970). Lake Ontario is also separated from the ocean but by smaller waterfalls. See, e.g.,
Thomas E. Croley II & Holly C. Hartmann, Effects of Climate Changes on the Laurentian Great
Lakes Levels, in OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, & EVALUATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
1998] 1287
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Article primarily concern the twenty-four states with shores along the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, and, in the case of
Pennsylvania, the tidal Delaware River.' 8 Nevertheless, many of the
legal doctrines and responses to coastal erosion are equally applicable
to shores along the Great Lakes.
Along the Gulf Coast and the Atlantic Coast south of Cape Cod,
sandy public beaches dominate."9 For the most part, the coast is lined
with barrier islands and barrier spits.2" In all of these states, other
than Mississippi, at least some of the barrier islands are developed
with recreational beach resorts. 21 Along the southern half of Califor-
nia's Pacific Coast, as well as portions of the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts,
there are sandy mainland beaches rather than barrier islands.22 Rock
AGENCY, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES app.
A 4-1, 4-3 (Joel B. Smith & Dennis A. Tirpak eds., 1989) [hereinafter POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE]. Therefore, a rise in sea level does not cause higher levels in the
Great Lakes. In fact, scientists assessing the implications of global warming have generally
concluded that increased evaporation from warmer temperatures would cause Great Lakes
levels to drop. See, e.g., Stewart J. Cohen, The Effects of Climate Change on the Great Lakes,
3 EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE 163, 168, 176 (James
G. Titus ed., 1986) (stating that a three or four degree Celsius warming facilitates a 7-18%
increase in evaporation, which more than offsets a 1-6% increase in precipitation, thereby
causing Lakes Erie, Michigan, and Huron to drop 0.44 to 0.83 m, and Lake Superior to
drop about 0.25 m); Croley & Hartmann, supra, at 4-24 (estimating that over the next 70
years, Lake Superior could fall 1.3 mm/yr.; Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Erie could fall 5.9
to 6.6 mm/yr.; and Lake Ontario could fall 9.3 mm/yr., but predicting that within 80 years,
flows out of Ontario would drop enough to make it impossible to meet the requirements of
the water management implementation plan).
18. See 3 WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, supra note 16, at 341.
19. See, e.g., MARINE BD., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESPONDING TO CHANGES IN SEA
LEVEL: ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS 40-45 (1987) [hereinafter MARINE BOARD REPORT]. For
a thorough discussion of the shoreline of any particular part of the nation, refer to the
appropriate volume from the Living with the Shore series published by Duke University Press
under the general editorship of William J. Neal and Orrin H. Pilkey, Jr. See, e.g., WAYNE F.
CANIS ET AL., LIVING WITH THE ALABAMA-MIssIssIPPI SHORE 109-11, 120 (Orrin H. Pilkey, Jr.
& William J. Neal eds., 1985); WILLIAM J. NEAL ET AL., LIVING WITH THE SOUTH CAROLINA
SHORE (Orrin H. Pilkey, Jr. & William J. Neal eds., 1984); LARRY G. WARD ET AL., LIVING
WITH THE CHESAPEAKE BAY AND VIRGINIA'S OCEAN SHORES (Orrin H. Pilkey, Jr. & William J.
Neal eds., 1989).
20. MARINE BOARD REPORT, supra note 19, at 40-45. Barrier islands and spits are long
narrow islands and peninsulas with an ocean on one side and a bay on the other. COASTAL
BARRIERS TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT: UNDEVELOPED COASTAL BARRIERS A-18 (1983). For a discussion on the evolution of
barrier islands and barrier spits, see NFAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 21-26, or any of the other
books in the same series. For an easy-to-read introduction to beach dynamics, see WILLARD
BASCOM, WAVES AND BEACHES 11-23, 158-235 (1964).
21. See CANIS ET AL., supra note 19, at 109-11, 120 (stating that Mississippi has four
barrier islands, three of which are part of the Gulf Islands National Seashore); COASTAL
BARRIERS TASK FORCE, supra note 20, at IV-14 (providing a table with the status of coastal
barriers by state).
22. MARINE BOARD REPORT, supra note 19, at 40-45.
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and cliff coasts are more common in Maine, Washington, Oregon,
and northern California, but even there, one finds occasional pocket
beaches.23 In at least some parts of most coastal states, there is easy
access to the beach every 500 to 1000 feet.24 In these areas, the
beaches are truly open to the public, and they attract tens of millions
of swimmers and sunbathers every year.
Bay shores, most of which are along estuaries, comprise over
eighty percent of the nation's shoreline. 25 The estuarine coast in-
cludes the shores along large embayments such as Chesapeake, Dela-
ware, and San Francisco Bays, smaller embayments like Biscayne Bay,
and many small "back-barrier bays" that lie between barrier islands
and the mainland. 26 The various types of estuarine shores are put to a
wide variety of uses. Marshes and swamps purify water and provide
food and nurseries for fish, birds, and terrestrial animals. 27  Small
crafts navigating the inland waterways may be beached for repairs,
overnight rests, or refuge from storms. Fishermen who do not own
boats cast their lines from these shores. Many people visit these water-
fronts to shop, have dinner, or watch the sun set. Horseshoe crabs lay
their eggs on estuarine beaches, providing an important source of
23. See, e.g., BASCOM, supra note 20, at 14-15 (noting the construction of pocket beaches
on the California-Oregon coast); MARINE BOARD REPORT, supra note 19, at 44-45 (stating
that although rock and cliff beaches are predominant in California, Washington, and Ore-
gon, pockets of sandy beaches can be found).
24. For example, in Ocean City, Maryland, the public has access to the beach on every
block. The same is true for much of the New Jersey shore. The U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers will not undertake a beach nourishment project unless the beach is open to the
public. Personal Communication with John Van Fossen, Project Manager, Baltimore Dis-
trict, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Sept. 10, 1997); see infra note 373.
25. See, e.g., NORDSTROM, supra note 5, at I (citing a 1967 estimate by K.O. Emery that
over 80% of the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico Coasts, as well as 10-20% of the Pacific Coast,
are in estuaries). There are also a number of large embayments that are not estuaries,
because of their high salinities, but whose wetlands and beaches are similar due to the
relatively calm waves, such as Mississippi Sound, Puget Sound, Long Island Sound, and
numerous coastal bays in Maine. See id. at 4. In Maryland and Virginia, over 95% of the
tidal shores are along estuaries. See id. at 1.
26. These bays are also called "back bays." See, e.g., CANis ET AL., supra note 19, at 113-
15 (describing Mississippi's Biloxi Back Bay area); see also COASTAL BARRIERS TASK FORCE,
supra note 20, at A-5 to A-8 (discussing general types of back-barrier environments).
27. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON WETLANDS: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 31 (1994) ("Wetlands provide
habitat for many species of fish and wildlife, including migratory birds, endangered spe-
cies, commercially and recreationally important finfish, shellfish, and furbearers, and
many species of wild plants .... Between 60% and 90% of U.S. commercial fisheries use
coastal wetlands as spawning grounds and nurseries."). For a useful and easy-to-read over-
view of coastal wetlands, see generally JOHN & MILDRED TEAL, LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SALT
MARSH (1969).
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food for many shorebirds. 2 Estuarine beaches are also an important
habitat for terrapins and some endangered species such as the tiger
beetle and the least tern.29
Until the second half of the twentieth century, the narrow
beaches along Chesapeake and Delaware Bays served recreational
needs-needs that are now met mostly by ocean beach resorts.3 ° In
some cases, the proximity of these shores to population centers has
ensured their continued use. This is particularly true for Asian Ameri-
cans, African Americans, and other minorities. 1 Nevertheless, these
shores are still largely undeveloped, unlike the barrier islands and
other ocean shores.32
Figure 2 illustrates some key terminology. Along sandy shores,
the wet beach lies between mean high water and mean low water. The dry
beach extends from mean high water inland to the seaward edge of the
dune grass or other terrestrial plant life, sometimes called the vegeta-
tion line.3 3 The dune grass generally extends inland from the point
where a storm in the last year struck with sufficient force to erode the
28. See, e.g., NORDSTROM, supra note 5, at 105-27 (noting that estuarine beaches are
important feeding and spawning areas for marine fish, foraging birds, and horseshoe
crabs, as well as important locations for small-craft launching, fishing, and swimming).
29. See, e.g., James G. Titus, Fragile Beaches Being Replaced by Armored Shore, BALT. SUN,
May 25, 1997, at K6, available in 1997 WL 5513564 [hereinafter Armored Shore] (citing pub-
lic comments by environmental experts from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the
Environmental Protection Agency).
30. See Tom Stuckey, Another Bay Ridge Inn to Close, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1997, at Fl,
available in 1997 WL 14707832 (stating that many bay resorts have closed due to the popu-
larity of Atlantic beaches); Armored Shore, supra note 29 (describing the decline of the Ches-
apeake Beach and the increasing popularity of ocean beach resorts).
31. The postwar sunbathing fad never caught on among Asian and African Americans,
who continued to fish and swim along bay shores. Personal Communication with Stephen
P. Leatherman, Geography Dep't, University of Md. (Oct. 18, 1996). The lack of financial
resources for transportation and vacation housing may also play a role. In Maryland, the
majority of people along the beach at Ocean City are white, while the majority of people
along the beaches at Sandy Point and Fort Smallwood parks are African American or Asian
American. See Armored Shore, supra note 29.
32. No state has undertaken an assessment of the linear portion of its estuarine shores
that are developed. EPA studies, however, have assessed the area of coastal lands that are
developed. See, e.g., James G. Titus et al., Greenhouse Effect and Sea Level Rise: The Cost of
Holding Back the Sea, 19 COASTAL MGMT. 171, 189-92, 200 (1991) [hereinafter Holding Back
the Sea] (estimating that of the 5000-10,000 square miles of land that could be inundated by
a one-meter rise in sea level, about 6000-7000 square miles are currently developed).
While the reported results do not distinguish estuarine shores from land along the ocean,
they make clear that the vast majority of coastal low lands are along bays rather than the
open ocean. See id. at 194, 199 (estimating that only 705 square miles of land near the
ocean is within five feet of sea level, and that the land in such proximity consists largely of
the bay sides of barrier islands).
33. See David C. Slade et al., Lands, Waters and Living Resources Subject to the Public Trust
Doctrine, in PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 13, 59 (1990) (explaining that
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The area below mean high water is usually publicly owned, and in all cases is subject to
public access for fishing and navigation. Along the ocean, the dry beach above mean high
water may be privately owned, but in several states the public has an easement; along the
bay, the high marsh above mean high water is also privately owned, but wetland protection
laws generally discourage development. See infra Part IV for additional details.
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vegetation,34 which is well above mean high water.35 Along marshy
shores, mudflats are found between mean low water and mean sea
level, 6 low marsh is found between mean sea level and mean high
water, and high marsh extends from mean high water to mean spring
high water.37 Collectively, the lands between mean high water and
mean low water (mudflats, low marsh, and wet beaches) are com-
monly known as tidelands.8
2. The Public's Interest in the Shore.-The body of common law
that collectively describes the public's ownership and access along the
shore is known as the public trust doctrine and is discussed in Part IV
below. In most states, the public owns these tidelands, while private
the "vegetation line" has been recognized as the "ordinary mean high water line" and as
the "high water line").
34. Cf ORRIN H. PILKEY, JR. ET AL., LIVING WITH THE EAST FLORIDA SHORE 25-28 (Orrin
H. Pilkey, Jr. & William J. Neal eds., 1984) (explaining that storms erode the beach and
dunes by washing sand offshore but that after the storm subsides, fair-weather waves re-
build the beach and dunes). The vegetation line tracks the inland reach of severe storms,
because recently eroded dunes and beaches lack vegetation during the time that is re-
quired for the vegetation to reappear. Id. at 25.
35. Cf. Stephen P. Leatherman, Coastal Geomorphic Responses to Sea Level Rise, in GREEN-
HOUSE EFFECT AND SEA LEVEL RISE: A CHALLENGE FOR THIS GENERATION 151, 165 (Michael
C. Barth &James G. Titus eds., 1984) (explaining that the highest storm tide would occur
when the storm surge corresponds with an astronomical high tide).
36. Tides are determined primarily by the moon. See BASCOM, supra note 20, at 83-87
(explaining why the moon has a greater effect on tides even though the sun has 150 times
more gravitational pull); NATIONAL OCEAN SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TIDE TABLES
1985, HIGH AND Low WATER PREDICTIONS, EAST COAST OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA,
INCLUDING GREENLAND 1 (1984) (noting that tide frequencies depend primarily on
changes in the moon's distance and phase). When the moon and sun are lined up-i.e.,
full and new moons-the resulting "spring tides" are more extreme. See BASCOM, supra
note 20, at 87-88 (explaining spring tides); NATIONAL OCEAN SERV., supra, at 199-234 (list-
ing mean and spring tide ranges along the east coast of North and South America). For
example, at Sandy Hook, NewJersey, mean high water is 2.4 feet above the mean sea level
(MSL), while mean spring high water is 3.3 feet above MSL. Id. at 64-67, 213.
37. See, for example, Timothy W. Kana et al., Charleston Case Study, in GREENHOUSE
EFFECT, SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL WETLANDS 37, 41-45 (James G. Titus ed., 1988) [here-
inafter Charleston Case Study], and Timothy W. Kana et al., New Jersey Case Study, in GREEN-
HOUSE EFFECT, SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL WETLANDS, supra, at 61, 72 [hereinafter New
Jersey Case Study], which illustrate the general rule of wetland zonation for case study sites
near Charleston, South Carolina, and Long Beach Island, New Jersey. In some warmer
areas, mangroves rather than marshes exist. See Thomas V. Armentano et al., Impacts on
Coastal Wetlands Throughout the United States, in GREENHOUSE EFFECT, SEA LEVEL RISE AND
COASTAL WETLANDS, supra, at 87, 114 (projecting that climatic warming would enable man-
groves in Florida to advance north). Cypress swamps are found in some freshwater areas.
See LOUISIANA WETLAND PROTECTION PANEL, U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SAVING LOUI-
SIANA'S COASTAL WETLANDS: THE NEED FOR A LONG-TERM PLAN OF ACTION 35-37 (1985)
(noting that cypress swamps cannot tolerate saltwater and hence are being destroyed as
rising sea level and other processes enable salt water to penetrate into these swamps).
38. See infra Part IV.
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parties own the dry beach and the high marsh.3 9 In a few states, the
public owns the dry beach, at least in some areas, because of either
court rulings or acquisitions.4" However, in five states, the public only
owns the area seaward of the mean low water mark.4" By definition,
low tide is lower than mean low water during half the days of the
year.42 Therefore, even in those states where tidelands are privately
owned, there is often a wet beach or mudflat along which one can
walk without trespassing.4 3 Thus, the shore44 itself is publicly owned
whether or not the adjacent dry land is open to the public.
Ownership, however, is only part of the picture. In the five states
where the tidelands are privately owned, the public still has an ease-
ment along the tidelands for at least some purposes-for example,
hunting, fishing, and navigation. In several states, the public has ac-
cess along the dry beach for recreational use as well.45 The right to ac-
cess along the shore, however, does not mean that the pub-
lic has a right to cross private land to get to the shore.46 Unless
there is a public road or path to the shore, access along the shore is
thus only useful to those who either reach the shore from the water
or have permission to cross private land. Although the public
has easy access to most ocean beaches4" and a few large em-
39. See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 360-364 and accompanying text.
41. These five states are Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia.
See Slade et al., supra note 33, at 69 n.22.
42. See, e.g., George M. Cole, Tidal Water Boundaries, 20 STETSON L. REv. 165, 171 (1990)
(defining mean low water as the average height at all of the low tides over a 19-year tidal
epoch).
43. This statement assumes that no bulkhead has been constructed.
44. Recall that this Article uses the term "shore" to refer to the interface between land
and water. See supra note 8.
45. See Slade et al., supra note 33, at 69 n.23.
46. This right to cross private land is also known as perpendicular access. See David C.
Slade et al., Lands, the Public Trust Doctrine and Access to Public Trust Lands and Waters, in
PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK, supra note 33, at 161, 162, 165 nn.1-2
(citing cases to support the "nearly universal rule" that the public trust doctrine does not
grant perpendicular access to the shore across private land). New Jersey is an exception.
See infra note 362.
47. Interview with Bill Millhouser, Office of Ocean and Coastal Resources Manage-
ment, Nat'l Ocean and Atmospheric Admin. (Oct. 29, 1997) (on file with author). A draft
report on public access revealed that most states have some sort of policy to promote ac-
cess, but few if any states know what the policy is accomplishing. Id. North Carolina and
California are notable exceptions. Id. In most of Ocean City, Maryland, the public has
access to the ocean beach at every block. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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bayments, 4" the access points to most bay shores are widely dis-
persed.49
In the last few decades, state and federal statutes have added to
the public's interests in the shore. Perhaps most importantly, section
404 of the Clean Water Act requires property owners to obtain a per-
mit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) before filling
high marsh and other coastal wetlands. 5' This statute, along with fed-
48. Access to the beach is plentiful along the shores of Long Island Sound, Mississippi
Sound, Puget Sound, and Delaware Bay. Interview with Bill Millhouser, supra note 47. The
San Franciso Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission is particularly vigilant
about creating new areas of access. Id. It appears that "Chesapeake Bay may be the 'odd
man out.' Id.
49. Although some states have a policy of "universal access"-an access point every
mile or so-Maryland does not have a policy that provides access to most of the shores of
Chesapeake Bay. E-mails Between the Staff of the U.S. Office of Ocean and Coastal Re-
sources Management andJames G. Titus (Oct. 29, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Office of Ocean and Coastal Resources Management E-mails]. The many different possi-
ble meanings of the word "access" may have led some federal coastal zone management
officials to assume incorrectly that Maryland has such a policy to promote access. Id.; cf
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838-39 (1987) (finding that the Com-
mission's argument had confused visual perpendicular access with pedestrian access along
the shore). Communications with five staff members of Maryland's Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Program and Program Open Space revealed that no one in those programs knew
how many new access points had been added by their own programs or other programs.
Office of Ocean and Coastal Resources Management E-mails, supra. In the last 10 years,
Maryland has acquired land along tidal waters at 23 locations. Telephone Interview with
Bob Elsworth, Program Open Space (Nov. 4, 1997) (on file with author). The total in-
crease in the number of access points is less than 23, however, because in an unknown
number of cases-perhaps the majority-the acquisition expanded an existing state park
or forest. Id.
The primary state program related to public access is Program Open Space, managed
by the Department of Natural Resources. Interview with Chip Price, U.S. Dep't of Natural
Resources (Oct. 29, 1997) (on file with author). This program uses its funds primarily to
upgrade or create "complete parks," often with boat ramps and other facilities. Id. The
Program lacks the funds to create the hundreds of new parks that would be required to
provide universal access to the Bay. Id. Although such universal access could be created by
purchasing land for paths to the water, the State does not favor universal access, because it
prefers only to create access points that it can manage. Without such management, the
people visiting the shores would tend to trespass on adjacent private property and leave
trash on the beach. Id.
The State has no program to obtain public access when new shorefront developments
are subdivided. Id. In many cases, these subdivisions include small private parks for the
use of property owners in the subdivision. Occasionally, community associations seek state
funding to upgrade their own facilities. Id. When the State informs the property owners
that they will have to give public access if they accept state money, the associations gener-
ally withdraw their requests for state funds. Id.
50. Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994). In the case of tidal wetlands,
this authority was also provided in the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. §§ 403, 409 (1994). That statute was not used to protect large amounts of coastal
wetlands, however, until the 1970s. See, e.g., Comment, Discharging New Wine into Old Wine-
skins: The Metamorphosis of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. PrTr. L. REV. 483, 486-89
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eral regulations"' and companion state laws,52 discourages private
landowners from filling high marsh to create dry land. It does not,
however, prevent owners from erecting structures on pilings53 driven
into the marsh.54
The section 404 program does not always prevent people from
filling wetlands. The Corps can issue a permit to fill a large area of
wetlands, as long as the property owner "mitigates" this destruction by
either creating new wetlands or enhancing other wetlands that have
been degraded.55 The Corps has also issued a number of general per-
mits that allow activities within narrowly defined categories to fill wet-
lands. For example, the Corps has issued a general nationwide permit
that allows the owner of a lot to fill up to one-half of an acre of wet-
lands.56 Theoretically, the Corps ensures that these activities do not
have a major cumulative adverse effect upon the environment, but the
general permits do not indicate how. 5 7
(1972) (explaining that the difficulty in developing and enforcing standards to govern the
conduct of individual water polluters led federal officials to revive the Refuse Act of 1899).
51. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (1997) (providing guidelines for the control of disposal
sites of dredged or fill material).
52. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-202 (Supp. 1997) (requiring a person to ob-
tain a license prior to dredging or filling state wetlands); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 131, § 40
(Supp. 1997) (stating that no person shall remove, fill, or dredge or alter any area subject
to protection under the section without authorization); R.I. GEN. LAws § 2-1-22 (Supp.
1997) (mandating that no person may change, add, take from, or otherwise alter any fresh
water wetland without first obtaining approval of the director of the department of envi-
ronmental management).
53. Pilings are wooden cylinders similar to telephone poles. They are driven into the
ground or the sea floor with large hammers known as "piledrivers." They have long been
used in the construction of wooden docks. More recently, pilings have been used to ele-
vate homes.
54. See Interview with Sandy Zelen, Chief, Enforcement Section, Baltimore District,
Army Corps of Engineers (Oct. 22, 1997) (on file with author); see also Proposed Rule for
the Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 57 Fed. Reg. 26,894 (1992) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts.
323, 328 and at40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 401) (clarifying when the
placement of pilings is considered to result in a discharge of fill material).
55. See generally U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency & U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Mitigation
Memorandum of Agreement (Feb. 6, 1990) (explaining the federal policy on wetland miti-
gation under section 404(b) (1) of the Clean Water Act).
56. Issuance of Nationwide Permit for Single-Family Housing, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,650,
38,662 (1995).
57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (1994) (stating that the Secretary of the Army may issue
general permits for any category of activities involving discharges of dredged or fill mate-
rial if the Secretary determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will
cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will
have only minimal cumulative adverse effects on the environment); 60 Fed. Reg. at 38,654
(promising that District Engineers will take measures to avoid a significant cumulative im-
pact from a nationwide permit that allows property owners to fill up to one-half of an acre
for single family homes).
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Federal regulations also provide exceptions for bulkheads and
other erosion control structures.58 The Corps has issued a general
nationwide permit that allows people to erect erosion control struc-
tures along shorelines, as long as no vegetated wetlands are filled and
no more than a modest amount of fill material is placed below mean
high water. 59 In Maryland, however, the Corps has delegated its per-
mit approval to the state,6" which tolerates a greater impact on wet-
lands and tidal waters. For example, property owners who erect an
erosion control structure in Maryland can obtain a permit to fill vege-
tated wetlands6 and to fill beaches and tidal waters up to ten feet
seaward of mean high water.62 In addition, Maryland's statute allows
anyone whose property has eroded to fill wetlands and other tidal wa-
58. See 61 Fed. Reg. 30,779, 30,787-88 (1996) (explaining that construction of erosion
control structures is authorized, as long as they meet certain conditions).
59. See id. (authorizing nationwide wetland permits). The nationwide permit allows
property owners to place one cubic yard of fill below the mean high water mark for every
foot of shoreline that is protected. Id. at 30,788. Thus, for example, if a bulkhead were to
raise the land below mean high water by 4.5 feet, a property owner could fill no more than
6 feet seaward of mean high water.
60. States can apply to assume the entire section 404 program. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 134 4 (g)-(/) (1994). To qualify, they must meet a variety of criteria and obtain EPA ap-
proval under guidelines promulgated at 40 C.F.R. pt. 233. The Corps' delegation of the
program to Maryland, however, has taken the form of a statewide general permit under 33
U.S.C. § 1344(e). See Baltimore Dist., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Dep't of the Army,
Maryland State Programmatic General Permit §§ 1-5 (May 6, 1996) [hereinafter Maryland
General Permit]. The legal justification for this permit is in doubt because general permits
are only allowed for classes of similar activities with minimal impact. 40 C.F.R. § 230.7(a).
However, the Maryland General Permit does not explain why the Corps of Engineers be-
lieves that the armoring of 15 miles of shoreline per year has a minimal adverse impact; it
does not provide a detailed analysis to justify the assumption that, collectively, all of the
permits issued by the State of Maryland to fill wetlands will have a minimal impact; and it
does not explain how all of the various activities that result in the filling of tidal and non-
tidal wetlands can be collectively viewed as similar in nature. See Sixty Day Notice of Civil
Action Challenging the Maryland State Programmatic General Permit, Letter from Jan
Goldman-Carter, Counsel Representing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n to Togo D. West, Sec'y of the
Army, William M. Daley, Sec'y of Commerce, Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, Carol
Browner, Administrator, Envtl. Protection Agency, and Jane Nishida, Sec'y, Md. Dep't of
the Env't (Apr. 22, 1997) (detailing the National Wildlife Federation's opposition to the
Maryland State Programmatic General Permit).
61. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201 (1996); Maryland General Permit, supra note
60, app. at 1-24, 1-31. Along sheltered waters, the state encourages property owners to
control erosion by planting vegetation. For this purpose, one can fill up to 35 feet seaward
of mean high water. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-202(a) (3) (iii) (Supp. 1997). Along
Chesapeake Bay and other waters with significant waves, hard structures are generally em-
ployed. See Interview with Rick Ayella, Director, Md. Dep't of the Env't, Tidal Waters Divi-
sion (Oct. 10, 1996) (on file with author).
62. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. . 16-202(a) (2).
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ters in order to reclaim any land that the owner has lost since the early
1970s.
63
3. Coastal Erosion and Rising Sea Level.-Although some shores
are accreting, coastal erosion is far more common.6 4 The average
ocean shore along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts is eroding two and
four feet per year, respectively.6 5 Although most of California's coast
is not eroding, about fifteen percent of it is eroding by at least five feet
per year.6 6 National assessments of wetland erosion are unavailable,
but assessments of particular areas,67 and informal opinions of profes-
sional observers, suggest that estuarine shores are generally eroding
as well. Blackwater National Wildlife Refuge on Maryland's Eastern
Shore has lost about half of its wetlands in the last fifty years,6 9 as
shown in Figure 3.
Coastal erosion is caused by a variety of factors, which broadly fall
into two categories. First, sand often migrates along the shore, caus-
ing some areas to erode and others to accrete."v Second, rising sea
63. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201.
64. See MARINE BOARD REPORT, supra note 19, at 46-51 (discussing the prevalence of
erosion along sandy coasts).
65. Id. at 50.
66. See id. (reporting that standard deviation of erosion rate is 1.5m/yr.). Assuming
that erosion rates are normally distributed, then about 16% of the shores are eroding more
rapidly than 1.5m/yr. See RONALD J. WONNACoTr & THOMAS H. WONNACOTr,
ECONOMETRICS 418 tbl.4 (1970) (presenting a table of standard normal distribution).
67. See, e.g., Michael S. Kearney & J. Court Stevenson, Sea Level Rise and Marsh Vertical
Accretion Rates in Chesapeake Bay, in 2 COASTAL ZONE '85, at 1451, 1456 tbl.1 (Orville T.
Magoon et al. eds., 1985) (stating that the area of marsh in the Blackwater National Wild-
life Refuge declined 59.2% between 1938 and 1985).
68. Personal communications with employees of the majority of state coastal zone pro-
grams confirm that estuarine shores are eroding. Memorandum from ICF Kaiser, Inc. to
Jim Titus, Work Assignment Manager, Envtl. Protection Agency (Oct. 31, 1996) [hereinaf-
ter ICF Kaiser] (deliverable under EPA contract #68-W6-0056).
69. Kearney & Stevenson, supra note 67, at 1456 tbl.1.
70. Natural headlands tend to erode and sand tends to collect in some types of inden-
tations along the coast. Jetties and other structures also tend to trap sand. See Timothy W.
Kana et al., The Physical Impact of Sea Level Rise in the Area of Charleston, South Carolina, in
GREENHOUSE EFFcr AND SEA LEVEL RISE, supra note 35, at 105, 109 (noting that jetties at
the entrance to Charleston Harbor have caused up to 300 meters of deposition to the
north and extensive erosion to the south, including over 500 meters of erosion along Mor-
ris Island).
One observer notes:
Since the stabilization of Ocean City Inlet with jetties in 1934-35, there has been a
pronounced alteration of the adjacent shorelines for several miles in each direc-
tion. Updrift of the jetties at south Ocean City, a large amount of sedimentation
.... has necessitated the lengthening of the Ocean City fishing pier, and the
north jetty is now impounded to capacity.... Since little of this sand is bypassing
Ocean City Inlet, the northern portion of Assateague Island is being starved of
sediment and pushed landward.
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FIGURE 3
THE CONVERSION OF MARSH TO OPEN WATER AT BLACKWATER
NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE IN DORCESTER COUNTY, MARYLAND
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Source: Court Stevenson, University of Maryland. The shape of the refuge has changed
slightly due to land acquisitions. Because the boundaries of the individual trapping units
have not changed, the extent of the wetland loss is most evident to the reader who com-
pares the conditions of a given trapping unit in 1938 with the condition in 1980. Although
a more recent map is not available, the loss has continued, according to Court Stevenson.
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level causes virtually all shores to erode. 7 1 As shown in Figure 4, sea
level has risen approximately one foot in the last century along most
of the U.S. coast. Using a model first developed by Danish coastal
engineer Per Bruun, coastal geologists have estimated that a one-
meter rise in sea level will cause beaches to erode 50 to 100 meters
from New England to Maryland, 200 meters along the Carolinas, 100
to 1000 meters along the Florida coast, and 200 to 400 meters along
the California coast.7 2 These model calculations are roughly consis-
tent with the observed rate of erosion.
7 3
Recognizing the value of ocean beaches, states have taken a vari-
ety of measures to protect them. Densely developed resorts periodi-
cally pump sand onto their beaches-a process known as beach
nourishment.7 4 While expensive, this engineering solution permits
the continued existence of the beach in approximately its current lo-
cation.7 5 In lightly developed areas, where beach nourishment is
often too expensive, states focus on preventing structures that impede
the natural erosion of the shore: Texas courts recognize the public
beach as a rolling easement that migrates inland with the shore.7 6
North Carolina and many other states prohibit new seawalls and bulk-
Stephen P. Leatherman, Geomorphic Effects of Sea Level Rise on Ocean City, Maryland, in JAMES
G. TITUS ET AL., POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE BEACH AT OCEAN CITY, MARY-
LAND 33, 37 (1985) (citations omitted).
71. MARINE BOARD REPORT, supra note 19, at 53-57 (discussing the Bruun Rule's dem-
onstration that rising sea level causes sandy beaches to erode). There are two important
exceptions: Rocky coasts with no protective beach may not erode, and shores that would
otherwise be accreting may simply accrete more slowly as sea level rises. Id. at 57.
72. Holding Back the Sea, supra note 32, at 178 (summarizing studies by Kyper & Soren-
sen, Leatherman, Kana et al., Bruun, and Wilcoxen, respectively).
73. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the rates of erosion along
the Atlantic, Gulf, and California coasts).
74. See MARINE BOARD REPORT, supra note 19, at 75-79 (discussing the uses of beach
nourishment).
75. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, supra note 7, at 47 (noting that beach nourishment
is now accepted as the primary means of shore protection). Beach nourishment is the
approach that the State of Maryland and the Corps of Engineers are using to stop Ocean
City's shore from eroding. Personal Communication with John Van Fossen, supra note 24.
The State employed this method partly because rising sea level prompted a shift away from
the hard structures that were favored until the mid-1980s. Larry Rosenthal, Doubled Erosion
Seen for Ocean City Series: P, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1985, at M7, available in 1985 INIL
2084622. States with relatively strict coastal land-use policies tend to rely less on beach
nourishment. For example, of $670 million in total expenditures for federal beach nour-
ishment projects during 1950-1993, only $8 million was spent in South Carolina. U.S. ARMv
CORPS OF ENG'RS, supra note 7, at 37-38.
76. See infta notes 398-399 and accompanying text (discussing how Texas courts have
recognized the beach as a rolling easement, because otherwise, the area of public access
would eventually disappear as the shore erodes).
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U.S. Sea Level Trends: 1900-97
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Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
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heads.77 Several states require new construction to be set back from
the shore by forty to one-hundred times the annual rate of erosion .7
Maine employs all of these approaches.7 9  These policies, coupled
with the high cost of holding back the ocean, seem likely to ensure
the survival of ocean beaches in all but a few locations.
The response to bay-beach erosion is very different. Beach nour-
ishment along these shores is exceedingly rare."' Because the seas are
relatively calm, bulkheads are able to hold back the bay and are much
less expensive than the seawalls that are needed to hold back the
ocean."' Bayfront developments usually provide no public access to
the shore, so officials tend not to think of the bay shore as a commu-
nity asset.8 2 As a result, estuarine shores are gradually being armored
in most developed areas.8 3
77. See infra notes 400, 404, 407 and accompanying text (detailing state regulations that
prohibit new erosion control structures within certain zones of the ocean coast).
78. See COMMITTEE ON COASTAL EROSION ZONE MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, MANAGING COASTAL EROSION 94-98 (1990) (discussing different types of state re-
quirements for erosion setbacks for new construction).
79. See MARINE LAw INST., MAINE STATE PLANNING OFFICE & MAINE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
ANTICIPATORY PLANNING FOR SEA-LEVEL RISE ALONG THE COAST OF MAINE 5-5, 5-6 (1994)
(100 year setback for new construction); id. at 5-9 (removal of a structure if a wetland
encroaches up to the structure for six months or more); id. at 5-8 (prohibition of new
seawalls).
80. A notable exception is Mississippi, where the barrier islands are undeveloped and
the primary beach resorts are along the bays behind the barrier islands. There, the public
has access to most of the bay shoreline. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, supra note 7, at 43
(showing that Corps of Engineers projects have placed 5.7 million cubic yards of sand
along Mississippi shores); Laura S. Howorth & Sondra Simpson, Sea Level Rise: Policy Impli-
cations for the Mississippi Coast, in LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS OF SEA LEVEL CHANGE FOR THE
MISSISSIPPI AND ALABAMA COASTLINES 18, 20 (David D. Burrage ed., 1990) (noting that most
of Mississippi's beaches are "man-made").
81. Compare Robert M. Sorensen et al., Control of Erosion, Inundation and Salinity Intru-
sion Caused by Sea Level Rise, in GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND SEA LEVEL RISE, supra note 35, at
179, 188 (noting that seawalls used along shores with large waves can cost $3000 per foot or
more) with id. at 191-92, 195-97 (stating that bulkheads and revetments used along inland
waters cost about $125-$300 per foot). Bulkheads are vertical structures that are usually
made of wood that can stop erosion in calm waters but not in the face of substantial waves.
Id. at 195-97. Revetments are sloped structures generally made of rock that can withstand
greater wave forces. Id. at 191-92. Seawalls are vertical walls that can withstand ocean
waves. Id. at 195. Along Chesapeake Bay, revetments comprise the vast majority of new
erosion control structures. See WETLANDS ADMIN., STATE OF MD., REPORT ON TIDAL WET-
LANDS ACTIVITIES AND LICENSES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 3 (1993).
82. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The lack of perpendicular access to the
shore and the lack of public concern over the status of estuarine shores are probably mutu-
ally reinforcing. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
83. ICF Kaiser, supra note 68, at 3. Although the gradual armoring of estuarine shores
is self-evident along eroding shores developed more than 20 years ago, no one has con-
ducted a comprehensive assessment of estuarine shoreline armoring. See id. at 1. An EPA
contractor that contacted each of the state coastal zone offices found that two-thirds of the
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Nevertheless, attitudes about the need to maintain natural estua-
rine shorelines vary among the states. At one extreme are Rhode Is-
land and Maine, which prohibit, to some extent, the erection of
bulkheads inland of wetlands, because these structures would prevent
wetland migration. 4 At the other extreme is Maryland, where some
scientists, and many officials, believe that the elimination of natural
shores may be good for Chesapeake Bay.8 5 Currently, Maryland rec-
ognizes a statutory right to hold back the sea, 6 and fifteen to twenty-
five miles per year have been armored over the last two decades.8 7
states had no data. Id. at 2-3. Nevertheless, the state officials were able to provide the
following estimates of shoreline armoring: California (San Francisco Bay)-66% of the
shoreline; Mississippi-42.4 miles of the shoreline; North Carolina-no data, but armoring
is a standard practice; Rhode Island-very little armoring of the shoreline; Texas-most
privately developed bay shores were armored; Virginia part of Chesapeake Bay-19% of
the 383 miles of shoreline was armored, and armoring was increasing by about 1.2 miles
per year; Washington State-30% of Puget Sound's shoreline was armored, and 4-5 miles
of armoring was added each year. Id. at 3-5 app. 1-7; see also infra Appendix 2 (showing that
permits were issued for armoring nearly 330 miles of the Maryland shoreline during 1978-
1994).
84. See infra notes 406, 416 and accompanying text (explaining that Rhode Island and
Maine have prohibited hard structures specifically so that wetlands can migrate inland as
sea level rises).
85. Michael Kearney of the University of Maryland believes that shoreline erosion may
be responsible for about 50% of the new sediment entering the Bay. Personal Communi-
cation with Michael Kearney, Geography Dep't, University of Md. (Feb. 20, 1997). The
turbidity caused by sediments decreases the amount of sunlight that is able to penetrate
the water to support the photosynthesis of submerged aquatic vegetation. CHESAPEAKE BAY
PROGRAM, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE STATE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY 22 (Robert
Magnien et al. eds., 1995). The proponents of shoreline hardening argue that natural
erosion did not cause excess turbidity several decades ago, because the oysters filtered all
the water in the Bay every three days, but that today only enough oysters exist to filter the
water every 10 months. See Roger I.E. Newell, Ecological Changes in Chesapeake Bay: Are They
the Result of Overharvesting the American Oyster, Crassostrea Virginica?, in UNDERSTANDING THE
ESTUARY. ADVANCES IN CHESAPEAKE BAY RESEARCH 536 (Maurice P. Lynch & Elizabeth C.
Krome eds., 1988) (estimating a decline of oyster filtration, but not addressing the shore-
line hardening issue). Others argue that natural erosion has always existed, that turbidity
is a problem of the last few decades, and that increased sedimentation was caused by
changes in land use that promoted soil erosion throughout the watershed. Personal Com-
munication with Michael Kearney, supra. Even if shore erosion caused 50% of the new
sediment in the Bay, a large fraction of the turbidity is caused by resuspension of sediment
from the floor of the Bay and its tributaries. Id.
86. See infra note 402 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Appendix 2. Maryland's high rate of shoreline armoring may result more
from the state's unique history than from environmental insensitivity. See Board of Pub.
Works v. Larmar Corp., 277 A.2d 427, 431-37 (Md. 1971) (summarizing the history of ripar-
ian rights in Maryland). An 1862 statute granted a riparian owner the right to fill naviga-
ble waters in Maryland, "limited only to the extent that he could not obstruct navigation."
Id. at 436 (citing 1862 Md. Laws ch. 129). Today, riparian owners in Maryland have a
statutory right to hold back the sea and reclaim land lost by erosion since the early 1970s.
See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201 (1996). This right is much more favorable to the
property owner and less favorable to the environment and the public than the law in most
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Most states allow bulkheads where they are necessary to protect
property, but they have not formally granted a right to hold back the
sea.88 When bulkheads are built inland of a marsh, with the land be-
hind them raised a few feet with fill, there is still marsh seaward of the
bulkhead. At that point, the state has not given away the shore. Later,
when the marsh erodes up to the bulkhead, the state can say: "'Twas
the sea, not we, who did the tidelands in."89 Only Maryland has pub-
lished estimates of the total amount of shoreline that has been
armored. 90
4. Greenhouse Effect and Accelerated Sea Level Rise.--A less immedi-
ate but ultimately more serious concern is that rising global tempera-
tures resulting from the greenhouse effect could raise the sea several
more feet. Scientists have known for more than a century9' that car-
bon dioxide and some other gases keep the earth warmer than it
would otherwise be, by absorbing infrared radiation that emanates
from the earth's surface. 92 The average concentration of carbon diox-
ide has increased from around 280 parts per million before the indus-
trial revolution, to 315 parts per million when precise monitoring
stations were set up in 1958, and to 358 parts per million in 1994.93
The earth's average surface temperature has increased by about 0.3 to
0.6 degrees Celsius in the last century.9 4 Assuming that no major ac-
tion is enacted to curtail the use of fossil fuels, the earth's average
temperature is projected to rise 1.0 to 3.5 degrees Celsius in the next
century-.9 5
states. See infra Part IV. But by repealing the longstanding right to fill most tidal waters, see
Larmar Corp., 277 A.2d at 440, the existing law is much more favorable to the environment
and the public interest than the riparian rights that had prevailed for the previous century.
88. See infra notes 394-405 and accompanying text.
89. Similarly, the federal wedand protection program prevents most wetlands from be-
ing filled, but it does not enable their migration inland as the sea erodes their outer
boundaries. Personal Communication with Gregory Peck, Office of Wetland Protection,
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (Dec. 1995); see also POTEmNriA EL'rcrs OF GLOBAL CIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 17, at 142 ("Section 404 of the Clean Water Act discourages develop-
ment of existing wetlands, but it does not address development of areas that might one day
be necessary for wetland migration.").
90. See infra Appendix 2.
91. See Jesse H. Ausubel, Historical Note, in CARBON DIOXIDE ASSESSMENT COMM., NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CHANGING CLIMATE: REPORT OF THE CARBON DIOXIDE ASSESS-
MENT COMMITTEE 488 (1983) (citing pre-1900 studies about the implications of rising
carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere).
92. See IPCC 1995, supra note 2, at 56-60 (discussing the general effect of greenhouse
gases).
93. See id. at 78.
94. Id. at 4.
95. Id. at 6.
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Since 1983, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
been warning coastal states and communities about the risks of rising
sea level.96 EPA's first study crudely estimated that sea level could rise
two to twelve feet by the year 2100. 9 7 From 1985 to 1991, EPA-spon-
sored publications generally projected that global temperatures would
rise four degrees Celsius by the year 2060, causing a four-foot rise in
sea level by the year 2100.98 More recent refinements in climate mod-
eling suggest that the global warming will only be about half as great.
As a result, sea level estimates have come down as well.99
With these refinements, scientists can now estimate a probability
distribution of future sea level rise. For purposes of valuing interests
in land that depend on the risk of the land being inundated, the use
of probability information is helpful. The value of an easement that
vests when the sea rises two feet, for example, would depend greatly
on how likely such a rise is to occur by various years. Table 1 shows
EPA's most recent estimates for sea level rise at New York City. EPA
estimates a 50% chance that sea level will rise one foot by 2050, two
feet by 2100, and four feet by 2200, as well as a one-in-forty chance
that the sea will rise 1.5 feet by 2050, 3.5 feet by 2100, and over 11 feet
by 2200.100
What are the expected impacts? At first, most of the major effects
would concern wetlands and property along the shore. Most water-
front homes are within 100 to 200 feet of the high water mark, and
most shores erode 100 to 200 feet for every foot of sea level rise. 01
Thus, a one-foot rise would force officials to choose between moving
these houses and replacing the tidelands with a wall.
Larger rises in sea level would have a potential to inundate much
larger areas. A four-foot rise could bring the sea several miles inland
96. In the 1980s, EPA sponsored numerous conferences and sent form letters to ap-
proximately 50,000 coastal officials, scientists, and active citizens briefly explaining the im-
pact of rising sea level and offering reports on the subject. As a result, property owners
may have been constructively notified that the sea is rising.
97. JOHN S. HorrsAN ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PROJECTING FUTURE SEA
LEVEL RISE: METHODOLOGY, ESTIMATES TO THE YEAR 2100, & RESEARCH NEEDS 38 (2d ed.
1983).
98. EPA 1995, supra note 2, at 139 & n.12.
99. See id. at 135-38 (explaining that estimates of sea level rise have declined primarily
because the warming estimates have declined).
100. These estimates are consistent with the nonprobabilistic projections published by
an international collaboration of scientists organized under the United Nations. See IPCC
1995, supra note 2, at 381 (estimating that global sea level is likely to rise 20 to 86 cm by the
year 2100).
101. See Holding Back the Sea, supra note 32, at 178 (citing various studies of erosion due
to sea level rise in the United States).
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TABLE 1
PROJECTED SEA LEVEL RISE AT NEW YORK CITv
FOR VARIOUS PROBABILITIES
(Compared with 1990 Levels (inches))
Sea Level Projection by Year
Cumulative
Probability 2025 2050 2075 2100 2150 2200
10 3 6 9 12 18 24
20 4 8 11 16 23 31
30 5 9 13 18 27 37
40 5 10 15 20 31 42
50 6 10 16 22 34 48
60 6 11 17 24 38 53
70 7 12 18 26 43 61
80 7 13 20 29 49 72
90 8 15 24 33 59 91
95 9 17 26 38 70 113
97.5 10 19 29 42 83 139
99 11 20 31 48 100 181
Mean 6 11 16 22 37 54
C 6 10 15 21 36 54
SOURCES: (1) JAMES G. Trrus & VIJAY K NARAYANAN, U.S. ENVrL. PROTECrION AGENCY,
THE PROBABILrrY OF SEA LEVEL RiSE 144-45 (1995). (2) James G. Titus & Vijay Narayanan,
The Risk of Sea Level Rise: A Delphic Monte Carlo Analysis in Which Twenty Researchers Specify
Subjective Probability Distributions for Model Coefficients Within Their Respective Areas of Expertise,
33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 151, 206 (1996). The estimates in this table are based on the data
and procedures found on page 145 of the EPA report. Cumulative probability refers to the
likelihood that the sea will rise less than the amount indicated in the table. For example,
there is a 95 percent chance that the sea will rise less than 38 inches by 2100.
in some areas and would inundate 7000 square miles of dry land-an
area the size of Massachusetts.10 2 In most developed areas, holding
back the sea would be cost-effective,10 3 but it would prevent new wet-
lands from forming in the newly inundated area. For example, if
shores are not armored, a two-foot rise in sea level would decrease
U.S. wetland acreage by 17% to 43%, but if shores are protected, the
loss would be 38% to 61%.1°4 These estimates may understate the
impact, because estuarine beaches and the narrow strips of vegetated
102. See id. at 187.
103. See id. at 189, 190.
104. Id. at 190. For example, a nationwide computer modeling study found that a 2.8-
foot rise in sea level would result in virtually a total loss of the existing wetlands at two sites
along Chesapeake Bay, but the net loss would be only 25% if new wetlands were able to
form inland. Armentano et al., supra note 37, at 130-39.
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wetlands found along many shores could be entirely lost. 10 5 As a re-
sult, "protecting all mainland shores could result in wetlands being
confined to a small number of isolated reserves, a situation that hu-
manity has already imposed on many terrestrial species. '16
A consensus is emerging that Maryland is particularly vulnerable
to rising sea level. 10 7 Because Chesapeake Bay has a tidal range of
approximately two feet, its coastal wetlands are generally within one or
two feet of sea level. l'0 Farmers in Somerset County are already re-
porting a gradual loss of arable land as the bay water penetrates in-
land, leaving soils too salty for cultivation. 0 9 In the next century,
rising seas could entirely inundate Smith Island and eliminate its
unique subculture of watermen who have populated that island for
over three centuries." 0 As Figure 5 shows, shores could retreat inland
by a few miles in parts of Somerset, Dorchester, and Worcester
counties.
Maryland's current coastal zone and environmental protection
policies, statutes, and regulations would ensure almost complete elimi-
nation of the state's bay beaches and coastal wetlands in developed
areas. The narrow dimensions of bay beaches and the low wetland
elevations imply that a very modest rise in sea level would remove
these ecosystems from their current locations."' The state's recogni-
tion of a right to protect shores with hard structures1 2 will prevent
these ecosystems from migrating inland. The lack of public access to
most shores, combined with the absence of a policy to create access to
105. See NORDSTROM, supra note 5, at 6 (stating that beaches are generally less than 5
meters (16 feet) wide along narrow estuaries with small tidal ranges, and upwards of 20
meters (75 feet) wide along large estuaries with large tidal ranges); supra note 72 and
accompanying text (explaining that most shores will erode more than 100 feet with a one-
foot rise in sea level).
106. Holding Back the Sea, supra note 32, at 201.
107. See Conference Statement: Changing Climate, Rising Sea Level, and Chesapeake Bay: Ques-
tions and Answers 2 (1996) (visited Aug. 21, 1998) <http://www.climate.org/conferences/
ChesapeakeConfStatement.html> (summarizing a conference of approximately 140 scien-
tists, property owners, and governmental officials who met to discuss the implications of
rising sea level and climate change for Chesapeake Bay).
108. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
109. Conference Statement, supra note 107, at 2.
110. Id.
111. See supra note 104 (discussing a model that indicates that a 2.8-foot rise in sea level
could result in virtually a total loss of the existing wetlands at two sites along the Chesa-
peake Bay); cf supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing a different model that
indicates that a one-foot rise in sea level will cause beaches in Maryland to erode 50 to 100
feet).
112. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201 (1996) (allowing a property owner to hold
back the sea and reclaim land lost by erosion); supra note 87 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Maryland's statutes concerning shoreline armoring).
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FiGURE 5
MARYLAND'S VULNERABILITY TO A RISE IN SEA LEVEL
V
5 below 5 ft
S5-o10 ft
iabove l0 ft
20 mie
This map shows the land that is below the 5-foot and 10-foot contours. The 5-foot contour,
for example, is 5 feet above the 1929 sea level. Given the typical 2-foot tidal range and the
8-inch rise in sea level taking place since 1929, these contours represent the land that
would be inundated by high tide if sea level were to rise 3-1/2 and 8-1/2 feet, respectively.
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inaccessible shores,1 13 will help to ensure that the public does not
even comment on permits to eliminate those shores.
B. Possible Options to Protect Natural Shores
Society has two fundamental ways to retain its wetlands and
beaches as sea level rises: (1) use technology to enable the shore to
keep pace with the rising sea level, or (2) allow nature to take its
course and adapt to the retreating shores. The most common tech-
nology is to add sand directly to a beach, thereby raising its eleva-
tion.'14 This process is commonly employed along ocean shores-
generally at public expense. 115 Estuarine beaches, by contrast, are
rarely nourished, and the technology for artificially elevating wetlands
is still in its infancy." 6
Allowing nature to take its course appears at first glance to be a
more straightforward approach. But private property owners gener-
ally do not wish to give up their homes or even their land-especially
along estuarine shores, where they can hold back the sea with a bulk-
head for a small fraction of the value of the land or structures that
would otherwise be lost. Thus, if society wants to retain its natural
shorelines, then governments will have to induce property owners to
yield their land to the sea.
Previous analyses have suggested several different policies for en-
suring that human activities do not impede the natural inland migra-
tion of shorelines as sea level rises.11 7 These approaches generally fall
into three categories:
1. Prevent Development or otherwise decrease the property owner's
economic motivation to hold back the sea;" 8
113. See supra notes 48-49 (discussing Maryland's lack of a policy providing access to
most of the shores of Chesapeake Bay).
114. See supra notes 74-75 (discussing the process of beach nourishment).
115. See COMMITTEE ON COASTAL EROSION ZONE MANAGEMENT, supra note 78, at 56-57
(explaining the beach nourishment process).
116. See LOUISIANA WETLAND PROTECTION PANEL, supra note 37, at 51 (discussing a rela-
tively new technique that involves periodic spraying of sediment on the marsh to help
increase the rate of accretion).
117. See POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 17, at 141-42 (out-
lining different approaches to preserve wetland shorelines as sea level rises); James G.
Titus, Greenhouse Effect and Coastal Wetland Policy: How Americans Could Abandon an Area the
Size of Massachusetts at Minimum Cost, 15 ENVrL. MGMT. 39, 44-46 (1991) [hereinafter Coastal
Wetland Policy] (same). For the first legal analysis of these options, see Robert L. Fischman,
Global Warming and Property Interests: Preserving Coastal Wetlands as Sea Levels Rise, 19 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 565, 570-74 (1991).
118. See 1 OFCE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PREPARING FOR AN UNCERTAIN
CLIMATE 199-204 (1993) (analyzing the effects of denying governmental subsidies such as
infrastructure, flood insurance, mortgage insurance, and the income tax deduction for
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2. Create Rolling Easements, a policy that allows development, but
explicitly prevents property owners from holding back the sea;119 and
3. Defer Action, continue current policies, and deal with the prob-
lem later.
Each of these policies can, in turn, be subdivided according to
whether the government or the property owner absorbs the loss. Ta-
ble 2 lists a number of examples for implementing each of the general
approaches. The following sections briefly examine how these ap-
proaches might work for areas that are currently undeveloped.
121
1. Preventing Development.--Policy makers have two ways to de-
crease a property owner's motivation to erect a bulkhead: (1) in-
crease the cost, or (2) decrease the benefit of erecting such a
structure. Perhaps the most important way by which governments
have increased the cost (to property owners) of these structures has
been to reduce the subsidies for their construction.12 1 Removing sub-
sidies for development can decrease the incentive to build homes that
might later require protection.122 On the other hand, subsidized
beach nourishment has decreased the need to build seawalls along
mortgage interest payments, and concluding that while these strategies could discourage
development, they would not necessarily prevent it).
119. Previous reports have used inconsistent terminology to describe this idea. See id. at
192 ("The 'Maine Approach'"); Fischman, supra note 117, at 574 ("bulkhead prohibi-
tions"); Lisa A. St. Amand, Sea Level Rise and Coastal Wetlands: Opportunities for a Peaceful
Migration, 19 B.C. ENvrL. AFi. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) ("presumed mobility"); Holding Back the
Sea, supra note 32, at 182 fig.6 ("Enforce Public Trust Doctrine"); Coastal Wetland Policy,
supra note 117, at 44 ("presumed mobility");James G. Titus, Greenhouse Effect, Sea Level Rise,
and Coastal Zone Management, 14 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 147, 166 (1986) ("in effect,
purchase an option").
120. This Article focuses on coastal lands that are undeveloped today, because in areas
that are already developed, setbacks are generally inapplicable, and plans to allow shores to
retreat are likely to be politically infeasible. For example, the primary coastal policy docu-
ment authorized by the Governor of NewJersey suggested that even mentioning the term
"retreat" would divide people and impede meaningful discussion of appropriate policies.
See COASTAL REPORT TASK FORCE, NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, NEW JERSEY
COASTAL REPORT: A FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT FOR A COASTAL MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP 19
(1997) ("The mere use of the word serves to divide people .... '[R]etreat' can mean
government-imposed prohibition on construction or reconstruction of oceanfront devel-
opment .... [which] often fuels the divisive 'retreat' debate . . ").
121. Until the early 1990s, for example, Maryland offered interest-free loans to anyone
who built a bulkhead or revetment to control erosion. Interview with Rick Ayella, supra
note 61.
122. The Coastal Barrier Resources Act curtails federal expenditures and financial assist-
ance that would encourage further development of designated coastal areas. See 16 U.S.C
§§ 3501-3510 (1994). Until its repeal, the Upton-Jones Amendments of the National Flood
Insurance Program denied federal flood insurance to homes that are about to collapse
into the sea due to erosion, and authorized subsidies for the removal of these homes to
other locations. See 42 U.S.C. § 4013(c) (2) (B) (repealed 1994).
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TABLE 2
POLICIES TO PROTECT TIDELANDS AS SEA LEVEL RISES
(a) Taxpayers Pay (b) Coastal Landowners Pay
A. Protecting Tidelands
1. Prevent Development Buy land now. Subdivide land with deeper lots.
Buy Setbacks that prohibit new
nondevelopment construction below a given
easement now. elevation or within a certain
distance of the shore. Dedicate
land as part of permit for coastal
development.
2. Defer Action Buy land and Evict people from their homes.
structures when
property
threatened.
3. Rolling Easements Buy Texas rolling Pass a statute declaring that all
easements. Buy future development is subject to
reversionary the rolling easement. Prohibit
interest. Buy bulkheads, seawalls, etc. Require
purchase option. individual structures to be subject
to rolling easement as condition
for building permit. Require
entire development to be subject
to rolling easement as condition
for subdivision, or for activities
that require wetlands to be filled.
Texas Open Beaches Act.
4. Hybrids Density Restrictions (1 & 2).
Cluster Developments (1 & 2).
Maine Dune Rules (1, 2, & 3).
South Carolina Beachfront
Management Act (1 & 3).
B. Protecting Future Alongshore Access When Bulkheads Are Built Today
1. Immediate Buy easement to Dedicate easement above bulkhead
Dedication narrow strip as condition for bulkhead permit.
above bulkhead.
2. Defer Dedication Give shoreline to Wait until beach erodes away,
owner today and then require owners to dedicate
buy back easement above bulkhead.
easement later.
3. One-Step Easement Buy access right Grant bulkhead permit on
that vests only condition of public access along
when shore shore above bulkhead once shore
erodes away land below bulkhead has eroded.
below bulkhead.
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ocean shores123 and would presumably have the same effect if applied
along estuarine shores. Nevertheless, these measures are unlikely to
reduce substantially the nationwide rate of bulkhead construction
along estuarine shores. Even without subsidies, riparian owners in
many areas continue to erect bulkheads, and no state is considering a
comprehensive program of beach nourishment along estuarine
shores.1
2 4
Policies that prevent development also decrease the benefits of
building bulkheads, and such policies can conserve natural shorelines
in a wider variety of situations.1 25 The most common way to prevent
development in vulnerable areas is to require a "setback," which pro-
hibits construction seaward of a setback line.1 26 Setbacks can be based
on elevation, erosion rates, or estimates of how the shore might
change in the future.1 27 Land subdivision policies requiring deeper
lots along the shore can help to ensure that setbacks do not leave
shorefront owners without permissible building sites. Building codes
can require houses to be moveable or small.128
Setbacks and other development restrictions can protect natural
shores for two reasons. First, they may reduce the value of the vulner-
able land below the point where the land is worth protecting from the
sea. For example, if an owner has a large lot and the setback requires
her to build her house at the landward edge of the lot, the setback,
123. See U.S. AiosY CoPs oF ENG'RS, supra note 7, at 37-46 (providing data on 56 feder-
ally funded beach nourishment projects).
124. See ICF Kaiser, supra note 68, at 3-4 (discussing how different states are currently
managing coastal erosion).
125. In developed areas, the analogous restriction would be regulations that prevent
redevelopment or reconstruction of storm-damaged houses. See MARINE LAw INsr. ET AL.,
supra note 79, at 5-6 to 5-7 (discussing the Maine Coastal Sand Dune Rules' requirement
for a permit to rebuild a house that is more than 50% damaged by a storm, and speculat-
ing that such a permit may be difficult to obtain); see also infra note 266 and accompanying
text; cf 1 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 118, at 180 (discussing a federal program
that purchases storm damaged properties "to break the damage-rebuild-damage cycle that
accounts for many damage claims" submitted to the federal flood insurance program).
126. See 1 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 118, at 187 (listing 15 states and
territories that have implemented setbacks).
127. See COMMITTEE ON COASTAL EROSION ZONE MANAGEMENT, supra note 78, at 62-64
(discussing how coastal states have applied various setback requirements).
128. See MARNE LAw INST. ET AL., supra note 79, at 5-8 to 5-9 (explaining that Maine's
regulations discourage the construction of large buildings in areas that will be affected by a
three-foot rise in sea level, but do not prevent construction of small structures "based on
the assumption that the smaller structures are moveable, and would be moved if
threatened by coastal erosion").
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from the owner's perspective, may reduce the value of the seaward
land to zero.129
Second, these restrictions may prevent the owner from increasing
the value enough to make the land worth protecting. Consider a pro-
posed $100,000 house on a $20,000 agricultural lot, for which a bulk-
head costs $40,000. Once the house is built, the combined $120,000
property is worth protecting, but if a setback prevents construction,
the land alone may not be worth protecting.13 ° Alternatively, if the
house is built, but is designed so that it can be moved for $5000, the
land may still not be worth protecting.' 31
Policies that prevent development in areas vulnerable to erosion
have generally been implemented through regulations that do not
compensate landowners. 13 2 At least conceptually, the mechanics of
such policies would be essentially the same if the government com-
pensated property owners by purchasing nondevelopment ease-
ments. 13 3  In some cases, governments might choose simply to
purchase coastal lands, thereby achieving other objectives as well, e.g.,
preserving natural habitat.
129. For example, having a shorter walk to (or better view of) the water may be as valua-
ble to the owner as having a larger backyard.
130. In this case, the setback does not reduce the market value of the land. In either
event, it is $20,000.
131. In this case, the homeowner is better off by spending $20,000 for a new lot plus
$5000 to move the house than spending $40,000 for the bulkhead.
132. Setbacks have sometimes been challenged as takings without compensation. See
infra Part III (discussing the successful challenge of the South Carolina setback). But see
COMMITTEE ON COASTAL ERosiON ZONE MANAGEMENT, supra note 78, at 99 ("States rarely
have been challenged for a taking of property when imposing erosion setback
regulations.").
133. Such easements could be purchased either with cash or transferable development
rights, i.e., the right to develop other properties more intensely than would otherwise be
the case. For simplicity of exposition, this discussion assumes that states either compensate
everyone or compensate no one. Nevertheless, some states might benefit from implement-
ing a hybrid in which some, but not all, property owners are compensated. For example,
South Carolina has a 40-year setback along its ocean coast, but the courts have required the
State to compensate owners whose lots fell entirely seaward of the setback. To avoid this
compensation, the State decided to allow development in those cases. See infra Part III.
If a state develops a policy to minimize shoreline armoring along its bay shores, how-
ever, the different circumstances might lead the legislature to conclude that the policy
would be undermined by exempting property completely seaward of the setback line. For
example, the legislature might decide that instead of protecting all of the coast with a 40-
year setback, it would be more realistic only to protect half of the state's estuarine shores,
but to ensure protection for at least 200 years. Such protection could leave the setback line
a mile from the shore in some areas. To avoid unfairness to owners in the protected area,
as well as takings challenges, the legislature might compensate those landowners.
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2. Rolling Easements.-A more narrowly tailored way to ensure
that natural shorelines survive rising sea level is simply to create a rule
to guarantee this result. This Article borrows the term "rolling ease-
ment" from the common law of Texas to describe a broad collection
of arrangements under which human activities are required to yield
the right of way to naturally migrating shores. 34 Rolling easements
can be implemented with (a) eminent domain purchases of options,
easements, covenants, or defeasible estates that transfer title if a bulk-
head is built or the sea rises by a certain degree, or (b) statutes that
accomplish the same result.13 5
The simplest way to implement rolling easements throughout a
state would be to prohibit bulkheads or any other structures that inter-
fere with naturally migrating shores.13 6 Another approach would be
for the government to purchase a property right to take possession of
privately owned land whenever the sea rises by a particular amount.1 37
Alternatively, the deed to the property could specify that the bound-
ary between publicly owned tidelands and the privately owned dryland
will migrate inland to the natural high water mark, whether or not
human activities artificially prevent the water from intruding. A gov-
ernment could also obtain a rolling easement by passing a statute that
simply "clarified" existing property law by stating that all coastal land
is subject to a rolling easement.1 3 8
Rolling easements might also be implemented on a more limited
geographical scale. For example, if the Corps of Engineers decided to
address the adverse environmental impact of armoring twenty miles of
shoreline along Chesapeake Bay, it might create a mitigation pro-
gram.1 39 Under the current approach, the Corps or the state might
calculate the total area of the wetlands that are lost-a narrow strip of
land twenty miles long and a few feet wide would only count as a few
134. Cf infra note 398 (discussing the term "rolling easement" as used in Texas).
135. See infra notes 414-418 (detailing states that have enacted rolling easement
policies).
136. See infra note 406 and accompanying text.
137. Such an interest might be characterized as the government's taking an executory
interest (or perhaps, because the King was the original owner of the land, as an implied
reserved possibility of reverter). See infra Part IV.
138. See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011(c) (West 1978 & Supp. 1998). The
common law of Texas already applied a rolling easement along the Gulf Coast; this statute
explicitly states that houses must be torn down as the shore approaches. See infta notes
414-415 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 230.1(d) (1997) (stating that the destruction of special aquatic
sites "may represent an irreversible loss of valuable aquatic resources"); 40 C.F.R. 230.10(d)
(granting permits to fill wetlands if the property owner mitigates the destruction); U.S.
Envtl. Protection Agency & U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, supra note 55, at 1 (discussing the
federal program for wetland mitigation).
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acres of wetlands.1 40 But the true impact of losing twenty miles of
beach and wetland shore is very different from the impact of losing a
few acres of marsh. Currently, governmental institutions only con-
sider the area of habitat lost, thereby devaluing the importance of long
narrow strips. 41  A rolling easement along twenty miles of shoreline,
by contrast, would ensure the preservation of the resource values that
are lost by armoring twenty miles of shoreline. 142 The private sector
could also play a role. For example, a land trust or an environmen-
tally concerned owner selling coastal property could retain a rolling
easement when selling the property, or donate the rolling easement
to a conservancy.
While recognizing that the mechanics of rolling easements would
vary, 143 Figure 6 illustrates a "wetland prototype policy" with the fol-
lowing characteristics:
* Bulkheads and any filling of privately owned land are pro-
hibited except to the extent necessary to keep the property
useful, e.g., to build a driveway.
e No one needs to abandon a house if it is safe and on pri-
vate property. Houses on high marsh would probably be
safe. 144 Those in front of an ocean dune would often be un-
safe or would interfere with preexisting easements.
140. Interview with Sandy Zelen, supra note 54 (discussing the mitigation process in
Maryland).
141. Id. ("The regulatory program is not always scientifically based. Mitigation offsets
are not always based on the science."). When enough scientific theory and research is put
before the Corps, however, the Corps can modify its policies to be consistent with the
science. Id.
142. Currently, small projects sometimes purchase credits for wetland mitigation from
wetand mitigation banks. Id. A "bank" might create 100 acres of wetlands and receive a
mitigation credit. See id. Individuals who obtain permits to fill small amounts of wetlands
then buy wetland mitigation credits from the bank to offset the wetlands they destroyed.
Id. An analogous procedure would be for someone to purchase a rolling easement along a.
suitable shoreline and then sell mitigation credits to people who armor shorelines. The
primary difference is that these mitigation credits would be measured according to the
shoreline length, rather than the area of wetlands filled. Cf infra notes 424-468 and ac-
companying text (discussing the unique opportunity offered by rolling easements for ac-
tions by the private sector).
143. This variation would occur because the rights of coastal property owners vary, and
because there are many ways by which rolling easements might be implemented. See supra
Part II.A.2, infra Part IV.
144. Owners often elevate coastal houses on pilings due to flood control regulations.
See, e.g., 44 C.F.R. § 9.11 (d) (2) (1997) (requiring new construction in coastal high-hazard
areas, when allowed, to be elevated on pilings); 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c) (2)-(3) (1997) (requir-
ing new structures to be elevated above the base flood level). The cost of a catwalk would
be similar to the cost of the bulkhead that must otherwise be built. Cf supra note 81
(discussing the costs of bulkheads). Rather than forcing an owner to leave her house, this
approach simply prevents engineering measures. People who like marshes displace those
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- During the first decade a house is on public land, no one
is forced out of the house, but the state charges rent.
This prototype simply preserves the existing allocation of rights. 145
High marsh and dry beach areas, for example, remain privately
owned.
The first significant impact of a rolling easement is that the
knowledge that the land might eventually have to be abandoned leads
an owner to avoid major capital expenditures to expand or otherwise
upgrade the home. 1 46 Later, this expectation leads the owner to avoid
major repairs (e.g., replacing roofs) in favor of stop-gap measures
(e.g., repairing leaky roofs).
Eventually the sea rises enough to flood the yard severely when-
ever an extremely high tide occurs. Without a rolling easement, the
homeowner would have the right to use fill to elevate the backyard,
and possibly to install a bulkhead as well. But the rolling easement
prevents these shore protection options, which would impair the abil-
ity of wetlands to migrate inland. To keep the property useful, the
homeowner is allowed to haul in gravel or otherwise elevate the drive-
way. When the sea rises enough for spring high tide to flood much of
the yard, high marsh vegetation takes over,' 4 7 but the property is still
privately owned. Assuming that the house is on pilings or otherwise
elevated, it continues to be useful.
Finally, if enough of the property is inundated by mean high tide
for the house to be on public land,' 48 the homeowner is free to move
who prefer lawns; eventually the combination of rent and tidal flooding may lead people to
leave voluntarily.
145. The reader may logically ask: Why not require houses to be removed when high
marsh takes over a lot? People currently have the right to build on private high marsh if
they do not fill it. Recently, the Corps has decided that owners of single-family homes can
even fill up to half an acre of high marsh. 60 Fed. Reg. 38,651, 38,662 (1995). The focus
of this Article is how to save the wetlands and beaches that are already in the public do-
main. There is a world of difference between ensuring that development does not cause a
contraction of that domain as shores erode, and expanding that domain inland to include
the high marsh, dry beach, and dunes. Setbacks expand the public domain as a means for
guarding against developmental encroachment, thereby raising suspicions as to whether
the inland expansion is actually the end and not merely the means. See infra Part III.A
(analyzing the Lucas case and the results from that particular setback). By contrast, rolling
easements can be tailored to expand, contract, or maintain existing public rights. Cf infra
Part II.B.5 (discussing a rolling easement that only protects public access). Hence, we
focus on a scenario in which existing public rights are maintained.
146. See fig.8.
147. See Kana et al., supra note 70, at 123-24, 130-34 (reporting that high marsh is found
in areas above mean high water but below mean spring high water); id. at 130-34 (showing
how Charleston-area wetlands could migrate inland as sea level rises).
148. In Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia, where the public
only owns up to mean low water, this scenario would not apply until the sea rises enough
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FIGURE 6
THE LANDWARD MIGRATION OF WETLANDS ONTO PROPERTY SUBJECT
TO A ROILING EASEMENT
TODAY +80 YEARS
+40 YEARS +100 YEARS
+60 YEARS
PRIVATE!
+120 YEARS
PUBLIC
Low Marsh
(a High Marsh
A rolling easement allows construction near to the shore, but requires the property owner
to recognize nature's right of way to advance inland as sea level rises. In this case, the high
marsh reaches the footprint of the house 40 years hence. Because the house is on pilings,
it can still be occupied (assuming that it is hooked to a sewerage treatment plant-a
flooded septic system would probably fail). After 60 years, the marsh has advanced enough
to require the owner to park the car along the street and construct a catwalk across the
front yard. After 80 years, the marsh has taken over the entire yard; moreover, the foot-
print of the house is now seaward of mean high water and hence on public property. At
this point, additional reinvestment in the property is unlikely, and the state might charge
rent for continued occupation of the home. Twenty years later, the particular house has
been removed, although other houses on the same street may still be occupied. Eventu-
ally, however, the entire area returns to nature.
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the house and clean up the site. Alternatively, the homeowner can
stay for a number of years and pay rent to the state, which owns the
land on which the house sits. To mitigate financial hardship, the an-
nual rent might start out at a fraction of its fair market value and
increase annually. This rent would generate the funds with which to
clean up the sites of houses that are abandoned.
One might also consider a beach prototype policy for property
along sandy beaches and relatively large bodies of water, where prop-
erty is more likely to be lost to erosion than to a gradual inundation
and conversion to marsh. As with the wetland prototype, the exist-
ence of the rolling easement would discourage reinvestment as the
shore approaches. The primary restriction of the rolling easement
would be the prohibition of bulkheads. Fill would be less of an issue
here, because these shores are often well above sea level.' 4 9 As the
shore erodes, eventually the house would be at least partly on the pub-
lic beach. If access along the shore is extremely important, the owner
could be required to move the house at that point. If access is not
important, the owner could simply be required to pay rent.
Along either wetland shores or beaches, owners-especially new
owners-would probably tend to convert their properties to rental
uses as the sea approached. Would-be landlords are more willing than
would-be homeowners to buy a house with only a five- to ten-year life
expectancy, as long as the property pays for itself. Moreover, renters
are often willing to tolerate conditions that homeowners would not.
3. Deferring Action.--Setbacks and rolling easements are antici-
patory planning policies in which shorelines remain natural, because
society takes action today. The other fundamental policy option is to
take no action today and deal with the problem later. Measures for
dealing with the problem later include ordering people to remove
for the house to be inundated at low tide. See Slade et al., supra note 33, at 69-70 nn.22-23
(summarizing cases that discuss the public trust doctrine under different scenarios in these
five states).
149. See MARINE BOARD REPORT, supra note 19, at 74 (explaining that bulkheads are
often used to provide protection for land that is well above sea level). As a result, property
owners might be allowed to hold back the sea with beach nourishment. Along wetland
shores, elevating the land with fill-even without a bulkhead-prevents new areas from
being flooded and new marsh from forming inland as sea level rises. Id. at 64-71, 74-75.
Thus, elevating land causes a net loss of wetlands unless the marshes are elevated as well-
something that will probably not occur. Id. at 70-71. By contrast, along sandy beaches, the
beach will tend toward a characteristic shape and return to that shape even if it is disrupted
through the addition of sandy material or rising sea level. Id. at 75-76.
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their homes without compensation 1 5 ' and buying people out. For
purposes of this Article, the principal difference between rolling ease-
ments and deferred action is that rolling easements provide advanced
notice to property owners that their land must give way to the sea.
4. Hybrid Policies.--Successful policies may also involve combina-
tions of preventing development, deferring action, and rolling ease-
ments. Existing setback policies involve combinations of preventing
development in the most vulnerable areas and deferring action to ad-
dress what will happen once the shore erodes up to the setback
line.15 ' Density restrictions are hybrid approaches that defer the
bulkheading decision but diminish the benefits of bulkheads by limit-
ing development.'5 2 A promising approach would be to require
houses to be set back enough to protect them from the expected ero-
sion over the next several decades-while creating rolling easements
to ensure that future generations do not simply build bulkheads along
the setback line. However, no state has yet instituted such a policy.
5. Protecting Access Along the Shore in Developed Areas. -- Setbacks,
rolling easements, and various hybrid policies can enable any state to
preserve its natural shorelines. Nevertheless, abandoning homes and
businesses to the sea will not always be a realistic option. Because
beach nourishment costs are often high,' 5 3 many of the older coastal
towns will require protection with hard structures even in states that
150. See St. Amand, supra note 119, at 8-12, 16-18 (discussing the adoption of this ap-
proach along the open coast of Massachusetts and North Carolina).
151. In Maryland, for example, new houses must be set back 100 feet along Chesapeake
Bay, see MD. REGs. CODE tit. 27, § 01.09.01C(1) (Supp. 1 1995), but homeowners can armor
their shores, see MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201 (a) (1996). In South Carolina, by contrast,
new construction along the ocean must be set back, see infra Part III, but the State has not
decided what it will do when the shore erodes up to the structures that are currently out of
harm's way. Interview with William C. Eiser, S.C. Office of Ocean and Coastal Resources
Management (Aug. 13, 1997). Eiser suggests that the most likely scenario is that in a few
isolated areas, houses will be abandoned and the shore will retreat. Id. More densely de-
veloped areas where the shores are open to the public will be protected by publicly funded
beach nourishment projects. Id. Private communities with no public access will not be
eligible for publicly funded beach nourishment, and hence will either have to fend for
themselves or dedicate easements so that they become eligible for beach nourishment. Id.
152. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. II § 8-1807 (Supp. 1997) (limiting densities in
areas within 1000 feet of the tidelands).
153. Beach nourishment projects generally cost millions of dollars. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENG'RS, supra note 7. Moreover, the turbidity caused by beach nourishment may
harm local marine environment. See LYNNE T. EDGERTON, THE RISING TIDE 38 (1991)
("Concerns for the local fauna-especially coral formations-inhibit many beach nourish-
ment schemes in Florida.").
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enact land-use planning measures to ensure the survival of wetlands
and beaches in newly developed areas.
The armoring of the coast need not mean that the state gives
away its claim to the shore. If the citizens want to retain this public
property, states can reserve an easement just inland of any new bulk-
heads, which is where the publicly owned wet beach would be if the
bulkhead was not built. Figure 7 illustrates two coastal communities
along the western shore of Chesapeake Bay in Calvert County, Mary-
land. Along Atlantic Avenue in North Beach, the public has access
along a narrow walkway between the homes and the revetment. Half a
mile to the south at Chesapeake Beach, however, the public is ex-
cluded from the shore.
Part B of Table 2 lists several options for retaining access along
armored shores. These measures are analogous to the means by
which natural shores can be protected. As part of a bulkhead permit,
landowners could be required to dedicate an easement just above the
bulkhead, so that when the shore erodes up to the bulkhead, the pub-
lic can still walk along the shore for fishing and other purposes. Alter-
natively, a rolling easement could be created that only protects public
access. Let us call this a "one-step easement." In such a case, until the
bulkhead eliminates the wet beach, the public continues to have ac-
cess only along that beach. At that point, the alongshore easement
"steps over" the bulkhead, giving the public access along the shore just
inland of the bulkhead. 154
C. Ability of the Three Options to Satisfy Various Criteria
Table 3 summarizes the economic efficiency, performance under
uncertainty, perceived fairness, political feasibility, and risk of back-
sliding for each of the options for protecting tidelands. 155 For sim-
plicity's sake, this analysis assumes that land ownership currently
entitles coastal property owners to develop their parcels, erect bulk-
heads, and remain forever, 156 and that regulations to the contrary di-
minish property values.
154. See fig.9. Unlike the options to retain tidelands in general, it may still be possible to
retain public access in areas that have already been developed.
155. These issues are also examined in Coastal Wetland Policy, supra note 117, at 47-55.
The discussion in that paper does not focus on those measures that protect access only;
such an analysis, however, would be largely parallel to the analysis presented here.
156. Part IV suggests that this assumption is not always true, but the distinction is unim-
portant for our purposes here.
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FIGURE 7
THE POTENTIAL FOR RETAINING PUBLIC ACCESS ALONG THE
SHORE AS SEA LEVEL RISES,
EVEN WHERE THE SHORE Is ARMORED
Both photos were taken in Calvert County, Maryland, along the western shore of Chesa-
peake Bay. The top photo shows Atlantic Avenue in North Beach. Here, the homes are
protected by a wooden bulkhead. Although the shore has eroded up to the bulkhead
along most of Atlantic Avenue, the public still has access along the shore, just inland of the
bulkhead. The lower photo shows the rock revetment that replaced the beach at Chesa-
peake Beach. Although a public easement along the shore would be as feasible here as in
North Beach, the state chose not to retain public access along this shore. (Photos taken
October 24, 1997.)
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1. Economic Efficiency and Social Cost.-Assuming that each policy
is applied to retain the same amount of tidelands, the most cost-effec-
tive approach is the approach with the least social cost-measured at a
discounted present value-regardless of whether the public or the
coastal property owners bear the CoSt.
1 5 7
In general, preventing development will have a higher social cost
than rolling easements, because the former prevents the property
from being used between now and whenever the sea rises enough to
erode it, which may be decades or centuries in the future.151 If a
property owner wants to build in spite of the knowledge that the
house will have to be abandoned a few decades hence, her reason may
be that the rental value of a bayfront house-even for a short period
of time-exceeds the cost of the structure. 59
Consider a numerical example. A coastal lot would become tide-
land if sea level rises three feet. t6° It is worth $20,000 as a site for a
$180,000 house and $10,000 in an alternative use. Preventing devel-
opment would thus impose a net cost of $10,000. A rolling easement,
by contrast, would allow rent to be collected on the property for many
decades. Assume further that the cost of moving the house (and
157. Government economists generally define "cost-effective" as the cheapest way of ac-
complishing a goal. See, e.g., EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF GovERN-
MENT PROGRAMS 46 (1981) ("This technique of finding the cheapest way of doing
something has become known as 'cost-effectiveness' analysis in the Defense Department
(where the benefits of a program can almost never be quantified)."). In defining a cost-
effective action, economists often ignore the question of who pays, not because that ques-
tion is irrelevant, but because a compensation scheme can in theory be designed to tax
winners and compensate losers. Id. at 41-43. Thus, governmental cost-benefit analysis
looks for the policy with the greatest net social benefit, regardless of who pays. Id. This
approach is sometimes called the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of economic efficiency. Id. In
general parlance, many writers shorten this to the term "economic efficiency." Id. at 42.
But cf infra note 170 (defining Pareto efficiency, which is concerned about the distribution
as well as the total economic benefits).
158. This ignores other potential benefits of setbacks. Locating a house farther from
the shore can also reduce (i) water pollution runoff from impervious surfaces and septic
systems, (ii) vulnerability to storms, and (iii) adverse impacts on dune and wetland ecology
resulting from physical presence and trampling by residents and their pets. See, e.g., St.
Amand, supra note 119, at 4-18 (discussing those three advantages of setbacks under vari-
ous state programs); COMMITrEE ON COASTAL EROSION ZONE MANAGEMENT, supra note 78,
at 55, 65, 67, 126 (discussing setback requirements). In a new neighborhood, there may
also be an aesthetic benefit to setting houses back from the shore. This is true because
everyone has a view of a natural shoreline, rather than just the water and adjacent houses.
159. Unfortunately, it may also be a case of gaming the system-that is, a calculated risk
that if one develops the property, the government will not actually require it to be aban-
doned. See infra Part II.C.5.
160. If the tidelands are marsh, land three feet above high tide would be tideland with a
three-foot rise in sea level. If the tidelands are a typical sandy beach that erodes one to two
feet per foot of sea level rise, then land within 300 to 600 feet of the shore would become
tideland, regardless of elevation. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3.
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cleaning up the site) would be $30,000, while the cost of a bulkhead
would be $10,000. Given these assumptions, the bulkhead restriction
would cost the property owner a total of $40,000 when the sea rises
three feet. 6 ' At a 5% interest rate, the impact of a rolling easement
on the market value would thus be $300 if a three-foot rise was certain
to occur in 100 years. But given EPA's estimate that such a rise has
only a 5% probability,' 62 the expected cost would be $15. In this case,
a rolling easement costs 1/666 as much as a setback, i.e., 0.075% of
the value of the land. If the property was four feet above mean high
water, the rolling easement would cost only $3, or 0.015% of the land
value.163
Setbacks are not always economically inefficient. If locating a
house at the landward end of a given lot allows the house to last for
sixty instead of thirty years, the long-term benefit is probably greater
than the initial aesthetic cost a buyer attributes to being farther from
the water.' 64 In those areas that are likely to be inundated soon, the
cost of forgoing the use of the land would be small. But the setback
implied by a four-foot rise in sea level would place an area the size of
Massachusetts off limits to development,1 65 preventing any develop-
ment on many parcels of land.
Measured by present value, deferring action is less costly than
preventing development, because land can be put to its most benefi-
cial use between now and the time that the land must give way to the
sea.' 66 Nevertheless, rolling easements would cost even less, primarily
161. The owner would lose the land worth $20,000 and would have to pay the $30,000 to
move the house, but a bulkhead would have cost $10,000. At a 5% discount rate, the
present value of $40,000 is $300.
162. See tbl.1; see also EPA 1995, supra note 2, at 126.
163. The probability that sea level will rise four feet in the next century is only 1%, one-
fifth the probability of a three-foot rise. See tbl.1; see also EPA 1995, supra note 2, at 126.
164. Theoretically, a well-informed property owner would make this choice anyway. But
because homebuyers are often poorly informed about potential hazards, state and local
governments have adopted building codes and safety standards. See, e.g., HOWARD
KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 6-7, 235-36 (1978)
(explaining that home owners have limited knowledge of flood risks and that few volunta-
rily bought flood insurance until the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
448, 82 Stat. 572 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), condi-
tioned the receipt of FHA and VA loans on the purchase of federal flood insurance).
165. See Holding Back the Sea, supra note 32, at 187 (estimating that a one-meter rise in
global sea level would inundate 7700 square miles of dry land, an area the size of
Massachusetts).
166. If one looks only at the cost of land and structures lost to the sea, deferring action
might appear to be more costly, because both the structure (or the cost of its removal) and
the land must be lost, whereas only vacant land is lost if development is prevented. But
more than vacant land is lost when development is prevented: Someone is also losing the
opportunity to live in a house on that land. The measure of the impact on today's land-
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FIGURE 8
OPTIONS FOR ENABLING WETLANDS TO MIGRATE INLAND:
WHY ROLLING EASEMENTS ARE THE LEAST EXPENSIVE
Prevent Development
Soon 2020
In each case, the land starts and ends as vacant farmland. This figure assumes that the
public rather than the property owner bears the cost. Under the Prevent Development
approach, the value of using the land for development is signified by the upfront cost of
buying a nondevelopment easement. Under the Defer Action approach, it is ultimately
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2040 2055
necessary to buy the entire land and structure. With rolling easements, a house must be
eventually abandoned as well, but the eventuality has been incorporated into the expecta-
tions of the owner, who forgoes renovations. The cartoon does not include the cost of
purchasing the easement, because its present cost would be trivial.
1998] 1325
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:1279
because the market would have better information. Knowing that a
house must eventually be removed, the owner is more likely to design
it so that it can be moved and less likely to build bulkheads and other
long-term improvements that would not completely pay for them-
selves before the house had to be moved, as shown in Figure 8. In the
decade or so before the property must be abandoned, it can be con-
verted to rental property and be strategically depreciated, 16 7 and real
estate markets can directly incorporate information about future rates
of erosion and sea level rise. Without a recognition that the property
must eventually be vacated, by contrast, property owners are more
likely to make improvements and remain psychologically attached to
the property, while governments are more likely to invest in major
infrastructure or allow changes in zoning to more intensive uses. 16 8
National assessments of the costs of sea level rise have not sought
to estimate the cost of protecting shores with rolling easements. Nev-
ertheless, the published research is sufficient to generate a rough esti-
mate. Appendix 1 roughly calculates that rolling easements could
protect U.S. tidelands in undeveloped areas for a total cost of $0.4 to
$1.2 billion; 99% of the cost would apply to land threatened with a
owner is present value. As shown in the text, losing (or moving) a house in the distant
future will have a present value of a few tens of dollars, while the cost of forgoing develop-
ment will be in the tens of thousands of dollars.
167. A study funded by the Electric Power Research Institute addressed this issue. See
Gary Yohe et al., The Economic Cost of Greenhouse-Induced Sea-Level Risefor Developed Property in
the United States, 32 CLIMATIC CHANGE 387, 392 (1996). The study quantified the extent to
which the cost to property owners from eroding shores could be reduced if, decades
before their property was threatened, owners understood the need to abandon the shore.
Id. at 390-92.
The "no-foresight" scenario discussed in the study assumed that property owners are
uncertain "about the rate of future sea level rise and/or [do not believe] ... that existing
property would actually be abandoned." Id. at 392. Another scenario, labeled "pure fore-
sight," assumed that "the economic value of structures ... depreciate[s] over time as the
threat of impending inundation and abandonment becomes known." Id. at 391. The
study estimated that with no foresight, the nationwide cost of a one-meter rise in sea level
would be $45.4 billion, but with pure foresight, it would be only $36.1 billion. Id. at 403-05.
The nationwide figures, however, include the cost of beach nourishment and other meas-
ures for holding back the sea. Id. at 392-93, 405. In several of the sites where holding back
the sea is unlikely, the certainty of knowing what would happen to the shore would de-
crease the cost of sea level rise by 50% to 75%. See id. at 397-98 (estimating that 30 years of
notice decreases the cost of sea level rise about 75% for areas around Apalachicola, Flor-
ida; Grand Chenier, Louisiana; Long Bay, North Carolina; Sullivans Island, South Caro-
lina; and Palacios, Texas, and by about 25% to 50% in Barataria, Louisiana; Pass Christian,
Mississippi; Dorchester, South Carolina; Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina; and Suffolk,
Virginia).
168. Cf COASTAL BARRIERs TASK FORCE, supra note 20, at iii-vi (examining the implica-
tions of a congressionally mandated end to federal subsidies for construction on vulnera-
ble coastal barriers).
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rise in sea level of less than two feet. Given the low probability and
remote nature of a larger rise in sea level, the cost of protecting all of
the undeveloped land in the U.S. coastal zone will only be a few mil-
lion dollars greater than the cost of protecting the land within three
feet of mean high water.
2. Performance Under Uncertainty.-A serious limitation of set-
backs and land purchases is that they prevent either too much or too
little development. Future sea level rise is uncertain, and if the sea
rises less than expected, society will have unnecessarily removed
thousands of square miles of valuable coastal land from development.
Yet, if the sea rises more than expected, the shore will erode up to the
setback line and the tidelands will be lost anyway. In fact, unless devel-
opment is kept out of an extremely large area, even if sea level rise is
accurately projected, the shore will eventually erode up to the setback
line.
Rolling easements, by contrast, are not tied to a specific scenario.
If sea level does not rise, they cost nothing. If it does rise, the wet-
lands and beaches will be protected. Rolling easements also perform
better than setbacks given economic uncertainty. Although undevel-
oped and lightly developed shorefront land is rarely protected today,
coastal land values could rise enough in the future for property own-
ers to have an incentive to protect even undeveloped land-especially
along estuarine shores.
Uncertainties regarding future coastal development and legal
rights are important disadvantages of relying on deferred action. No
policy can avoid the fact that abandoning the coast will cost more if
coastal property becomes more valuable. Nevertheless, if taxpayers
must bear the cost, then purchasing either land or rolling easements
is less risky than deferring action and buying people out later, because
the compensation can be fixed today. If property owners bear the
cost, then the legal uncertainty is greatest if action is deferred. 169
169. By definition, purchases of land, development fights, and rolling easements do not
even implicate the Constitution's prohibition against taking property withoutjust compen-
sation. See infra Part V. Regulatory creation of rolling easements has a good chance of
withstanding court challenges if enacted several decades before property has to be aban-
doned. See infra Parts III, IV.
Deferred action has the greatest legal uncertainty. Prohibiting shore protection with-
out advance warning might be rejected as a taking-especially in states like Maryland,
where the government has stated or implied that land ownership includes a right to hold
back the sea. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVR. § 16-201 (1996) (stating that a beachfront prop-
erty owner "may make improvements into the water in front of the land to... protect the
shore of that person against erosion"). Yet, the public trust doctrine may imply a long-
standing governmental property right to prohibit bulkheads, and courts may hold that the
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3. Perceived Fairness. -Economic efficiency and performance
under uncertainty primarily concern the total cost to society, rather
than the cost to individuals. But legislatures represent individuals.
No matter how worthy a policy may be, few people are enthusiastic
about bearing its costs, and many will vehemently oppose policies if
they feel that the costs they must bear are unfair. The Italian econo-
mist Vilfredo Pareto proposed as an equity criterion the condition in
which it is not possible to make anyone better off without making
someone worse off, a criterion that is now known as "Pareto
efficiency." 0
To avoid the perception of unfairness, policy makers would ide-
ally enact Pareto improvements-that is, policies with no losers. How-
ever, for new issues such as sea level rise, defining a Pareto
improvement is stymied by the lack of agreement among the various
parties about what the baseline would be without the proposed pol-
icy. 171 Owners assume that land lasts forever, and taxpayers assume
the beaches always belong to the people anyway. 172 Even winners may
perceive themselves as losers.
A regulatory setback policy prohibiting development in low areas
would single out some farmers and other land holders to subsidize
society's concern about the future environment. At the same time,
similarly situated landholders on higher ground could profit from the
development that such setbacks would rechannel inland. In this con-
right to hold back the sea is not constitutionally protected until someone actually builds a
bulkhead. See infra Part IV. Moreover, whatever the law is today, it could change over the
next several decades.
Setbacks are more likely to be (and have been) rejected as unconstitutional takings.
See infra Part III. However, they do not create much long-term legal uncertainty. The only
fruitful time to challenge them is before one builds. So even if setbacks are rejected as
unconstitutional takings, the rejection will come early and will afford policy makers plenty
of time to implement other options. See infra Part III.A (discussing South Carolina's imple-
mentation of rolling easements in cases where setbacks would be unconstitutional takings).
170. See, e.g., HLA. R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 15-16 (1987) (discussing
Pareto efficiency).
171. Cf David Hawkins, Speech to the Administrative Conference of the United States
(Apr. 23, 1990), reprinted in MarshallJ. Breger et al., Providing Economic Incentives in Environ-
mental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463, 483-84 (1991) (stating that existing arrangements
are usually employed as the baseline for economic incentive approaches, but other base-
lines might be more appropriate).
172. Property owners assume that they have the right to use their property, and they
would find preventing development or subsequent eviction inequitable. Other taxpayers
would question the equity of compensation, because people have no inherent right to
bulkhead property at the expense of public lands. Nuisance theory leaves this problem
indeterminate as well: The ideal of minimizing transaction costs suggests a no-bulkhead
rule in undeveloped areas and a pro-bulkhead rule in heavily developed areas. See infra
Part IV.C.I.b.
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text, those who own undeveloped land less than five feet above mean
high water would be big losers.
No legislation can eliminate the resentment that arises when two
groups have long assumed that they possess rights that are in fact mu-
tually exclusive. 17 3 But purchasing or legislatively creating rolling
easements can minimize the conflict by laying out the rules of the
game at least a generation before they take effect. People's ideas of
fairness depend mostly on their expectations. Accordingly, a policy is
easier to accept if people never expected anything else.174 If future
conditions necessitate policy changes, a common baseline will make it
easier to agree on how much the new policy costs particular individu-
als (even if people continue to disagree on how much other people
should pay). For this reason, enacting a policy today that decides
which shores should be armored will almost certainly improve the
likelihood of success, even if changing circumstances prompt future
generations to modify the plan.
The intergenerational nature of this problem also favors rolling
easements, because such a policy is Pareto-superior to deferring ac-
tion. Both approaches cost the current generation nothing, but roll-
ing easements leave future generations better prepared. Preventing
development through land purchases or large-scale setbacks is not a
Pareto-improvement over deferring action. Instead, such policies
would force our generation to pay a price for the sake of future
generations.1
75
4. Political Feasibility.-The economic, legal, and technical mer-
its of a policy are largely irrelevant if the political process cannot
adopt or enforce it. Along ocean shores, coastal setbacks have been
feasible because of the widespread interest in ocean beaches and be-
173. For example, recent agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Or-
ganization have not removed the resentments between those Zionists who believe that
Israel should occupy all of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank of the Jordan River) and
those Palestinians who believe that the State of Israel has no right to exist at all, let alone
occupy the West Bank. See Edward T. Canuel, Note, Nationalism, Self-Determination, and
Nationalist Movements: Exploring the Palestinian and Quebec Drives for Independence, 20 B.C.
I, r'L & Comap. L. REv. 85, 104-06 (1997) (discussing the conservative Israelis' and the na-
tionalist Palestinians' continued resentment following the Palestinian Peace Accords).
174. Moreover, agreeing on what is fair is easiest when the judges of fairness are some-
what removed. No matter how difficult it is to decide whether property owners or taxpay-
ers should pay for saving the tidelands, deciding will be more difficult later, when the costs
are greater and people know precisely who wins and who loses.
175. In our hypothetical example, deferring action may be Pareto-superior to setbacks.
If the $10,000 cost of a setback comes out of investment, then in 100 years, the total cost
will have compounded to $1.3 million, more than enough to rebuild the house inland.
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cause the setbacks are usually less than 200 feet. 176 Preventing devel-
opment in an area the size of Massachusetts in order to protect
estuarine shores seems less likely. There is no evidence that federal or
state governments are willing to spend tens or hundreds of billions of
dollars to buy all the necessary coastal lands, or even the smaller sums
necessary to buy nondevelopment easements. Even if the United
States Constitution would permit a blanket prohibition of develop-
ment without compensation, our political process would not. 177 Den-
sity restrictions would be more politically feasible than total
prohibitions on development, but if minimum lot sizes are too large,
they could hurt land values enough to meet strong opposition as well.
Deferring action is feasible today, but it would require future politi-
cians to choose between more stringent 7 versions of the regulatory
and land-purchase options that are presently infeasible.
Rolling easement policies are the most politically feasible ap-
proach for protecting tidelands on a broad scale. The cost would be
small compared with the other options. 179 Perhaps more importantly,
176. Multiplying the typical erosion rate, see MARINE BOARD REPORT, supra note 19, at 50,
by the time horizon of erosion setbacks for states that have them, see COMMITTEE ON
COASTAL EROSION ZONE MANAGEMENT, supra note 78, at 96-97, results in the following typi-
cal setbacks: Florida-typically no setbacks, but in areas where the erosion rate is one
standard deviation above the norm, the setback is 36 meters; New Jersey-50 meters; New
York-no setback in the typical case, 66-88 meters in areas with the highest observed ero-
sion; North Carolina-the minimum setback is 60 feet, and 60-80 meters in areas where
erosion is one standard deviation above the norm; South Carolina-80 meters; Rhode Is-
land-no setback in the typical case, and 20 feet in areas with the highest observed ero-
sion. Most other states have a fixed setback that is not based on the erosion rate. Id. at 97.
A typical fixed setback appears to be about 100 feet. See, e.g., id. at 64 (100 feet in Dela-
ware); supra note 151 (100 feet in Maryland along Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries). But
see infra note 177 (50 feet along back-barrier bays in Worcester County, Maryland).
177. For example, beginning in 1989, the comprehensive plan of Worcester County,
Maryland included a 100-foot setback for purposes of decreasing non-point source runoff.
Personal Communication with Planning Staff of the Worcester County Zoning Comm'r
(Apr. 1994). In 1992, the Commission adopted an interim setback of 85 feet from the
mean high water mark. Id. However, the political consensus in the county was unable to
support such a large setback, and the final setback was established at 50 feet. See WORCES-
TER COUNTY, MD., CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAws § ZS-1-304(s) (1) (1994); Personal Commu-
nication with Planning Staff of the Worcester County Zoning Comm'r (Apr. 1994).
178. In terms of the actual cost faced when the decision is made, buying property own-
ers out (or forcing them out) would be more expensive in the future than today, because
some land that is vacant today would be developed. Coastal Wetland Policy, supra note 117,
at 48, 54-55. Note that when discussing the impact on today's property value or net social
cost, one must focus on present discounted value. However, when looking at the risk of
backsliding and the political feasibility of enforcing a required abandonment, the key con-
sideration is the cost perceived at the time the property is vacated.
179. Compare Appendix 1 (illustrating that rolling easements are unlikely to cost more
than $300-$1100 million) with Holding Back the Sea, supra note 32, at 200 (estimating the
value of the undeveloped land that could be inundated by a 50- to 200-centimeter rise in
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this approach takes advantage of the long-term' 8 and uncertain na-
ture of the phenomenon. The setback approach polarizes the polit-
ical climate and encourages developers to challenge regulations (or
governmental estimates of market value) by disputing the underlying
science and the projections that the sea level will rise. Rolling ease-
ment policies, by contrast, foster political consensus by forcing devel-
opers to concede that sea level rise is likely before they can argue that
the regulation will affect property values. 18 1
5. Risk of Backsliding.--Even if a tideland protection policy is en-
acted, a subsequent repeal will always be possible. The effectiveness of
a tideland protection policy depends upon whether the repeal occurs
because the policy turns out to be unneeded or because those with
narrow interests who gambled and lost are able to persuade policy
makers to backslide and bail them out. Where development is pre-
vented, the risk of backsliding is fairly low. If government buys a no-
sea level at $13 to $120 billion). Deferring action would eventually cost more than rolling
easements, because the former requires the loss of land and structures, while the latter
affords property owners the opportunity to depreciate their structures or avoid developing
land likely to be inundated, whichever is most cost-effective. Cf, e.g., Yohe et al., supra note
167, at 391 ("[T]he economic value of structures can be expected to depreciate over time
as the threat of impending inundation and abandonment becomes known.").
180. An unusual aspect of this approach is that because most of the costs are in the
distant future, using a high discount rate makes rolling easements more feasible. This
approach stands in stark contrast to the many environmental policies where near-term
action produces benefits over many decades, and thus economic viability depends on a low
discount rate. Environmental economists have long pondered how to discount appropri-
ately the value of future benefits to present value. See, e.g., GRAMLICH, supra note 157, at
107, 112-13 n.22. The most popular candidates are the rate of return on private invest-
ment, often about 7% to 10%, and a lower rate representing the risk-free rate of return or
a pure rate of time preference, generally 1.5% to 3%. Id. at 107-09; WORKING GROUP III,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 130-32 (1996). It is axiomatic among economists
that if an environmental policy has benefits over many decades, a high discount rate tends
to discourage policies to protect the environment. See WILLIAM R. CLINE, INST. FOR INT'L
ECONS., THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING 235-36 (1992) (predicting that with a dis-
count rate of 5% to 10%, the effects of global warming 100 to 200 years hence are very
unimportant); GRAMLICH, supra note 157, at 130 (explaining that high discount rates result
in too little investment to protect the environment). Rolling easements are an important
exception.
181. Consider once again the numerical example discussed in Part II.C.1. In response
to a setback preventing development on a particular parcel, a developer might say that the
sea probably will not rise and that any possible impacts are so far in the future that the
discounted benefits of taking action today are trivial; yet, the developer is having to bear a
substantial near-term cost. By contrast, with a rolling easement that takes over the parcel
when the sea rises three feet, these arguments imply that the regulation is not likely to
affect the property and that the present value of the regulation's impact is $15. Developers
would probably not change tacks and claim that the sea is going to rise more than the
government expects, because such an assertion would scare away potential buyers.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
development easement (or imposes such a condition by regulation),
the owner of the remaining estate has little reason to clamor for the
government to allow her to develop a property just when it is about to
be inundated. If the government buys the land outright, then there is
no private owner at all.
If action is deferred, by contrast, the likelihood of backsliding is
very high. Few tasks would be more distasteful to a state legislator
than to require people to abandon bayfront homes when the property
owners themselves are willing to spend the money necessary to protect
their property from the sea. Admittedly, governments have required
property owners to abandon oceanfront homes as the shore retreats.182
However, the ocean shore has a large constituency of people who use
the public beach that a seawall would obstruct. Furthermore, private
seawalls are generally unable to hold back the ocean during a severe
storm, which creates a potential safety hazard."
Rolling easements pose intermediate enforcement problems.' 4
Backsliding would be somewhat more likely with a no-bulkhead regu-
lation than with a government purchase of a rolling easement, be-
cause the public can more easily accept relaxation of a regulation
than the relinquishment of a public property interest for which the
government has paid. 8 5 Private conservancies that bought rolling
easements would seem even less likely to allow private individuals to
erect bulkheads that eliminate natural shores. There is no guarantee,
182. E.g., Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex. App. 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (af-
firming a trial court order to "remove the beach house, sand piles, plantings, and any other
obstructions or barrier to the public's use of the beach area").
183. See, e.g., Gary Griggs & Lauret Savoy, Shoreline Protection and Engineering, in LIVING
WITH THE CALIFORNIA COAST 46, 58-61 (Gary Griggs & Lauret Savoy eds., 1985) (explaining
that wooden bulkheads tend to fail in high-energy environments).
184. The economics study by Yohe and his colleagues implies that a rolling easement
policy would result in a greater number of people voluntarily allowing the shore to retreat.
Yohe et al., supra note 167, at 343-406. If people doubt the sea will rise or expect the
government to protect them, they will make imprudent investments that later require pro-
tection. Id. at 388-90, 394-96. In the "perfect foresight" case, 45% of the shore is aban-
doned if sea level rises one meter, simply because the economics do not support holding
back the sea. Id. at 403. Without foresight, however, only 30% is abandoned, because 15%
of these communities develop or redevelop even though-once the costs of shore protec-
tion are considered-the development is not economicallyjustified. Id. To the extent that
rolling easements force people to recognize the inevitability of abandoning the shore, they
lead to the better investment decisions characterized by Yohe's "with foresight" scenario.
See id. at 394-96, 403-05. Because it is not cost-effective to hold back the sea in these cases,
the risk of backsliding is minimized. Id. at 388-90, 406.
185. See infta Part III.A (recounting a case in which South Carolina resisted a property
owner's request for permission to build a semi-hard structure, because, among other
things, the State had effectively paid several hundred thousand dollars for a rolling ease-
ment on that property).
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however, that a century from now conservancies would not decide to
sell the easements to property owners and use the proceeds to protect
more critical habitat.
The risk of backsliding would tend to be greatest in those areas
where: (a) property owners are either unaware of the rolling ease-
ments or are lulled into believing that they will not be enforced, and
(b) the cost of holding back the sea is small compared with the bene-
fits of doing so. The former consideration suggests that public aware-
ness must be a key component of any effort to ensure the survival of
estuarine shores.
186
The latter consideration favors some hybrid approaches that,
when combined with rolling easements, would probably have a
smaller risk of backsliding than a plan that relied solely on rolling
easements. Limiting density to one-acre zoning would increase the
cost of protecting a given home with a bulkhead. Requiring new
homes to be moveable would decrease the cost of not holding back
the sea, because the structures themselves would not be lost. Limiting
house size would have a similar effect and would also decrease the
potential benefits of a bulkhead, even if the house could not be
moved. At least along marshy shores, requiring the house to be ele-
vated on pilings would also decrease the need to build a bulkhead by
ensuring the utility of the house during those early years when water
levels periodically reach the house. It would also reduce public sym-
pathy for people desiring to build a bulkhead.
In a thoughtful commentary on previous EPA analyses of this is-
sue, Professor Joseph Sax, a pioneer of environmental law, warned
that even with a purchased easement, success "turns on the assump-
tion that people will play by the rules of the game. It is this assump-
tion I wish to question." ' 7 Sax suggested the creation of a trust fund
to compensate property owners when the time comes to abandon
186. Public awareness serves at least four different purposes. First, as long as
homebuyers know about the potential loss of property to a rolling easement, the market
will lower values as the shore approaches the property. Cf Yohe et al., supra note 167, at
391-92 (estimating that if markets are equipped with information, property values could
decline to zero by the time the property is inundated). Second, the discount will lead the
public to see the riparian owners not as victims, but as unscrupulous investors who seek to
profit from the revision of a government regulation. Third, the public will have little sym-
pathy for those who protest their ignorance of rolling easements. Fourth, the market may
reflect higher prices for beach homes in the second row, because they will eventually have a
waterfront view. See id. at 391 (explaining that as sea level rises, premiums associated with
being close to the shore will migrate inland). As the biggest losers from governmental
backsliding, this class might become a countervailing voice. Id. at 391-92.
187. Joseph L. Sax, The Fate of Wetlands in the Face of Rising Sea Levels: A Strategic Proposal,
9 UCLAJ. ENV-rL. L. & POL'Y 143, 148 (1991).
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their properties."' While this approach may be appropriate in some
areas, there is also the risk that it will take us back to the political
infeasibility of deferred action: If the government would not be will-
ing to buy out whole towns just to protect some tidelands, would it be
willing to spend the proceeds of a trust fund to buy out whole towns
just to protect some tidelands?
Rolling easements would leave future generations with the flexi-
bility to keep their tidelands or give them up. Sax was correct that we
cannot guarantee that they will choose the tidelands. 8 9 Perhaps we
should be satisfied if we preserve the choice.
III. WOULD OPTIONS TO PROTECT TIDELANDS REQUIRE
COMPENSATION?
According to the Bill of Rights, private property cannot be taken
"without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."1 90 Common sense suggests
two literal meanings of this "Takings Clause": (1) all of the tideland
protection policies require compensation, because they eventually de-
prive owners of their property; and (2) none of the policies require
compensation, because the public does not use the private land when
it prevents development or denies a permit to build a bulkhead.
Neither of these views would prevail in the United States Supreme
Court.
A. A Case Study Involving Setbacks and Rolling Easements
Consider a story that involved both setbacks and rolling ease-
ments, a story that included one of the most important Supreme
Court rulings involving shorefront development: Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council.191 In 1984, EPA and the South Carolina Sea
Grant program sponsored a conference in Charleston, South Carolina
188. Id. at 153-60. Charging rent for houses and bulkheads that are on public trust land
would be a possible source of funds. Cf Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-1-107(3) (1990) (requiring
that those who developed tidelands after 1973 "shall pay an annual rental based on the fair
market value as determined by the assessed valuation of the property").
189. Sax, supra note 187, at 147-60 (discussing landowners' likely behavior when the sea
level rises).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although this proscription of government behavior origi-
nally applied only to the federal government, today it also applies to the states. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deprive any person of... property, without
due process of law .... ").
191. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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to present the results of a study192 on the impacts of future sea level
rise on the city and the surrounding barrier islands, with the latter
organization mailing 10,000 brochures to people in the area. Shortly
thereafter, the South Carolina Coastal Council commissioned a Blue
Ribbon Committee to address the problem of rising seas and eroding
shores.' In 1987, the Committee issued its report, which recom-
mended a setback equal to forty times the annual erosion rate. 194
In 1986, a developer named David Lucas paid $975,000 for two
oceanfront lots on the Isle of Palms in South Carolina.'95 The lots
were about 300 feet from the beach,'96 but because they were near an
inlet, the shore had advanced and retreated several times in the pre-
ceding few decades, with much of the lot on the active beach as re-
cently as 1973.197 In 1988, the South Carolina legislature responded
to the Blue Ribbon report by enacting a Beachfront Management Act
that prohibited construction seaward of an erosion setback line.' 98
Because his lot was seaward of the line,' 99 the setback left Lucas with a
worthless lot.200 Lucas then sued for compensation. 0
The trial court decided that the setback was a taking because it
deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the property.20 2 In
1990, this decision and Hurricane Hugo prompted the South Caro-
lina legislature to replace the prohibition of development with rolling
192. The study was published later that year as GREENHOUSE EFc-r AND SEA LEVEL RISE,
supra note 35, which estimated the future sea level rise, its effects, and the value of policies
that prepare for these changes.
193. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1037 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); accord Klarin & Hershman, supra
note 6, at 305 (explaining that the Blue Ribbon Committee was motivated in part by the
sea level conference).
194. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1038 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Committee justified
this proposed erosion setback based on both existing erosion rates and the EPA's estimate
that the sea level would rise one foot in the following 40 years. See Report of the South
Carolina Blue Ribbon Comm. on Beachfront Management (Mar. 1987) [hereinafter Re-
port on Beachfront Management] (citing the predictions of a 1983 EPA study).
195. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.
196. Id. at 1008.
197. Id. at 1038 (BlackmunJ., dissenting) (citing trial transcript).
198. Id.; accord S.C. CODE ANIN. § 48-39-290 (West Supp. 1997). See generally id.
§ 48-39-250 (explaining the legislature's motivation for enacting the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act).
199. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008. For practical purposes, the setback line was either 40 times
the annual erosion rate plus 20 feet inland from the crest of the primary dune, or 20 feet
inland of the most landward position of the mean high water line over the last 40 years,
whichever was the farthest inland. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A), (B) (West Supp.
1997).
200. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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easements for lots seaward of the setback line.213 Thus, by the time
the Council appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the lots
were eligible for building permits. Accordingly, the Council argued
that the case was no longer ripe for judicial review. 204 The court
"shrugged off the possibility of further administrative and trial pro-
ceedings"20 5 and reversed on the merits, holding that the regulation
was designed to avoid a serious public harm and thus could not be a
taking.20 6
Lucas appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 20 7 The Court treated the case as a claim for a temporary
taking between the setback's enforcement in 1988 and its conversion
to a rolling easement in 1990.20' For this period, at least, it accepted
the trial court's finding that the State deprived Lucas of any reason-
able economic use of his property.209 With these assumptions, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fifth Amendment's re-
quirement to pay compensation cannot be avoided simply by charac-
terizing the erosion hazard as a nuisance. 210  A regulation that
prohibits all productive use is a taking unless property law had already
given the State the power to prevent the nuisance.211 The Court re-
manded the controversy to the South Carolina Supreme Court to de-
cide whether the State had that power.21 2
On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court chose not to con-
duct such an analysis.213 It simply said that it knew of no basis in the
common law for preventing construction on Lucas's property and re-
manded the case for a trial on the damages.214 However, the parties
203. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D) (1) (creating a special permit, which is a hybrid
between a setback and a rolling easement, rolling only up to the setback line).
204. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1010.
207. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 502 U.S. 966 (1991).
208. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010-13.
209. Id. at 1011-13 & n.3.
210. Id. at 1024-27.
211. Id. at 1029.
212. Id. at 1031-32.
213. The Coastal Council proposed to brief the South Carolina Supreme Court on the
"background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses rthat Lucas]
intended." South Carolina Coastal Council, Motion to Clarify Remand at 4, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992) (No. 90-38). Perhaps feeling that at
this point the Council needed to concede defeat, the Court never took them up on this
offer and instead urged the Council to settle. Interview with Cotton Harness, Former Gen-
eral Counsel, S.C. Coastal Council (Mar. 14, 1994) (on file with author).
214. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992), on re-
mand from 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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settled before trial, with the Council paying Lucas $1.5 million for title
to the property. The Council resold the lots to John C. Gwinn for
$850,000, with the condition that a rolling easement would govern any
construction.215
The State's resolve to enforce the rolling easement was soon
tested.216 The erosion-and-accretion cycle switched from accretion to
erosion-as much as fifteen feet per month. By the time Mr. Gwinn
had completed construction on one of the lots, the shoreline was
threatening the swimming pool that he had built seaward of the new
house. Even though the Beachfront Management Act prohibited new
structures from holding back the sea, the State allowed Gwinn and
nearby owners to use sand bags.2 17
The property owners then petitioned the Coastal Council for per-
mission to install geotectile containers-essentially ten-foot sandbags
weighing about 6000 pounds. The Council denied this request, but
gave the owners permission to create artificial dunes by bulldozing
sand from the wet part of the beach. Gwinn and the other owners
filed suit, seeking an injunction to compel the State to allow installa-
tion of the geotectile containers. Before the case could be decided,
the erosion cycle reversed again and the shore began to accrete. After
almost a decade of tenacious enforcement by South Carolina's coastal
agencies, the Beachfront Management Act has saved the beach along
the Lucas-Gwinn property.218
The holding in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council implies that
in some situations, setbacks will require compensation. 21 ' The legisla-
ture's replacement of setbacks with rolling easements-only where
setbacks were likely to be takings-suggests an assumption that rolling
easements will not require compensation. But the United States
Supreme Court did not address rolling easements or bulkhead
prohibitions.
The remainder of this Part examines the general theory by which
a court could decide whether a tideland policy requires compensa-
215. Personal Communication with William C. Eiser, S.C. Coastal Council (Mar. 8,
1994).
216. Interview with William C. Eiser, supra note 151.
217. Stanley R. Riggs, Conflict on the Not-So-Fragile Barrier Islands, GEOTIMES, Dec. 1996, at
14, 16, 18.
218. See Interview with William C. Eiser, supra note 151.
219. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) ("Where
the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use,
we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature
of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with.").
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tion, assuming, for the sake of argument, that a property owner has
the right to build a home and to protect it from the sea.220 The Tak-
ings Clause applies to both physical invasions and regulations that
deny all beneficial use to the owner. Parts III.B and III.C of this Arti-
cle examine these two types of governmental action. Table 4 summa-
rizes the author's best guess regarding the takings implications of the
doctrines discussed in these sections, and how they relate to the policy
options presented in Part II.
B. Physical Invasions: Implications for Protecting Access Along the Shore
The most common example of a physical invasion is an eminent
domain acquisition. Nevertheless, even installing a cable television
box 2 2 1 or requiring public access along a private beach or waterway
222
is enough of an invasion to be a taking. An invasion by the sea due to
natural factors is not a constitutional taking.223 If a government dam
directly floods someone's property, it is a taking, 224 but if a project
merely causes riparian land to erode away slowly, it is not.225
1. Permit Conditions: Illegitimate Uses of Governmental Power.-Not
every physical invasion is a taking. For example, there is no taking
when, in return for a permit to develop property, a local government
requires a private developer to dedicate land for roads or other public
220. Part IV examines how the validity of that assumption varies from state to state.
221. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982)
(holding that the installation of a cable television box, which involved the "direct physical
attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building," constituted a taking).
222. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (holding that
requiring homeowners "to make an easement across their beachfront available to the pub-
lic on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach" was a taking);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that requiring access to
a waterway was a taking because the federal navigation servitude does not apply to waters
made navigable by private efforts).
223. See Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 519-20 (Miss. 1986) (en
banc) (citing the rule that where the forces of nature raise the sea level, the public lands
expand inland without compensation), affd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469 (1988); see also infra Part IV.B.2.
224. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871)
("[W]here real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water . . . it is a
taking .... ").
225. See Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d 975, 977 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (holding that erosion
caused by a Corps of Engineers jetty was not a taking unless the Corps either raised the
water level or entered the property), overruled on other grounds, Owen v. United States, 851
F.2d 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See generally Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana:
Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REv. 3 (1983) (discussing the extreme exam-
ple of coastal Louisiana, where landowners were not compensated for the 30 to 40 square
miles of land lost per year, largely as a result of federal flood and navigation structures).
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infrastructure directly necessitated by the development itself.2 2 6 How-
ever, if the conditions of a permit are designed to save the govern-
ment money on projects the government intended to embark upon
anyway, rather than simply to offset the consequences of granting the
permit, then the government has exceeded its power. In Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,227 the Commission refused to give the
Nollans a permit to replace their small bungalow with a large ocean-
front house unless the Nollans gave the state an easement permitting
public access along the dry beach behind their house.22 8 The in-
creased access to the beach, the Commission argued, would counter-
act the decreased "visual access" for those traveling along the street in
front of the Nollans' house.2 29
The Court found no "essential nexus" between the easement and
the objective of preserving the view of the water.2 0 A permit condi-
tion must be the means to an end that the government could already
achieve by denying the permit.2 1l In this case, preserving visual access
would have been a legitimate end.212 However, the fact that both the
impact and the condition included the word "access" did not imply
that improving access along the shore would compensate for a loss of
visual access.233 The Court indicated that requiring the Nollans to set
226. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-90 & n.7 (1994) (citing cases in sev-
eral states that require a reasonable relationship or a direct connection between proposed
development and required dedication).
227. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
228. Id. at 828 (explaining that the proposed permit was conditioned on granting the
public an easement across the Nollans' private property between the mean high water
mark and a seawall that separated the beach from the rest of the Nollans' property). As in
all but a few states, the public already had access along the wet beach, but the dry beach
was not open to the public other than in particular areas. See infra Part IV (discussing the
right to access along the shore).
229. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
230. Id. at 837-39. The Court also noted that the Commission had an ongoing program
of acquiring the dry beach, id. at 841, essentially extending the public trust inland from the
mean high water mark to the seawall that divided the beach from the rest of the Nollans'
property, id. at 828. The opinion closed by advising that eminent domain is the proper way
to convert private land to public beach. Id. at 841-42.
231. Id. at 836. The Court added:
[T] he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the build-
ing restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The
purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some
valid governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation.... [U]nless
the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development
ban, the building restriction is . . . "an out-and-out plan of extortion."
Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by Town of Auburn v. McEvoy, 553 A.2d 317 (N.H. 1988)).
232. Id. at 838.
233. Id.
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aside part of their land for viewing the beach would have passed this
test. 234 Unfortunately, the Court did not comment on cases in which
the Commission required an easement along the dry beach in return
for a seawall permit.235 In such cases, because both the adverse im-
pact and the condition involve lateral access, an essential nexus would
exist. The question would then become: Is the connection between
the impact and the condition sufficient? The Nollan Court did not
develop a test for how tight the connection must be, because in that
case, there was no nexus at all.23 6
The required connection between the impact and the condition
was at issue in Dolan v. City of Tigard.237 Mrs. Dolan wanted to build a
parking lot and expand her business on a parcel adjacent to a flood-
plain and planned bike path.238 The City granted a permit for the
expansion, but only on the condition that she dedicate land for a
floodway and the bike path. 239 The Court found a nexus between the
impacts of the development and each of the permit conditions. First,
the development would increase runoff and hence flooding-
problems that a floodway could ameliorate. Second, the business ex-
pansion would increase traffic-a problem that a bike path could
diminish.24 °
Because there was a nexus between the impacts and the condi-
tions, the Court had to formulate a test for deciding "whether the
degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions
bear the required relationship to the projected impact of [the] peti-
234. See id. at 836.
235. Compare Barrie v. California Coastal Comm'n, 241 Cal. Rptr. 477, 485 (Ct. App.
1987) (finding a reasonable nexus between a dry beach dedication requirement and a
permit for a seawall) and Whalers' Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 2, 14 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding a reasonable nexus between a dry beach dedication
requirement and a permit for a seawall, because seawalls in general cause erosion, which in
turn necessitates additional access along the shore) with Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 376 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding an insufficient nexus
between a beach dedication and a permit for a seawall because the Commission did not
show that the particular seawall would cause erosion, and because the post-Nollan require-
ment for substantial nexus requires a site-specific showing). Erosion caused by seawalls was
the narrow focus of the California courts. This question is irrelevant if the shore is erod-
ing: It does not matter whether the seawall causes the erosion, because a retreating shore
will eventually reach the seawall. Considering the latter nexus would lead to a different
result in Surfside, because seawalls always eliminate eroding beaches by blocking their land-
ward migration, even if they do not accelerate the erosion. See figs.1, 8.
236. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 & n.7 (1994).
237. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
238. Id. at 379.
239. Id. at 379-80.
240. Id. at 387-88.
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tioner's proposed development. '2 41 The Court adopted what it called
a "'rough proportionality"' test based on a rule already adopted by a
majority of state courts.2 42 As an example of this test, the Court favor-
ably cited a Nebraska case holding that "a city may not require a prop-
erty owner to dedicate private property for some future public use as a
condition of obtaining a building permit when such future use is not
'occasioned by the construction sought to be permitted.' 243  In
adopting this test, the Court rejected the more stringent "'specifi[c]
and uniquely attributable"' test, which requires that "the local govern-
ment..., demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the
specifically created need. ' 24 4 Nevertheless, this test is still relevant in
coastal states where it has been adopted as a matter of state law.24 5
Applying the rough proportionality test, the Supreme Court held
that dedicating a floodway was not roughly proportional to the in-
creased flooding. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned
that the increased flooding could be mitigated just as effectively by
preventing development without granting the public access to that
land.24 6 The bike path was a closer case. The Court acknowledged
that a bike path "could" offset the traffic impact but held that the City
had to show that it "would" offset the impact.2 47
2. When Is a Policy That Protects Access a Taking?-Figure 9 illus-
trates four alternatives for protecting access along the shore.2 48 Be-
cause all of these measures protect the same alongshore access that a
241. Id. at 388 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)).
242. Id. at 391.
243. Id. at 390 (quoting Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Neb.
1980)).
244. Id. at 389-90 (alteration in original). This test had been adopted by Illinois, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Ohio. See id. at 389-90, 389 n.7.
245. See, e.g., Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 334 A.2d 30, 40 (N.J. 1975) (applying
the specifically and uniquely attributable test); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264
A.2d 910, 912-13 (R.I. 1970) (holding that state case law embodies the specifically and
uniquely attributable test). A New Hampshire case thatJustice Scalia quoted fondly in the
Nollan decision, Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837, held that the New Hampshire State Constitution
required the specifically and uniquely attributable test. J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson,
432 A.2d 12, 15 (N.H. 1981) (holding that the specifically and uniquely attributable test is
required by the New Hampshire State Constitution), overruled on other grounds by Town of
Auburn v. McEvoy, 553 A.2d 317 (N.H. 1988). The McEvoy case did not overrule the re-
quirement for the specifically and uniquely attributable test.
246. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392-95.
247. Id. at 395 (endorsing the dissent in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or.
1993) (in banc) (Peterson, J., dissenting), rev'd, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
248. See also supra Part II.B.5 and tbl.2 (explaining the one-step easement and other
policies for protecting access where shores are armored).
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bulkhead might otherwise destroy, they all have the essential nexus
that was lacking in Nollan.
The most straightforward case is the one-step easement. Such a
permit condition is narrowly tailored: It protects access along the
shore at both the same time and the same place that the bulkhead
destroys access.249 As a result, one-step easements would pass even the
more stringent "specific and uniquely attributable test" that some
states require.
25 0
Requiring immediate dedication 25 1 of an easement above the
bulkhead as a condition for a bulkhead permit is not quite as narrowly
tailored in time, because the condition takes effect immediately to off-
set a problem that the bulkhead will cause in the future.252 Neverthe-
less, an immediate dedication may still pass the specific and uniquely
attributable test, because the easement dedicated is "directly propor-
tional to the specifically created need."2 51 It certainly would pass the
rough proportionality test, because the dedication is necessitated by
the construction being permitted.
California has sometimes required property owners to dedicate
dry beach in return for a seawall permit.254 This policy would proba-
bly fail the specific and uniquely attributable test, because such a con-
dition does not specifically offset the problem created by the seawall.
At the outset, there is temporal discontinuity. Because seawalls elimi-
nate all of the dry beach before eliminating any of the wet beach, such
a condition increases access only during those early years when the
seawall would not have diminished public access anyway. In Figure 9,
249. See fig.9.
250. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (defining the "specific and uniquely at-
tributable" test).
251. See supra Part II.B.5 and tbl.2 (explaining the option of immediate dedication of an
easement when a bulkhead permit is issued).
252. This discussion assumes that the right to protect one's home does not mean a right
to protect every square foot of the backyard. Deferring dedication until the beach is lost
would be difficult unless the owner seeks a permit to rebuild the seawall just as the beach is
about to be lost. By then, the home, rather than just the yard, may also be threatened.
Given our assumption that the owner has the right to protect her home, this would dimin-
ish any state authority to deny a seawall permit.
253. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390 (1994). Ignoring transaction costs, the
present value of immediately dedicating an easement has a greater cost to the owner than
making it available to the public a few decades later. Cf supra Part II.C.1 (explaining why
the present value of acquiring an interest that vests in the future is far less than the present
value of an interest that vests immediately). However, when administrative costs are in-
cluded, the total cost may be less. The deferred dedication would require surveyors and
coastal geologists to monitor the erosion and make a determination when the wet beach
has been completely eroded, but immediate dedication avoids that cost.
254. See supra note 235.
1998] 1343
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:1279
FIGURE 9
FOUR APPROACHES TO PROTECTING ACCESS WHEN GRANTING A PERMIT
TO BUILD A BULKHEAD:
Is THERE A SUFFICIENT NEXUS UNDER NOLLAN/ODoLAN?
California Coastal
Commission Approach
Immediate Dedication
Before
Seawall
After
Seawall
Thirty
Years
Later
Sixty
Years
Later
[! -7 Private
Land
0 '' --
Public Trust
Tidelands
Private Lands with
Public Recreation
Easement
The California policy of requiring dedication of dry beach access in return for a seawall
permit has a nexus with the impact of the permit, because the seawall eventually impairs
wet beach access. But the condition does not directly offset the impact of the seawall, be-
cause the seawall eliminates the dry beach (and hence the access created by the condition)
before it eliminates the wet beach. A one-step easement, by contrast, is narrowly tailored to
restore access along the shore at the exact time when the seawall would otherwise elimi-
nate it, and hence would pass even the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test.
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Defer Dedication One-Step Easement
-~ a Oo
4~f
4 1 Official announcing expiration
of seawall permit that did not
make a provision for public acce
Immediate dedication of an easement above the seawall should meet the court's "rough
proportionality test" because the long-term effect is to protect the access along the shore
that the seawall eliminates. Deferred action, like a one-step easement, offsets only the
access that is lost, but it fails to make the dedication part of the initial permit. Therefore, it
might not be viewed as mitigation of a permit at all and hence could be judged as an
ordinary physical invasion.
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for example, the permit condition increases public access only for the
next thirty years in return for the partial loss of access caused by the
seawall between thirty and sixty years hence as well as the total loss of
access thereafter. Just as the bicycle path in Dolan would not have
directly offset the particular traffic generated by the expansion of the
business,255 dry beach dedication today does not directly offset the
loss in access from eventual loss of the wet beach.
The Dolan opinion, however, implies that one may be able to step
away from the particular time and place where access is preserved and
look at the total amount of beach to which the public has access. In a
state where new seawalls are continually causing the loss of the wet
beach to which the public has access, a policy of dry beach dedication
could prevent the overall amount of beach area to which the public
has access from declining. The Court in Dolan indicated that the dedi-
cation for a bike path would not have been a taking if the City had
proven that the bike path actually would offset the increase in traffic
caused by the store. It did not require proof that customers would all
take their bikes to the store or even that the traffic reduction had to
occur on the same day. 2 5 6 Thus, if a state agency can show, for exam-
ple, that the increase in pedestrian traffic along the beach created by
a dry beach dedication will offset the loss in traffic resulting from the
elimination of the wet beach, the dry beach dedication policy would
probably pass the Dolan test.
A final possibility is to defer action today and then require dedi-
cation of an easement above the bulkhead at a later date. For exam-
ple, eventually the seawall might need to be rebuilt. Some of the same
arguments for an immediate dedication would still apply.25 7 However,
deferring action and requiring a dedication later would present two
additional problems. First, if the beach is already lost, it may be more
difficult to convince a court that the impact of the permit is the loss of
the beach (even though, strictly speaking, denial of the permit would
eventually cause the bulkhead to be destroyed and the beach to reap-
pear). 258 Second, the political difficulties of requiring conditions for
255. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395 ("[T]he city has not met its burden of demonstrating that
the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by petitioner's development
reasonably relate to the city's requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle path-
way easement.").
256. See id. at 395-96 (holding that to support the dedication of land for a bike path, the
City must quantify the extent to which the path is likely to offset the increased traffic result-
ing from business expansion).
257. See supra Part II.B.5.
258. Given the assumption that people have the right to build and defend their homes,
this hurdle may be particularly severe. The hypothetical permit denial leading to the
[VOL. 57:12791346
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renewing a permit would be much greater than requiring the condi-
tion when the seawall is built the first time.259
C. Regulations That Deny Beneficial Use
In theory, courts decide whether a regulation is a taking by weigh-
ing its importance, economic impact, and interference with "invest-
ment-backed expectations. '26" Because such balancing is
subjective,261 the Court has identified two types of per se takings:
physical invasions and property regulations that deny all beneficial
use. 26 2 Although the Supreme Court has never precisely defined how
much must be taken to constitute a loss of "all economically beneficial
or productive use of land, 263 at least two lower courts have found
wetland-protection regulations to be takings when they prevented de-
velopment and decreased property values by roughly ninety
percent.264
beach regeneration might also destroy the property owner's home, thus implying that de-
nial of the permit would be essentially a taking of the home. In such a case, arguing that
the access being protected is something that the state could protect by denying the permit
would be even more difficult: Given the assumption in Part III that an owner has the right
to build a home, not only is access already gone but the state could not deny the permit
anyway.
259. See supra Part II.C.4.
260. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); accord Gazza
v. New York State Dep't of Envt. Conservation, 605 N.Y.S.2d 642, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1993)
("The rationale behind Lucas is not to punish the 'original' landowner, but to prevent a
windfall to sophisticated subsequent purchasers."), affd, 634 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div.
1995), affd, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 58 (1997). The Gazza court
stated that the state's Tidal Wetlands Act was one of the "bundle of limitations" accompa-
nying the property. Id. The court concluded: "He cannot reasonably argue that his invest-
ment-backed expectations were impacted by legislation which had long been in place when
he purchased the property." Id. at 645 (citation omitted).
261. Cf Loveladies Harbor Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388-89 (1988) (acknowl-
edging that balancing a governmental interest in preserving wetlands against a private
property interest reveals a private interest deserving compensation, but stating that the
"court is most reluctant to hold that a taking has occurred on this basis alone").
262. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) ("We have
... described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without
case-specific inquiry . . . . The first encompasses regulations . . . [creating] a physical
'invasion' of ... property .... [and] [t]he second . . . is where regulation denies all eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use of land.").
263. Id.
264. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 n.27 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(stating that a 95% decline in value would be a taking, but if the decline is closer to 60%,
"the correct outcome is no longer clear"); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 340
(1992) (finding that an 88% decline in property value frustrated investment-backed expec-
tations even though the remaining value of the property was still greater than the purchase
price).
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Must a property owner suffer such an overwhelming loss to be
entitled to compensation? The balancing test suggests that less impor-
tant regulations would warrant a lower threshold. If preventing wet-
lands from being filled is the only way to prevent their immediate
destruction, only a large impact on property values would be a taking.
However, if preventing future destruction is found to be less impor-
tant, then a smaller impact on property values could be a taking. Set-
backs may be particularly vulnerable to a balancing test, because there
is a lower cost measure that can provide the same protection: rolling
easements.
265
The next two sections examine two issues that courts would have
to consider when plaintiff landowners claim that a regulation has de-
prived them of the use of their property: (1) whether, for the purpose
of a taking, property can be physically or temporally partitioned, and
(2) which actions the government can regulate even when doing so
destroys the property's value. These issues would not arise with tide-
lands policies designed to protect access only. Because the owner can
build a house, the property's overall utility is not substantially dimin-
ished, let alone destroyed, either temporarily or permanently. 266 Nev-
ertheless, these questions may be important for policies that attempt
to ensure the continued survival of the tidelands themselves.
1. Partitioning the Estate for Takings Purposes.-When deciding
whether an owner has lost all beneficial use of the property, what por-
tion of the estate must one consider? This question contains both
geographic and temporal components. A setback of one foot, for ex-
ample, might deny all beneficial use to that first foot of land, yet
barely impair the use of the remaining land. By contrast, a rolling
easement might deny all beneficial use after the year 2100, yet barely
affect current property values today.
265. See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571 (explaining that courts must engage in ad hoc
balancing and must consider, among other factors, whether the government "limit[ed] the
constraints on property ownership to those necessary to achieve the public purpose"). The
balancing test provides an opportunity for courts to find a taking when the diminution in
value is less than total. See id. Nevertheless, some commentators are skeptical about
whether this capability survives Lucas. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1377 (1993) ("[T]he
Court has provided an effective blueprint for confiscation .... ").
266. Furthermore, however an estate might be partitioned in theory for takings pur-
poses, the right to exclude others from one particular part of the property is not a sub-
parcel that, if destroyed, would automatically trigger a taking. See Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (adopting a new test to clarify when a regulation can require
dedication of land or an easement without triggering a taking).
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a. Geographic Partitioning.-Unlike physical invasions, a reg-
ulation may not be a taking when it destroys the economic utility of
one part of a lot, as long as the parcel as a whole remains valuable.
267
Although Lucas was an exception, oceanfront setbacks have often
avoided the takings problem because the lots were deeper than the
setback. 268 However, protecting thousands of square miles by prevent-
ing development would often require larger setbacks and thereby in-
crease the likelihood of a taking. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a
taking can be minimized if setbacks are established before large lots
are subdivided. Although prohibiting bulkheads to protect homes
may deny all use, denying permits to protect eroding backyards does
not.
b. Temporal Partitioning.-By allowing development while re-
quiring it to be eventually removed, rolling easements partition an
estate temporally rather than geographically. Here too, the law has
only been partly settled. For example, if a regulation unconstitution-
ally prevents the productive use of land for a year, after which the
regulation is repealed, the state must compensate the owner for the
temporary taking.269 But when the regulation prevents the use of
267. See, e.g., Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568-69 (stating that per se partial takings apply
only to physical invasions, but noting that the Supreme Court has not yet considered par-
tial regulatory takings in detail). For an analysis of the anomalies that can result from not
recognizing partial regulatory takings, see Epstein, supra'note 265, at 1387-92, and William
W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1404-05 (1993). Some partial
regulatory takings, such as street setbacks, may be justified by the resulting mutual benefit.
See infra note 324 (explaining that no compensation is required under an eminent domain
partial taking when the part not taken appreciates in value by more than the value of the
portion taken as a direct result of the project for which the land was taken). To a point, a
mutual benefit also results from waterfront setbacks, because a single house built close to
the water blocks everyone's view of the shoreline. Cf WARD ET AL., supra note 19, at 48
(noting that "construction setback lines.... allow[ ] natural shoreline processes to operate
without interference and preserve[ ] the recreational and aesthetic values of the beach").
Beyond that, however, the owners are not the beneficiaries. See St. Amand, supra note 119,
at 11 (describing the anger of property owners in North Carolina after the enactment of
the Coastal Area Management Act and supporting guidelines that together created an ero-
sion setback line).
268. Cf St. Amand, supra note 119, at 11 (discussing how North Carolina
"grandfathered" small lots in its setback program).
269. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 321 (1987) (holding that "where the government's activities have already worked a
taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the
duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective"); see
also supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
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property at the end of a long period of time, the takings implications
are less clear.2 70
Zoning has often phased out nonconforming uses by allowing
such uses to continue for only a specified period of time,27 but usu-
ally there are alternative uses for the property.2 72 Although a policy
that required land to be abandoned fifty years hence would often al-
low no productive use when the deadline finally arrived, it would have
a trivial impact on the current value of the parcel.2 73 Thus, the doc-
trine of nonconforming use argues against the necessity of compensa-
tion for rolling easements. 27
4
Two Supreme Court cases concerning coal mining in Penn-
sylvania, when read together, imply that a regulation that eventually
curtails the useful lifetime of real property is less likely to be a taking
than a regulation requiring an immediate curtailment. Both Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon27 5 and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
270. Cf Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a taking does not occur when a regulation today removes from the bundle of
property rights the right to rebuild a house should it ever be destroyed by a storm, because
existing uses can continue and the impact on those uses is speculative). The long-term
contingent prohibition of bulkheads required by a rolling easement is much more re-
mote-and restricts less essential uses of property-than the potentially near-term contin-
gent prohibition of post-storm construction. Moreover, if a regulation that prohibits
bulkheads also allowed for nonstructural shore protection such as beach nourishment, the
impact on use would be even more "speculative."
271. See, e.g., Oswalt v. County of Ramsey, 371 N.W.2d 241, 246 & n.3 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that municipalities can phase out a nonconforming use without paying
compensation and that limiting repairs of partially destroyed structures is an acceptable
method to phase out nonconforming uses, but declining to decide whether a regulation
prohibiting the reconstruction of houses in a floodplain is a taking); Harbison v. City of
Buffalo, 152 N.E.2d 42, 47 (N.Y. 1958) (noting that a right to continue a nonconforming
use may be terminated after a reasonable period, during which the owner may have a fair
opportunity to amortize his investment and make future plans).
272. See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 162 N.W.2d
206, 213 (Minn. 1968).
273. See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining why the impact is trivial).
274. Extending this analogy, deferred action would be analogous to laws that require
removal of nonconforming uses without a fair opportunity to amortize the investment. See
Oswalt, 371 N.W.2d at 246. Hence, compensation would generally be required regardless
of this particular interpretation.
Along sandy public beaches, rolling easements may be viewed as physical invasions,
similar to the possibility of reverter for a defeasible estate. Courts have held that taking a
possibility of reverter does not require compensation when the condition that triggers the
reversion is not imminent. See B. Glenn, Annotation, Rights in Condemnation Award Where
Land Taken Was Subject to Possible Rights of Reverter or Re-entry, 81 A.L.R.2D 568 (1962). In
those cases, however, the rule did not benefit the government, but rather the current es-
tate holders, who were compensated for the full value of the estate. See id.
275. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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DeBenedictis2 76 involved split estates, in which coal companies owned
subsurface coal while other parties owned surface rights to the
land.27 7 In each case, the surface owner had conveyed the "support
estate," contractually accepting the risk of any subsidence resulting
from mining.
278
When construction that was vulnerable to subsidence replaced
preexisting land uses, the Pennsylvania legislature became concerned
about potential risks to public health and safety, and enacted the
Kohler Act of 1921,279 which prohibited mining whenever it
threatened homes with subsidence.2 8 ° Because the Act destroyed the
value of the plaintiffs support estate, the Mahon Court found it to be a
taking.28
1
Several decades later, the legislature passed the Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act of 1966,282 which also sought
to prevent serious subsidence by limiting the amount of coal that
could be extracted, but allowed mining to continue until subsidence
became a threat.283 In Bituminous Coal, the coal companies alleged
that by limiting the coal that they could remove, the State had taken
their coal for public use and completely destroyed the support es-
tate. 28 4 This time, the Court viewed the mineral estate as a whole and
found no taking.28 5
Comparing these two cases is similar to comparing deferred ac-
tion and rolling easements. Just as the Kohler Act destroyed the plain-
tiffs mineral estate to avoid an imminent risk posed to adjacent
276. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
277. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412; Bituminous Coal 480 U.S. at 500.
278. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412; Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 481-82.
279. The Kohler Act of 1921 was one of the Pennsylvania legislature's first attempts at
dealing with the problem of subsidence. See The Kohler Act, 1921 Pa. Laws 445 (codified
as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 661 (West 1998)) (regulating the mining of anthra-
cite coal).
280. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
281. See id. at 414-16. The Court also criticized the motives of the legislature as being
disingenuous. See id. at 398 (remarking that the purpose of the Kohler Act was "not to
protect the lives or safety of the public generally but merely to augment the property rights
of a favored few").
282. 1966 Pa. Laws 1 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-1406.21
(West 1998)). The 1966 Act, which regulated the mining of bituminous coal and declaring
a public interest in the support of surface structures, was more favorably received. See infra
note 285.
283. Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 476-77.
284. Id. at 498-500.
285. See id. at 500-01. The Court also had nicer things to say about this statute compared
with the Kohler Act. See id. at 488 ("[T] he Commonwealth is acting to protect the public
interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area." (citing the Bitumi-
nous Mine Subsidence and Land Conversation Act)).
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properties from sinking land,2 6  deferred action could destroy
shorefront land values by preventing bulkheads to avoid imminent
tideland loss from the rising sea. Likewise, just as the Subsidence Act
put mining companies on notice but allowed mining to continue until
it threatened neighboring property,28 7 rolling easements also put
owners on notice but allow homes to remain by the sea until contin-
ued occupation threatens elimination of the neighboring public
lands. If anything, a rolling easement would be less of a taking than
the Subsidence Act's limitation on mining.288 While the coal compa-
nies paid for the support estate that was taken,2 9 coastal landowners
generally have not paid the state (the owner of the tidelands) for the
right to erect a bulkhead.29 ° Moreover, the impact of a rolling ease-
ment on present property values would generally be less than the one-
to nine-percent reductions caused by the Subsidence Act.29 '
2. Nuisance Versus Public Use: Before and After Lucas.-
a. Before Lucas.-Courts have long viewed regulations that
abated nuisances differently than those that secured public benefits.
In Mahon, Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion emphasized the im-
portance of this distinction, declaring that a "restriction imposed to
protect the public health, safety, or morals from dangers threatened is
not a taking.... Restriction upon use does not become inappropriate
as a means, merely because it deprives the owner of the only use to
which the property can then be profitably put. '29 2 Justice Holmes's
286. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 398-99 (noting that the Kohler Act protected the surface
rights of the property owners whose right of subjacent support had been withheld or
waived).
287. See Bituminous Coal 480 U.S. at 501 ("Petitioners may continue to mine coal profita-
bly even if they may not destroy or damage surface structures at will in the process.").
288. Admittedly, the Subsidence Act merely hastened the closure of mines that would
have to close eventually anyway, while rolling easements affect fee simple property, which
theoretically lasts forever. Nevertheless, rolling easements only take effect if the shore
erodes. Therefore, rolling easements merely hasten the removal of structures that would
eventually have to be removed anyway.
289. See Bituminous Coal 480 U.S. at 478 (noting that coal companies acquired or re-
tained estates in land, but severed title between the coal underneath the surface and the
surface estate).
290. See infra note 366 and accompanying text (discussing how the common law of ero-
sion transfers title from a riparian owner to the state when the land is flooded by mean
high water).
291. Compare Appendix 1 (estimating the cost of rolling easements at typically less than
1% of coastal property values) with Bituminous Coa4 480 U.S. at 496 & n.24 (noting that the
Subsidence Act would reduce average coal production of 13 mines by about 1.8%, with
three mines having to leave at least 4% of the total coal in the ground).
292. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417-18 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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majority opinion did not dispute this distinction, but noted that the
Fifth Amendment's protection is even more fundamental: "When this
seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police
power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualifi-
cation more and more until at last private property disappears....
[I]f regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 29 3
This distinction has given courts substantial flexibility, because
many regulations can be characterized either way. 294 Tort theory sug-
gests a cost-benefit test: If the harm is greater than the abatement
cost, the property owner has a duty to abate the nuisance. 29 5 Yet, if
that principle is applied to the essential bundle of rights implied by
ownership, we quickly reach the point where "at last private property
disappears." 296 Nevertheless, some courts have conducted this type of
analysis even when these essential uses are involved.297
b. After Lucas.-Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas
cleared away some of this analytical underbrush. The fact that a regu-
293. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
294. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("[T]he
distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the
eye of the beholder."); id. at 1018 ("[Rlegulations that leave the owner of land without
economically beneficial or productive options for its use... carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise
of mitigating serious public harm.").
295. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979) (providing the general rule that
an activity may be a nuisance if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's
conduct).
296. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. If regulations that pass a cost-benefit test never required
compensation, the public would never have to purchase land for nature reserves and other
open space. Assuming that the government is rational, decisions to buy land always mean
that the value to society is greater if the land is kept in its natural condition. Therefore,
developing the land would have a greater harm than benefit, and would thus be a
nuisance.
297. See, e.g., McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
that if landowners are denied all use of their property, takings claims must balance the
public interest against the private deprivation); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham,
284 N.E.2d 891, 900 (Mass. 1972) (asserting that the social benefit of avoiding construction
in a floodplain outweighs an 88% reduction in property value resulting from prohibited
development). The balancing test from Penn Central allows courts to find a taking if the
loss is less than 100%. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978) (indicating that when the Court is "deciding whether a particular governmental
action has effected a taking .... [the focus is] on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole . . . ."). By
contrast, the balancing associated with a nuisance analysis allows a court to avoid finding a
taking when the deprivation equals 100%. Cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 & n.20 (1987) (describing "[t]he Court's hesitance to find
a taking when the State merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public
nuisances").
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lation controls a noxious use, he wrote, "cannot be the basis for de-
parting from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be
compensated. . . . [To hold otherwise] would essentially nullify
Mahon's affirmation of [the] limits to the noncompensable exercise of
the police power. '29 8 Instead, a state can avoid compensating the
property owner only if "the proscribed use interests were not part of
his title to begin with."29 9
Justice Scalia's elaboration leaves room for interpretation, but the
general thrust provides several avenues by which tideland policies
could escape the need to pay compensation. First, if the regulation
merely reaffirms a preexisting common law duty or power of the state
to limit construction, it is not a taking.300 Second, if the existing com-
mon law has not addressed the issue, but "common-law principles
would have prevented the erection" of the structures on the land,
then the regulation is not a taking.3" 1 Third, if statutes or regulations
have been in force long enough to have been factored into invest-
ment-backed expectations of property owners, their enforcement does
not require compensation. 0 2
Would the background principles of property law allow a state to
retain the tidelands as shores retreat? One must consider both gen-
eral property law and the unique attributes of coastal property law.
c. General Background Principles of Property Law.--A few states
have adopted the view that title to property does not include the right
to fill wetlands. 3 ' That rule, however, does not address dry land that
298. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
299. Id. at 1027.
300. See id. at 1029 ("Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that back-
ground principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership.")
301. Id. at 1031.
302. See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Takings Clause does
not require a static body of state property law .... Coastal property may present such
unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further in regulating its
development and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise permit."); Gazza
v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 605 N.Y.S.2d 642, 644-45 (Sup. Ct. 1993)
(holding that no taking had occurred because wetland regulation was already factored into
the investment-backed expectations of the property owner), affd, 634 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App.
Div. 1995), affrd, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 58 (1997).
303. See, e.g.,Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) (declaring that
an owner has "no absolute ... fight to change the essential natural character of his land
.... [and Government can limit] the use of private property to its natural uses"). This
widely cited statement probably understates the bundle of rights included in land owner-
ship: Housing, farming, and commercial land uses all destroy natural habitat and alter
regional hydrology. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC Eco-
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may become wet in the future. No court has yet contradicted the
South Carolina Supreme Court's holding on remand in Lucas that
nuisance law would not empower a state to impose setbacks that
render a parcel economically unproductive. Rolling easements, by
contrast, do not impair the property's use today,3 °4 and by the time
they must be enforced, many decades may have passed. As a result,
the rolling easement will have plenty of time to become part of the
investment-backed expectations in areas that are developed in the fu-
ture, 305  and perhaps even in areas that have already been
developed. 0 6
Deferred action will probably be a taking, except where the
unique aspects of coastal property law provide government with a ba-
sis for taking over shorefront property as the shore erodes. Conceiva-
bly, a twenty-foot rise in sea level will eventually occur, causing future
generations to consider homes on retreating shorelines to be as irre-
sponsible as Justice Scalia considers "a nuclear generating plant...
that... sits astride an earthquake fault, ' 3 7 in which case the common
law might respond by allowing the police power to require a massive
relocation of coastal homes without compensation. But prudence
does not warrant policies that depend on such a speculative
eventuality.
SYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 21 (1992) (describing a side effect of
agricultural and urban uses of land as "the degradation of aquatic ecosystems").
304. See supra notes 288-291 and accompanying text; cf Esposito v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that a taking does not occur
when a regulation eliminates the right to rebuild a house if a future storm should destroy
it, because the existing use continues and the regulation's impact on the land's use is
speculative).
305. In this case, the land will already be subject to a rolling easement before the land is
subdivided, developed, and sold.
306. Lower courts generally assume that the expectation of just compensation for a
prior regulatory taking is extinguished upon transfer. See Gazza, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45
(holding that just compensation is not required for a denial of a wedand permit for a
buyer who should have known that the permit would be denied). In areas where rolling
easements are likely to be politically feasible, most houses will not have to be moved until
several decades after the rolling easements are enacted. See supra note 158 and accompa-
nying text. Because most houses change hands at least once in the course of several dec-
ades, most of the property that has to be vacated will be owned by people who bought their
homes after the regulations were enacted, and thus will have no takings claim. Neverthe-
less, exempting current owners for several decades may be desirable, both to prevent tak-
ings claims and to protect preexisting investments in the minority of properties where
bulkheads will be needed soon. With or without such grandfather clauses, the apparent
nontransferability of the takings claim (or exemption) would tend to discourage transfers,
because the ability to sue for a taking (or maintain a property free of the rolling easement)
vanishes upon transfer, thereby effectively creating a transfer tax equal to the present value
of an exemption.
307. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:1279
d. Background Principles of Property Law Unique to the Coast.--A
body of law has gradually developed to address the unique problems
and opportunities found along the coast. According to the law of ac-
cretion and reliction (hereinafter the "law of erosion"), ownership mi-
grates inland when shores erode. 08 Moreover, the public trust
doctrine requires the state to hold the tidelands in trust for the peo-
ple," °' and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 3 10
transfers a concurrent interest known as the federal "navigation servi-
tude.13 1 1 Federal statutes authorize the Corps of Engineers to regu-
late and deny permits to fill navigable waterways, including
wetlands. 312 Finally, statutes and the police power enable states to
limit threats to health or safety due to construction in floodplains313
or septic tank discharges314 in areas with high water tables.
All of these doctrines diminish the rights of coastal lowland own-
ers, compared with the rights of noncoastal dryland owners. While
some of these doctrines may have imposed takings when first imple-
mented,315 the older doctrines have become background principles of
308. See infta note 338 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the law of
erosion).
309. See infta notes 440-444 and accompanying text (discussing the state's responsibility
toward the tidelands).
310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
311. See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 276 (1897) (holding that riparian prop-
erty is subject to a dominant federal servitude); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 215 (5th Cir.
1970) (holding that the navigation servitude includes the power to deny a permit to fill the
marsh below mean high water without compensating landowners); Coastal Petroleum Co.
v. United States, 524 F.2d 1206, 1211 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (holding that the navigation servitude
includes a power to mine limestone and build levees on land below mean high water with-
out compensating landowners).
312. See The Clean Water Act of 1977, § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994) (regulating the
manner in which dredge or fill material can be disposed of in navigable waterways); accord
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, § 10, 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 409 (1994) (declaring it unlaw-
ful to fill navigable waterways without the permission of the Corps of Engineers).
313. Compare Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed Dist., 283 N.W.2d 538, 542-43 (Minn.
1979) (finding no taking when a regulation restricted filling land in a floodplain, because
the fill narrowed the remaining floodway and would thereby increase flooding elsewhere)
with Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770, 773-74 (Conn. 1964) (finding
a taking when floodplain regulation prevented residential development and reduced prop-
erty values by 75%) and Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-
Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232, 239-41 (N.J. 1963) (finding a taking when regulation prevented
development in order to preserve a natural floodwater detention basin).
314. See, e.g., Lenawee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 205-07 (Mich.
1982) (denying a claim for rescission of a contract when, due to an irreparably defective
septic tank, rental property was effectively rendered worthless by the Board of Health,
which condemned the property and obtained a permanent injunction proscribing human
habitation).
315. Compare supra note 264 (discussing how a new wetland regulation can be a taking)
with infra note 316 and accompanying text (discussing how wetland regulation is not a
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coastal property law, and the newer statutes are now part of the invest-
ment-backed expectations of those who purchase coastal land.316
Under at least some conditions, any of these principles might allow a
state to enjoin activities that threaten tidelands.31 7
3. When Is a Tideland-Protection Policy a Taking?-The following
discussion briefly applies the doctrines introduced earlier in this Part
to the three basic policies for protecting tidelands, maintaining the
assumption that property owners have a right to hold back the sea.
a. Rolling Easements.-A statute or regulation that declares
the existence of rolling easements in undeveloped areas" 8 is unlikely
to be a taking, even in a state that recognizes a right to hold back the
sea.319 In general, rolling easements would not deny all productive
use. Although productive use would eventually end if and when the
sea level rises to a particular elevation, the regulation itself does not
prevent productive use when instituted.32 ° Moreover, because the
contingency would generally be decades-perhaps centuries-away,
the impact on property values would be very small.32 t If included as a
condition for a subdivision or building permit, rolling easements
taking when such regulation is already incorporated into investment-backed expectations).
Compare Gibson, 166 U.S. at 271-72, 276 (holding that the congressional power to regulate
navigable waterways under the Commerce Clause implies a navigation servitude, so that
the government's interference with private riparian fights along inland navigable water-
ways does not require compensation) with Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180
(1979) (holding that the same congressional power does not exempt the government from
having to compensate riparian owners along waterways that were not navigable until pri-
vate efforts connected them to the sea).
316. See, e.g., Gazza v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 605 N.Y.S.2d 642,
644 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that a property owner who bought wetlands at a discount
because of known restrictions on development did not suffer a taking when a building
permit was denied), affd, 634 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 1995), affd, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 58 (1997).
317. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the oldest of these principles, the law of erosion
and the public trust doctrine.
318. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing rolling easements as a means of prohibiting bulk-
heads or any other structures that interfere with naturally migrating shores).
319. See infra Part IV.C.2 (explaining that, in undeveloped areas, rolling easements allow
the state to take over lands to which the state is already entitled under the law of erosion,
so that no taking results); infra Part VI.A.3 (same).
320. See supra notes 143-149 and accompanying text (discussing how rolling easements
are consistent with private land use until the rising tide renders the land public).
321. See infra Part V (noting that the required compensation is minimal even if a rolling
easement is a taking).
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should pass the Nollan-Dolan test for the same reason that a one-step
easement passes this test.
322
The most likely situation in which a court would find a taking
would be when someone buys shorefront property before a regulation
to protect tidelands is enacted and then is forced to abandon that
property. The more common scenario would involve people who
purchase property after the regulation is issued. These people would
find it almost impossible to successfully challenge the regulation as a
taking, because the regulation will have been factored into their in-
vestment-backed expectations.
The owners of property that is not directly along the shore today
would be even less likely to have a valid takings claim. Because the
rolling easement would enable these properties to become shorefront
for a time before eventually having to become abandoned, the policy
might actually increase property values in many cases. 23 This in-
crease would preclude a taking even if the property had not been
transferred. 24
b. Deferring Action.-If states avoid addressing the problem
of rising sea level, and then prohibit bulkheads at some point in the
future, takings claims may succeed more often. If a house could be
economically relocated, but there was no room on the existing lot,
then denying a bulkhead permit would often deprive the owner of the
use of the land. If the house could not be salvaged, then the denial
would deprive the owner of the use of the house-even if there was
room on the lot to build another home. If the home could be moved
back and still remain within the same lot, then there would not be an
immediate taking, because the property would still be usable. Never-
theless, the continued erosion of the shore would eventually make the
322. For a discussion of the Dolan test, see supra notes 237-247 and accompanying text.
Just as a one-step easement would pass this test because it only protects public access, see
supra note 154 and accompanying text, a rolling easement should pass the Dolan test be-
cause a permit condition that requires a rolling easement simply enables the inland migra-
tion of wetlands that would occur if the permit were not issued, see supra Part II.B.
323. Increases in value would be most common for the second row of houses along the
shore, where the prospect of a waterfront view relatively soon might increase the property
value by more than the reduction resulting from the rolling easement's requirement that
the property must be eventually abandoned. See supra note 186.
324. See, e.g., C.D. Sumner, Annotation, Eminent Domain: Deduction of Benefits in Determin-
ing Compensation or Damages in Proceedings Involving Opening Widening, or Otherwise Altering
Highway, 13 A.L.R.3D 1149, 1153 (1967) (explaining the general rule that when only part
of a property is taken by eminent domain, any benefit to the remaining property can be
offset against the required compensation).
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property unusable, and therefore, the ability to relocate the house
might merely delay the finding of a taking.3
25
c. Preventing Development. -Most policies that prohibit devel-
opment in an area likely to be inundated by a rising sea would involve
at least some takings, because thousands of square miles of land could
be inundated.3 26 Consider, for example, a new setback that prohib-
ited development below the five-foot contour. Someone who had just
bought a small lot that was useful only as a building site, but was en-
tirely below that elevation, would be deprived of beneficial use in the
same way that David Lucas was deprived.327 Someone else with a lot
that was partly above the contour could still build a home; it would
just have to be on the high ground. In agricultural areas, where lots
have not yet been subdivided, developers who bought farms entirely
below the five-foot contour and paid a substantial premium for the
land might have a takings claim because they assumed that the prop-
erty could be subdivided. 28 However, those who bought parcels that
were partly above the five-foot contour would probably not have a via-
ble claim as long as they could make an economically viable use of the
parcel as a whole. As long as farming remained viable, the farmers
who bought the land based on its agricultural value would not have a
claim.
29
Setbacks do not involve dedicating land to the state. Therefore,
they do not present a Nollan-Dolan issue. 3 This issue would arise,
325. Deferring action in this case would require an analysis similar to declaring today
that rolling easements are in effect in areas that are already developed. The property is not
rendered immediately useless, but owners are told that the lifetime of their property has
been shortened. The main difference between rolling easements and the choice to defer
action is that, in the latter case, when owners are finally told that they cannot hold back the
sea, they must immediately spend money moving the house away from the shore.
326. See supra Part II.A.3-4.
327. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009, 1011-13 (1992)
(stating that a setback regulation had deprived Lucas of all beneficial use of his property);
see also supra Part III.A (discussing Lucas).
328. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (noting the relevance of investment-
backed expectations in a takings analysis).
329. See supra notes 260-262 (discussing the rule that there cannot be a regulatory taking
unless investment-backed expectations are frustrated). Farmers generally invest in farm-
land with the expectation of farming; hence, limiting the land use does not generally frus-
trate their investment-backed expectations. However, equity, economic efficiency, political
feasibility, and the difficulty of deciding how much land to protect, may be more important
reasons for avoiding an exclusive reliance on setbacks and other strategies that prevent
development. See supra Part II.C.
330. See supra Part III.B.2 (explaining the Nollan-Dolan doctrine in the context of poli-
cies to protect access along the shore when bulkhead permits are issued).
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however, if a permit condition required a developer to dedicate"5 t part
of the parcel's lowlands332 to ensure that wetlands were able to mi-
grate inland. A takings challenge to such a requirement would be
more likely to succeed than if the permit simply prohibited develop-
ment in those lowlands. 33 Nevertheless, it could probably pass the
Nollan-Dolan test with the proper showing that the condition is
designed to address the effect of the permit itself.314 Perhaps the key
showing would be that the dedication is genuinely designed to offset
eventual wetland loss rather than to serve an immediate purpose such
as a park or nature reserve. 35 Dedicating land within five feet of
mean high water would probably pass such a test, but dedicating a
parcel that was mostly more than twenty feet above sea level would
probably not.336 Although a rational policy maker might prepare for
331. See supra notes 251-253 and accompanying text.
332. This Article uses "lowlands" to refer to lands that are dry today but are low enough
to be tidally flooded if sea level rises significantly.
333. Compare Part III.C.1 (explaining that there is generally no taking when only a frac-
tion of a parcel is placed off-limits to development) with Part III.B.1 (discussing cases where
there was a taking when permit conditions required dedication of part of a parcel).
334. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. At first glance, requiring an immediate
dedication of land might appear to have some similarity to the dedication of the floodway
that the Court rejected in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1994). Just as the
dedication of a floodway was unnecessary when a nondevelopment restriction would suf-
fice, see id. at 393, so one might think that dedicating lowland for wetland migration is
unnecessary. There is, however, a difference. The City of Tigard's proposed dedication
would have increased its total land holdings. See id. at 380. By contrast, setting aside part
of a parcel for wetland migration merely diminishes the extent to which the development
decreases the intertidal (and publicly owned) wetlands in the long run. Thus, requiring a
dedication of coastal land for wetland migration is more analogous to the Dolan bike path,
which was intended to counteract the effect of the property owner's development on the
publicly owned streets. See id. at 395 ("Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and other public
ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a proposed
property use."). However, unlike the City of Tigard's convoluted and unsuccessful attempt
to show that the bike path mitigated the transportation problems caused by the store at
issue, see id. at 381, the showing necessary to justify wetland dedication would be straight-
forward, see infra note 335 and accompanying text.
335. Compare Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395-96 (holding that a taking could be avoided by show-
ing that the required dedication would actually avoid the problem associated with issuing
the construction permit) with Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42
(1987) (holding that private property had been taken after having noted that the State had
an ongoing program of purchasing the same type of beach access that was being required
as a permit condition, but that dedication would not avoid the problem associated with
issuing the construction permit). Thus, a permit condition with respect to wetlands can be
justified, but only by an actual intent to offset the wetland loss created by the proposed
development.
336. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that along much of the United
States coast, a four-meter rise in sea level has a 1% chance of occurring by the year 2200.
EPA 1995, supra note 2, at iii, 145. Even a disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet
would only raise sea level about 20 feet. Id. at 89 (citing H.W. Menard & Stuart M. Smith,
Hypsometry of Ocean Basin Provinces, 71 J. GEOPHYSICAL REs. 4305 (1966)). Furthermore,
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a very unlikely event occurring over a very long time period, courts are
skeptical about whether such foresight is really the rationale when
more immediate explanations are apparent.
337
IV. Do PROPERTY OWNERS HAVE A COMMON LAW RIGHT TO
ELIMINATE WETLANDS AND BEACHES?
For over one thousand years riparian property lines have re-
treated whenever shores have eroded. 3 8 Consequently, in undevel-
oped areas, the "law of erosion" always recognized a rolling easement.
But suppose a bulkhead prevents the shore from retreating: Should
the boundary move inland anyway? If not, is the bulkhead a nuisance?
To analyze this question, consider a situation in which the tide-
lands are owned by a private party. If the owner of the adjacent dry
land builds a bulkhead, and thereby prevents the property line from
migrating inland, the bulkhead would reallocate land ownership from
the tideland owner to the dryland owner. The tideland owner could
argue that because the dryland owner took away her land, she should
be compensated. However, if a house had been built, the dryland
owner could counter that the bulkhead benefitted society in that the
private house is worth more than a wetland or a beach. A common
law court deciding whether the law of erosion should only apply to
such an occurrence is generally thought to be unlikely over the next several centuries. See
id. at 85, 113-14 (discussing the impact of the Antarctic ice sheet on sea level); IPCC 1995,
supra note 2, at 364, 389 (noting the impossibility of estimating the likelihood of a collapse
of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet over the next 100-1000 years, but concluding that such an
occurrence by 2100 is very unlikely).
337. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985) (find-
ing no rational basis for denying a permit to build a home for the mentally retarded in a
500-year floodplain when plaintiff alleged that the denial was motivated by discrimination
against the mentally retarded).
338. See, e.g., County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 66-69 (1874) (quot-
ing the Institutes ofJustinian, Code Napoleon, and Blackstone for the universal rule that a
boundary shifts with the shore); Ford v. Turner, 142 So. 2d 335, 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962) ("The boundary lines of land... restrict[ ] as that margin gradually changes or shifts
by reason of accretion or erosion."); Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean
City, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (Md. 1975) ("Land inundated by mean high water reverts to State
ownership .... when, as a result of gradual erosion, fast land becomes submerged.");
Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 519-20 (Miss. 1986) (en banc) (stat-
ing that where the forces of nature raise sea level, the public lands expand inland without
compensation), affd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
The Lovingston Court noted: " 'The question is well-settled at common law .... Every
proprietor whose land is thus bounded is subject to loss by the same means which may add
to his territory, and as he is without remedy for his loss in this way he cannot be held
accountable for his gain.'" Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 68 (quoting Mayor of New
Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 717 (1836)); accord Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 35 (1894) ("The rule, everywhere admitted ... is equally applicable to lands bound-
ing on tide waters or on fresh waters . . ").
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undeveloped areas would have to weigh the value of protecting tide-
lands against the value of encouraging development. 339
When tidelands are owned by the public, however, the common
law replaces this balancing with a per se rule known as the "public
trust doctrine": The state retains ownership of the tidelands unless it
decides otherwise. 34" This "doctrine" is really two doctrines: (1) the
"property doctrine," which is a universally accepted set of principles
regarding the ownership of submerged lands at the time of statehood
and subsequent changes in ownership, and (2) an "expansive doc-
trine," which is a controversial theory of substantive due process that
invalidates even legislative grants of submerged lands.3 4' Subpart A
below describes the origins of the public trust doctrine, and subpart B
explains the relationship between the law of erosion and the property
portion of the public trust doctrine. Subpart C examines the implica-
tions of these doctrines for the three tideland protection policies.
This Article focuses on the "property doctrine" because its tideland-
protection features apply to every coastal state. Nevertheless, subpart
D examines the takings implications of the more expansive doctrine.
Although the focus here is state law, most of the reasoning applies
equally to the federal government's navigation servitude.
A. Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine42
In 1820, Robert Arnold, a waterfront property owner found
Benajah Mundy collecting oysters from the mudflats on his property
in Perth Amboy, New Jersey. 4 3 Showing surveys and titles to those
lands dating back to a grant from Charles II to the Duke of York, the
property owner sued in trespass. 44 The shellfish collector defended
339. See infra Part IV.C.I.b (applying the common law of nuisance to bulkhead
construction).
340. See infta Part IV.B.1 (explaining that tidelands are publicly owned under the com-
mon law); infra Part IV.D (explaining that in some states the public trust doctrine invali-
dates legislative grants of tidelands, and in other states the doctrine is a rule of
construction with a presumption that the legislature has not permanently placed tidelands
into private hands unless the statute indicates an explicit intention to do so).
341. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631 (1986) (discuss-
ing the economic and environmental pitfalls from relying on the expansive doctrine).
Like most critics of the public trust doctrine, Lazarus accepts the validity of the property
doctrine.
342. Although the focus in this and the following three subparts is on state law, most of
the reasoning applies equally to the federal government's navigation servitude. Cf id. at
636-37 (discussing the federal navigation servitude as an early application of the public
trust doctrine in the United States).
343. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 1-2 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
344. Id. at 2-3
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on the grounds that the mudflats were incapable of ownership.34 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the civil law, the Magna
Carta, and subsequent English cases and concluded that before the
American revolution, the King had no authority to grant ownership of
tidelands to private individuals:
[T]he ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both
the water and the land under the water, for purpose of pass-
ing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance,
and all the other uses of the water and its products (a few
things excepted) are common to all the citizens, and . . .
each has a right to use them according to his
346necessities ....
In so holding, the NewJersey court recognized a doctrine that since at
least sixth century Rome had given the public the right to enter any
beach and fish, construct cottages, land boats, and off-load cargo.347
In the following decades, the United States Supreme Court stated that
all thirteen original states followed the public trust doctrine348 and
that new states were also granted submerged lands upon statehood. 49
345. Id. at 2-4.
346. Id. at 76-77.
347. The Institutes of Justinian state:
All persons therefore are as much at liberty to bring their vessels to the bank, to
fasten ropes to the trees growing there, and to place any part of their cargo there,
as to navigate the river itself. But the banks of a river are the property of those
whose land they adjoin; and consequently the trees growing on... them are also
the property of the same persons....
Any person is at liberty to place on [the shore] a cottage, to which he may
retreat, or to dry his nets there, and haul them from the sea.
J. INST. 2.1.4, 2.1.5.
348. See Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366, 410 (1842) ("For when the
revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them,
for their own common use.. . ."). ChiefJustice Taney pointed out that submerged lands
had originally been "held by the king... as the representative of the nation, and in trust
for them." Id. at 409. Thus,
"[T]he dominion and propriety in the navigable waters, and in the soils under
them, passed, as a part of the prerogative rights annexed to the political powers
conferred on the Duke;" and "in his hands they were intended to be a trust for
the common use of the new community ... a public trust for the benefit of the
whole community, to be freely used by all for navigation and fishery, as well for
shell fish as floating fish," -and not as "private property, to be parcelled out and
sold .... "
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 16 (1894) (emphasis added) (quoting Martin, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) at 411-13).
349. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229-30 (1845). A century later, the
Supreme Court held that the federal government had retained tidelands along the ocean
coasts of all new states. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-41 (1947). Congress
overruled this decision with the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356
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B. Interrelationships Between the Law of Erosion and the Public
Trust Doctrine
1. The Public Trust Doctrine of Property Law.-According to the
public trust doctrine, navigable waters and the underlying lands were
publicly owned at the time of statehood, and grants of riparian land
do not reduce the public's right to use submerged lands unless the
state's intent to do so is unambiguous. 5 ' Early courts justified this
doctrine on the ground of the sanctity of preexisting arrangements.351
Commentators have emphasized that from an economic standpoint,
navigable waters and roadways are logically public goods: Most land is
privatized because the administrative costs of having private property
(e.g., title keeping and rent collection) are small compared with the
benefits (e.g., privacy, more efficient use, and avoiding a tragedy of
the commons).352 Along beaches, waterways, and roads, by contrast,
the likelihood of a tragedy of the commons and a need for privacy is
much less.353 Up to a point, there may even be safety benefits from
additional users.354
(1994 & Supp. 1 1995), which grants the states the ocean floor out to the three-mile limit,
see 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994).
350. See Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410; see also David C. Slade et al., The Conveyance of
Public Trust Land and the Nature of the Remaining Servitude, in PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE TO WORK, supra note 33, at 175, 180-81 nn.5-10 (discussingiudicial limitations on
the ability of states to convey public trust lands to private parties); cf United States v. Den-
ver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 (1893) ("It is... the well-settled rule of this court
that public grants are construed strictly against the grantees, but they are not to be so
construed as to defeat the intent of the legislature . . ").
351. See, e.g., Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410 ("The question must be regarded as settled
in England, against the right of the king, since Magna Charta, to make such a grant [of
public trust lands]."); Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 73-78 (stating that the existence of the public trust
doctrine since the Magna Carta implies that the king had no power to sell public trust
lands).
352. See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 715-23 (1986) (suggesting why certain types of prop-
erty are vested in the public "where many persons desire access to or control over a given
property, but they are too numerous and their individual stakes too small to express their
preferences in market transactions").
353. See id. at 722-30 (discussing the traditional doctrines of prescription, public trust,
and custom as justifications for the public ownership of roads and waterways). Given this
common law justification for the public trust doctrine, a possible justification for privatiz-
ing estuarine shores in some areas might be that, compared with the ocean coast, the
estuarine tidelands are no longer important for "passing and repassing, navigation, fishing,
fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses of the water and its products." Arnold, 6 N.J.L.
at 77. Newly recognized uses of the tidelands, such as recreation and environmental
habitat may provide countervailing reasons to keep these tidelands in public hands. See
supra Part II.A (explaining the uses of estuarine shores).
354. In cases where additional people did pose a crowding problem, such as port con-
struction, even the expansive public trust doctrine allowed a certain amount of privatiza-
tion. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 405-11 (1892) (citing an 1869
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FIGURE 10
THE NEED FOR ROLLING EASEMENTS ALONG THE TEXAS COAST
Failure to enforce the rolling easement policy impairs transportation along the shore, a
traditional use of the beach in Texas. In the area depicted, authorities have been forced to
restrict traffic to one-way only. Photo taken near Access Road 3 along the northern por-
tion of San Padre Island, Texas, March 29, 1998.
Cases invoking the public trust doctrine usually refer to "naviga-
ble waters," but "navigable" includes areas subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide whether or not they are truly navigable.35 5 Tidelands are
usually included because of the needs associated with hunting, fish-
ing,35 6 transportation along the shore (see Figure 10),3 5 and landing
boats for rest or repairs. Most states own the land up to the high water
legislative grant of a portion of the Lake Michigan shore to a railroad company). By the
same token, many communities charge beach user fees, but only for the relatively crowded
ocean beaches and only during peak periods of use. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Im-
provement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 358-60 (NJ. 1984) (discussing a municipal association's
use of fees and restrictions to provide access to the beach for its residents in light of
overcrowding).
355. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988) (" [T] he States
have interests in lands beneath tidal waters which have nothing to do with navigation ....
It would be odd to... suggest that the sole measure of the expanse of such [public trust
tide]lands is the navigability of the waters over them." (citations and footnote omitted)).
356. See supra notes 347-348 and accompanying text.
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mark,358 which is usually construed as mean high water; therefore, the
public trust includes mudflats, low marsh, and wet beach-but not
high marsh or dry beach.359 Hawaii, New York, Oregon, Washington,
and Louisiana include the dry beach as well. 6° In Maine, Massachu-
setts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia, publicly owned land ex-
tends only up to the low water mark, but the public has access to the
tidelands for fishing, hunting, and navigation (see Figure 11).6'
In several states the public now has the right to access along all or
part of the privately owned dry beach. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has expanded the public trust doctrine to include access along
the dry beach for recreation as well as the traditional public trust pur-
poses. 62 The public has access along the dry beach in Oregon, Texas,
and parts of Florida based on the doctrine of customary use.3 63 A
number of states have gradually obtained access in particular areas
through purchases or voluntary assignment by the property owners in
357. See, e.g., Texas Open Beaches Act, 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 15.7(h) (West 1997) ("A
local government shall not... close a public beach to pedestrian or vehicular traffic with-
out prior approval of the General Land Office:").
358. See, e.g., Board of Pub. Works v. Larmar Corp., 277 A.2d. 427, 437 (Md. 1971) ("It is
well established that the title of land below the highwater mark, as well as rivers or streams
within the ebb and flow of the tide, belong to the public."); Slade et al., supra note 33, at 44
n.58 (listing cases from all 23 tidewater state courts defining the landward boundary of the
public trust).
359. See fig.2.
360. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 451 (West 1980) ("Seashore is the space of land over
which the waters of the sea spread in the highest tide during the winter season."); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 90.58.030(2) (b) (West Supp. 1998) (defining ordinary high water mark
with respect to the vegetation line); In reAshford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968) (defining
the seaward boundary mark to be the vegetation line); Dolphin Lane Assocs. v. Town of
Southampton, 333 N.E.2d 358, 360 (N.Y. 1975) (locating the high water line by reference
to the line of vegetation); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 674 (Or. 1969)
(construing high water mark as equal to the vegetation line). The vegetation line is well
inland and above the mean high water. See fig.2.
361. Slade et al., supra note 33, at 69 n.22, 70 n.23.
362. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (ex-
panding the public trust inland along the ocean by recognizing a right to sunbathe and
otherwise enjoy the dry beach between mean high water and the vegetation line). The
court declared that in NewJersey the public trust doctrine also includes a right of access to
the shore: "To say that the public trust doctrine entitles the public to swim in the ocean
and to use the foreshore in connection therewith without assuring the public of a feasible
access route would seriously impinge on, if not effectively eliminate, the rights of the pub-
lic trust doctrine." Id. at 364.
363. See Hay, 462 P.2d at 673, 676-77 (holding that the public has access to the privately
owned dry beach based on the doctrine of custom); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 97
(Tex. App. 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a trial court holding that the public has ac-
quired access to the beach seaward of the natural vegetation line through prescription,
dedication, and custom); see also City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama Inc., 294 So. 2d 73,
78 (Fla. 1974) (holding that in the particular area under consideration, the public had an
easement to the privately owned dry sand beach based on the doctrine of custom).
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return for proposed beach nourishment. 64 However, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine invalidated as a taking a legislative effort to
expand the existing right of access along the wet beach to include
recreational activities.365
2. The Law of Erosion.-The property lines between private and
public land move inland with eroding shores and seaward with ad-
vancing shores, 366 assuming that the shoreline change is natural.
When riparian landowners cause the shorelines to advance seaward,
virtually all courts have held that, under the common law, the riparian
owner does not get title to the new lands.367 A majority of states award
364. Beach nourishment projects sponsored by the Corps of Engineers often motivate
the creation of public access along the shore. See, e.g., infra note 373 (discussing the fed-
eral policy of providing beach nourishment only for beaches that are open to the public);
supra note 151 (suggesting that communities in South Carolina may open their beaches to
the public to obtain beach nourishment). For example, during the 1980s, the State of
Maryland had to obtain access along the dry beach before the Corps of Engineers could
undertake the beach nourishment project there. See infra note 373; see also Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (mentioning an ongoing program by the
California Coastal Commission of acquiring dry beach access).
365. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176-77 (Me. 1989) (holding a statute that
"imposed upon all intertidal land... an easement for use by the general public for 'recrea-
tion' without limitation" to violate the Takings Clauses of the Maine and United States
Constitutions).
366. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201 (a) (1996) ("A person who is the owner of land
bounding on navigable water is entitled to any natural accretion to the person's land
... ."); Ford v. Turner, 142 So. 2d 335, 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (stating that the
boundary lines of land located on the bed of a stream or other body of water extend or
restrict as the water line shifts by reason of accretion or erosion and that "newly formed
land belongs to the owner of the land to which it is an accretion"); Carolina Beach Fishing
Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 177 S.E.2d 513, 517 (N.C. 1970) (holding that, be-
cause property boundary shifts with advancing and retreating shore, the town's construc-
tion of a sand berm at a location that was no longer above mean high water did not
constitute a taking because the erosion had divested the landowner of title to the land); see
also supra note 338.
367. See, e.g., Patton v. City of Wilmington, 147 P. 141, 142 (Cal. 1915) (holding that
artificial accretions accrue to the state). But see California ex reL State Lands Comm'n v.
United States, 457 U.S. 273, 285 (1982) (holding that, under federal common law, accre-
tions along the ocean beach accrue to the upland owner, whether or not such accretions
are artificial and whether or not the riparian owner is responsible for presence of the
structure causing the accretions). See generally Annotation, Waters: Rights in Respect of
Changes by Accretion or Reliction Due to Artificial Conditions, 134 A.L.R. 467, 472 (1941) ("In
general, a riparian owner cannot claim title to land added by accretion or formed by relic-
tion as a result of creating by himself an artificial condition causing the accretion or relic-
tion."). The Court in State Lands Commission applied federal common law because the
federal government was the riparian owner. State Lands Comm'n, 457 U.S. at 283-84.
In Maryland, an 1862 statute repealed the common law rule and awarded property
owners title to any land created by filling tidal waters. See 1862 Md. Laws ch. 129, § I ("The
proprietor of land bounding on any of the navigable waters of this State, is hereby declared
to be entitled to all accretions to said land by the recession of said water, whether hereto-
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the riparian owner the artificially formed land if she is not responsible
for the accretion (e.g., a federal navigation jetty causing the shore to
advance seaward) .368 The minority rule, however, vests the state pub-
lic trust with the new land.369
The majority rule has two practical advantages. Determining
what portion of a shoreline change resulted from artificial causes,
such as sedimentation from a jetty or a river diversion, is much more
difficult than determining how much the shoreline changed when the
owner filled some wetlands.3 7° Moreover, the majority rule prevents
the state from depriving shorefront owners of their riparian access by
pumping sand onto the beach and creating new land.3 71 That "advan-
tage" can also create a problem: Beach nourishment reduces the vul-
nerability of all oceanfront homes to erosion and storns.3 72 These
public projects may be delayed, however, if a few of the owners insist
fore or hereafter formed or made by natural causes or otherwise . . . ."); Board of Pub.
Works v. Larmar Corp., 277 A.2d 427, 436 (Md. 1971) (concluding that under the 1862
statute, a riparian owner had the right to make artificial landfill in navigable waters in front
of his shore). Although that right was curtailed in 1970, see id. at 442 & n.6 (noting that
afterJuly 1, 1970, a party desiring to alter its shoreline had to obtain a license pursuant to
the Wetlands Act of 1970), property owners are still awarded title to land created by ero-
sion control activities, as well as land created to offset shoreline erosion that has occurred
since January 1, 1972, see MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201 (1996).
368. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 324 So. 2d 746, 750 (Miss. 1975)
(holding that when accretion is caused by the Corps of Engineers or another stranger
without the complicity of the upland owner, artificial accretion goes to the upland owner);
see also Slade et al., supra note 33, at 105-08 (listing cases holding that artificial accretions
caused by a third party accrue to the dryland owner in Alabama, Alaska, Illinois, Massachu-
setts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New York, and Wisconsin); Anno-
tation, supra note 367, at 468 ("Generally, a riparian owner is not precluded from
acquiring land by accretion or reliction, notwithstanding the fact that the accumulation is
brought about partly by artificial obstructions erected by third persons, where the riparian
owner had no part in erecting the artificial barrier."); infra note 369.
369. See Slade et al., supra note 33, at 105-08 (listing cases holding that artificial accre-
tions caused by a third party do not accrue to the dryland owner in California, Florida,
Hawaii, and Texas).
370. The shoreline change caused by filling can be ascertained simply by comparing
surveys from before and after the land was filled, and the change is often obvious to the
naked eye because the fill is a different material than found naturally on the beach. By
contrast, if a shore slowly accretes as a result of an artificial structure, the newly created
land will be made from the same sediments that are already found on the shore. For
example, if a structure catches whatever sand is washing along the beach, the material
caught will, by definition, be the same as the material already found on the beach.
371. See, e.g., Larmar Corp., 277 A.2d at 432 ("If an intervening party were permitted to
gain title to accretions.., the riparian landowner would be deprived of his valuable water-
access rights.").
372. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION app. E at
257-58 (1995) (discussing beach nourishment costs and benefits).
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upon reaping the additional benefit of title to the newly created
beach. 73
When a shore retreats, the boundaries retreat-regardless of
whether the erosion is natural or anthropogenic 4 Were it other-
wise, the public trust rights, such as lateral beach access, would be
routinely eliminated-even on the ocean shore, where jetties and
groins regularly cause pockets of erosion.
From the standpoint of traditional property law, the law of ero-
sion is like the law of defeasible estates, in which title to land changes
hands when a specific condition occurs.375 Courts have long dealt
with conditional grants in which a landowner conveys a piece of land
but only for so long as it is used for a church,376 a park,377 a rail-
road, 378 or a school 3 7 9 or until the occurrence of a specified event.
3 8 0
373. The State of Maryland and the Corps of Engineers had to address this issue before
undertaking a large beach nourishment project at Ocean City, Maryland. Personal Com-
munication with John Van Fossen, supra note 24. The state law authorizing the beachfill
project specified that any land created by the project would belong to the State. See MD.
CODE ANN., NAT. RES. II § 8-1103 (1990). Before the project was undertaken, the State also
obtained public easements to what remained of the dry beach, which was then privately
owned. Personal Communication with John Van Fossen, supra note 24. Property owners
were willing to provide these easements, because without the beachfill project, they would
have soon lost their dry beach-and perhaps their homes-to the sea. Id. These ease-
ments were required by the longstanding Corps policy of only providing government ero-
sion control assistance for beaches that are open to the public. See, e.g., U.S. ARMsy CORPS
OF ENG'RS, DIGEST OF WATER RESOURCES POLICIES AND AUTHORITIES 14-1 (1996) (explaining
that Public Law No. 84-826 authorized federal erosion control assistance only for publicly
owned shores, or for private shores if such protection would result in public benefits); see
also Act of July 28, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-826, 70 Stat. 702, 702 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. § 426) ("Shores other than public will be eligible for Federal assistance if there is
benefit such as that arising from public use or from the protection of nearby public prop-
erty .... "); Act of August 13, 1946, Pub. L. 79-727, § 1, 60 Stat. 1056 (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. § 426) (declaring U.S. policy to protect shores that are owned by states, munic-
ipalities, or other political subdivisions).
374. See, e.g., Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d 975, 977 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (holding that a
boundary migrated inland even though erosion was caused by a Corps of Engineers jetty);
see also supra note 338 (suggesting that boundaries have retreated with an eroding shore
since the Institutes of Justinian).
375. See CURTIS J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE § 3.4 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing
defeasible estates).
376. See, e.g., First Universalist Soc'y v. Boland, 29 N.E. 524, 524-25 (Mass. 1892) (discuss-
ing a deed that granted land to the plaintiff for so long as it was "'devoted to the uses,
interests, and support of those doctrines of the Christian religion"').
377. See, e.g., People v. City of Long Beach, 19 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 n.2, 594 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962) (discussing a deed that required land to be used "for a park, playground, recrea-
tional center and/or beach used for recreational purposes, and for no other purposes
whatsoever").
378. See, e.g., Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 9 (1990) (holding that where land had been
granted for so long as it was used as a railroad, the federal government had authority to
convert rails to trails, but that doing so might be a taking that required compensation).
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The law of erosion reaches the same result.as would occur if the sover-
eign had conveyed coastal property only for so long as erosion
processes do not submerge it, reserving for the public a reversionary
interest that vests when the land is below mean high water.
C. Takings Implications of Tideland Policies
Could efforts to ensure that tidelands migrate landward as sea
level rises be enforced at common law? The answer is yes, at least for
rolling easements, and possibly for deferred action. With a rolling
easement, the granting sovereign tells the riparian owner today that
she will not be allowed to eliminate the public's reversionary interest
by building a bulkhead.3 8 1 With deferred action, the sovereign en-
forces the reversion eventually, but without having warned the ripar-
ian owner that it would do so.38 2 In the context of nuisance law,
people usually are not allowed to interfere with (let alone destroy) a
neighbor's property without the owner's permission, and the public
trust doctrine holds that the sovereign-who owns the neighboring
tidelands-generally will deny the permission to destroy the tide-
lands.3 83 These arguments are less likely to justify setbacks.
1. Deferring Action.--Must the public's right to the tidelands give
way to a private owner's desire to maintain his premises? Simple sym-
metry, nuisance principles, and analogous cases concerning ocean
coasts suggest that the public's rights are superior.
a. Is the Law ofErosion Symmetric?-The natural effect of ero-
sion is to reduce the estate of the dryland owner. A bulkhead shifts
the loss onto the tidelands owner. Given that the law of erosion does
379. See, e.g., Hagaman v. Board of Educ., 285 A.2d 63, 65 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1971) (discussing a deed that stated that it was the "understanding" of the parties that the
land conveyed would be "used for the erection and maintenance of a public school").
380. See, e.g., Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 134 P.2d 245, 246-48 (Cal. 1943) (in bank)
(requiring a railroad to forfeit land for failure to comply with a grant condition requiring it
to run 18 local passenger trains per day); Baker v. Weedon, 262 So. 2d 641, 642 (Miss.
1972) (discussing a will conveying a home to a widow as long as she lived, after which time
the home would be transferred to the grandchildren from a previous marriage if the widow
had no children at the time of her death).
381. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining that rolling easements ensure that public tidelands
will not be eliminated).
382. See supra Part II.B.3 (emphasizing that lack of notice is the primary way by which
deferred action differs from rolling easement policies).
383. See David C. Slade et al., State Powers, Duties, Limitations and Prohibitions Under the
Public Trust Doctrine, in PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WOR, supra note 33, at
213, 215 (noting that courts require the state, as public trustee, to prevent the destruction
of land subject to the public trust).
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not allow a riparian owner to expand her holdings by bulkheading
and filling seaward, allowing the same owner to retain the saved land
by bulkheading and filling landward would be an asymmetry. Simi-
larly, a landowner does not generally lose the right to exclude the pub-
lic when she lowers dry land to become navigable water.38 4 It would
be asymmetric to allow the landowner to gain the right to exclude the
public by elevating dry land so that it does not become navigable
water.
The law of erosion is generally symmetric. 85 The general princi-
ples are that shoreline ownership advances and retreats with the grad-
ual changes of the sea, and those boundaries are not altered by the
private activities of a landowner that change the shoreline itself. Even
if the equivalence between filling navigable waters and preventing
their encroachment by elevating dry land has not been recognized by
reported cases, common law courts have the ability to rectify inconsis-
tencies in the law that are brought to their attention.386
b. Nuisance Principles. -Many commentators have suggested
that nuisance law maximizes social wealth by minimizing social costs,
including transaction costs. 38 7 In an undeveloped area-or even in a
384. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1979) (holding that requir-
ing public access to newly navigable waters is a taking, because a federal navigation servi-
tude does not apply to waters made navigable by private effort).
385. In Maryland, statutes modify the symmetry by entitling property owners to reclaim
land lost to erosion since the early 1970s. See Mn. CODE ANN., ENviR. § 16-201 (1996).
386. A federal court evaluating a takings claim would often tend to take the state law as
it finds it even if there appear to be inconsistencies. See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1994) (requiring federal courts to decide cases based on state law unless they are
preempted by federal statutes, the U.S. Constitution, or treaty); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 73-78 (1938) (construing "state laws" in the Rules of Decision Act as including
state common law). A state court, by contrast, would have the ability to clarify the property
law as part of a takings claim. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1031-32 (1992) (remanding a takings case to state court for determination of rights
under state property law). In some states, a federal court could certify the question of state
law for a decision by the state's highest court. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CMVIL
PROCEDURE 221 (1985). To the extent that asymmetries and ambiguities in the law appear
to leave room for concluding that a property owner can indirectly eliminate the tidelands
even though she cannot do so directly, plaintiffs might be best advised to bring cases in
federal courts. See, e.g., id. at 219-20 (showing a lack of consensus among federal circuits
on whether federal courts interpreting state law are bound by precedent no matter how
antiquated it may be, or should consider possible future revisions of the state law even if
doing so requires federal court "'to psychoanalyze state court judges'" (quoting Polk
County v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1959))).
387. For example, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed showed that economic effi-
ciency is promoted when the law treats an activity as a nuisance if and only if it can be
avoided at a cost less than the total harm of the nuisance to society. See Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 I-LRv. L. REv. 1089, 1115-24 (1972); accord Epstein, supra note 265, at 1389 ("It is
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developed area as long as the house is set back from the shore-struc-
tures that change land ownership without creating new land produce
no social benefit. If the law treats them as a nuisance, they will not be
built; if they are not treated as a nuisance, the owner who benefits will
want to build them in spite of the net cost to society. As a result,
resources will be wasted on negotiations to prevent their construction.
In this context, the rationale for denying riparian owners any land
created by bulkhead and fill projects applies equally to bulkheads that
stop erosion and those that fill navigable waters.38 8
When the shoreline approaches a home, this balance might
change. If the cost of moving the house plus the value of the dry land
is greater than the cost of the bulkhead plus the value of the lost tide-
lands, social welfare is maximized by building the bulkhead. In cases
where moving a house costs at least as much as a bulkhead,38 9 a com-
mon law court might find bulkheads not to be a nuisance, unless the
tidelands are more valuable than the dry land.
In the case of publicly owned tidelands, however, this balancing
has already taken place: The public trust doctrine's requirement that
tidelands must not be privatized unless the sovereign indicates other-
wise39° is effectively an ancient determination that tidelands are more
valuable to society as public lands. Because this doctrine preceded
the original grants of land from the King of England,39 1 it can also be
viewed as an intention of the original grantor and grantee in titles to
coastal property.
A bulkhead that protects one's own land by reducing the size of
an adjacent lot is like a dam that diverts floodwater onto a neighbor's
land. In most states, a landowner has no right to protect her land
preferable for 5 percent of the cases to involve the purchase of an easement to create a
nuisance than for 95 percent to involve the purchase of a restrictive covenant to prevent
one. Such an allocation properly reflects a world with positive transaction costs .... ").
388. Cf Lummis v. Lilly, 429 N.E.2d 1146, 1149-50 (Mass. 1982) (stating that when an
erosion control structure causes a neighbor's land to erode, a court deciding whether the
structure is a nuisance should follow the reasonable use rule and weigh the various costs
and benefits of the structure).
389. See POTENTIAL EvaEcrs OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 17, at app. B 3-37,
3-75 (reporting that houses at Long Beach Island, New Jersey can be moved for $10,000
per house and that bulkheads cost at least $130 per foot).
390. See Slade et al., supra note 350, at 175-77 (noting that a state has the power to
convey its jus privatum interest in public trust lands to private ownership through specific
legislation). A possible counterargument to this reasoning is that nuisances are broad
classes of activities. See supra note 387.
391. See Matthews v. Bayhead Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 360 (N.J. 1984) ("The
genesis [of the public trust doctrine] is found in Roman jurisprudence .. " (citingJ. INST.
2.1.1)).
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from floodwater with a structure that floods a neighbor instead;19 2
thus, it follows that no one has an automatic right to build a bulkhead
that causes the public's tidelands to disappear. 93
c. Ocean Coasts: Case Law.-Some states have explicitly ad-
dressed the conflict between owners defending their homes from ero-
sion and the public's right to use- the beach. Although courts have
rarely been asked to rule directly on the right to protect one's prop-
erty,394 they have come close in California and Texas. In Whalers' Vil-
lage Club v. California Coastal Commission,395 a California appellate
court rejected the property owners' claim that riparian ownership in-
cludes a "'right' to construct a revetment or seawall to protect one's
dwelling from destruction. "396 Nevertheless, the actual holding was
narrower, enabling the Coastal Commission to impose conditions on
seawall permits, not to deny them entirely.397
The public trust rights are even more established in Texas. State
courts have held that under both statutory and common law, property
392. See 50 AM.JUR. 2D Levees andFllood Control § 16, at 266 (1995) ("[A]lIthough a ripar-
ian landowner may take measures to protect himself or herself from the harmful effects of
floodwaters, he or she may not, by erecting a dam, dike, or levee, change or divert the
natural flow of a watercourse without being chargeable in damages to persons and prop-
erty injured thereby."); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1029 (1992) ("[T]he owner of a lakebed, for example, would not be entitled to compensa-
tion when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would
have the effect of flooding others' land."); Biberman v. Funkhouser, 58 A.2d 668 (Md.
1948) (reaffirming that Maryland follows the civil law rule that no one can substantially
change the flow of rainwater runoff so as to flood a neighbor). But see MartinJ. McMahon,
Annotation, Liability for Diversion of Surface Water by Raising Surface Level of Land, 88
A.L.R.4TH 891, 897-98 (1991) (noting that some jurisdictions follow the "common-enemy
doctrine," under which every landowner "has an unqualified right to fend off surface wa-
ters as the landowner sees fit without being required to take into account the conse-
quences to other landowners").
393. To argue that the rising sea, not the bulkhead, causes the tidelands to vanish is
merely semantics-like blaming a flood on the rain rather than on the dam.
394. The political process generally protects people from losing their homes as long as
they do not need a subsidy-and sometimes even when they do. When houses fall into the
water along the ocean, it is usually because individualized erosion protection is not
feasible.
395. 220 Cal. Rptr. 2 (Ct. App. 1985).
396. Id. at 8.
397. This pre-Lucas case included some dicta suggesting that the State could prevent a
seawall: "'one may not do with his property as he pleases; his use if subject to reasonable
restraints to avoid societal detriment.'" Id. (quoting People v. Byers, 153 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Ct.
App. 1979)). However, Lucas has largely nullified this approach. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024-
27 (rejecting the theory that regulations are not takings if they prevent social harm, in
favor of a rule that when a regulation destroys a property's value, the state can avoid com-
pensation only if the proscribed use was not already part of the bundle of rights associated
with owning the property).
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along the Gulf of Mexico is subject to a "rolling easement. ''3 8 People
have been prevented from repairing storm-damaged houses and have
been required to remove structures when erosion left a portion of the
structure seaward of the vegetation line.3 99
d. Bay Coasts: Case Law.-Even if state common law origi-
nally had a property right sufficient to prevent construction of bulk-
heads, one must consider whether that right has been given away.
Along the ocean coast, state regulations often discourage or prohibit
seawalls.4 °° Storms and the many people walking on the beach put
oceanfront homeowners on notice that stopping erosion with seawalls
may be technically and politically infeasible. Ocean coast property
owners have little reason to assume that the state has given them a
right to protect homes at the expense of the beach.4 °1
398. See Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 111 (Tex. App. 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (recog-
nizing the beach as a rolling easement because otherwise the area of public access would
disappear as the shore erodes); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. 1986,
writ. ref'd n.r.e.) ("[Blecause legal title shifts with the natural movements of the
beach, this Court has concluded that the public easement also shifts with the natural move-
ments of the beach." (citations omitted)). The reader may logically ask: Why are we dis-
cussing rolling easements in a subpart focused on deferred action? Recall from Part II.B
that this Article uses the term "rolling easement" to signify the entire collection of policies
in which property owners are warned in advance of their inability to erect bulkheads, and
that deferred action policies are essentially the same except for the lack of substantial
advance notice. The Texas rolling easement cases involved situations more like the de-
ferred action alternative: their reasoning was that riparian owners never had a right to stop
the inland migration of tidelands, and the only notice the property owners had about the
need to abandon shorefront structures was the fact that shores are eroding; i.e., the court
did not indicate that the government had put property owners on general notice that the
structures would have to be abandoned.
399. See, e.g., Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. App. 1989, writ denied)
(holding that the statute requiring removal of structures seaward of the vegetation line
merely enforced a common law public right, and hence was not a legislative taking);
Matcha, 711 S.W.2d at 99-101 (holding that as the vegetation line moves inland, the State
can enjoin reconstruction of a storm-damaged house that is left seaward of the vegetation
line). In these cases, a violent hurricane left private property seaward of the natural vegeta-
tion line, thereby triggering a transfer of that property. Arrington, 767 S.W.2d at 957;
Matcha, 711 S.W.2d at 96. Consequently, the court did not address whether someone had
the right to protect her property from impending erosion. Because a bulkhead or seawall
would impair public access and eventually be seaward of the vegetation line, these cases
imply that they could be ordered removed as well. Beach nourishment, by contrast, would
not impair public access and could stop the vegetation line from retreating. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 372, at 1-2 (discussing beach nourishment as an engineer-
ing alternative for shore protection).
400. See, e.g., S.C. CODE A-. § 48-39-290(B) (2) (a)-(b) (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting
any new erosion control structures seaward of the setback line, as well as the repair of any
such structures suffering more than a certain percentage of damage from a storm).
401. Similarly, if protection is allowed, property owners have no basis to expect public
access to also be eliminated. During several trips to Great Britain, the author has observed
that much of the English coast has been bulkheaded, but there is invariably a walkway just
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The quiet bayfront shores, by contrast, provide little reason to
expect an invasion by either the sea or people demanding access.
Most state governments do not put property owners on notice either.
Maryland, for example, recognizes a right to protect one's backyard
from erosion by filling wetlands where necessary.40 2 In other states,
courts have held that the state can waive the public trust doctrine
where people filled wetlands in the past.4" 3 North Carolina some-
times protects the public trust by requiring bulkheads to be placed a
foot or two inland of mean high water,40 4 but the State does not re-
quire the bulkheads to be removed if the shore retreats.40 5 The most
important exception may be Rhode Island, whose coastal zone man-
agement plan specifically prohibits hard structures inland of the
marsh in some areas so that wetlands can migrate inland as sea level
rises.40 6 This policy, however, does not explicitly require homes to be
relocated.
States appear to have a common law right to require shorefront
owners to abandon property as shores erode. Because some states
may be waiving those rights,40 7 however, their ability to defer action
above the wall. In Maryland, along Atlantic Avenue in North Beach, the public has access
along a narrow walkway between several homes and Chesapeake Bay. See fig.7.
402. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201 (1996) (granting the right "to reclaim fast land
lost by erosion").
403. City of Berkeley v. Superior Ct., 606 P.2d 362, 373 (Cal. 1980); Opinion of the
Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 604-10 (Me. 1981); Opinion of the Justices to Senate, 424 N.E.2d
1092, 1099-1100 (Mass. 1981).
404. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, 07H.0208(b) (7) (B) (Apr. 1996) (requiring bulk-
heads to be constructed "landward of significant marshland or marshgrass fringes"); Webb
v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources Coastal Resources Comm'n,
404 S.E.2d 29, 30-32 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the validity of a permit issued for a
bulkhead constructed two feet inland of the mean high water line).
405. According to Doug Huggett of North Carolina's Division of Coastal Management,
"It would be political suicide to require people to take down these bulkheads." Interview
with Doug Huggett, Assistant Major Permits Coordinator, Div. of Coastal Management,
Dep't of Envtl. and Natural Resources (Oct. 29, 1997) (on file with author).
406. Rhode Island Coastal Resource Management Program § 210(B)(4) (1993)
("Bulkheading and filling along the inland perimeter of a marsh prevents inland migration
of wetland vegetation as sea level rises."); id. § 210.3(C) (3) ("In Type I waters, structural
shoreline protection may be permitted only when the primary purpose is to enhance the
site as a conservation area and/or a natural buffer against storms.").
407. In Maryland, the State has probably not waived the right to prohibit bulkheads and
revetments along the shore, except when bulkheads have been built. Courts have long
held that the additional riparian rights provided by statute should be viewed as licenses,
which are not constitutionally protected property rights. See, e.g., Board of Pub. Works v.
Larmar Corp., 277 A.2d 427, 439 (Md. 1971) (holding that an unused riparian right to fill
tidal waters was a license that could be revoked by the legislature). This view is consistent
with the public trust doctrine cases, which have narrowly construed any purported legisla-
tive grants of tidal waters to private parties. See, e.g., City of Berkeley, 606 P.2d at 369
("[S] tatutes purporting to abandon the public trust are to be strictly construed; the intent
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and still protect tidelands without a taking may be less than would
have been the case under the common law.408
2. Rolling Easements.-Deferred action lets the state indulge
property owners with the wishful thinking that their estates will last
forever. Rolling easements, by contrast, remind them that the law of
erosion holds otherwise.40 9 Regardless of whether owners of devel-
oped bayfront property have a basis to assume that they have a vested
right to erect a bulkhead, owners of undeveloped lands should have
no such expectation. To the extent that the state ever had a right to
take over lands as they were flooded, rolling easements simply indi-
cate that the public is not relinquishing that right.410
Analogizing to water law, rolling easements reject "first in time,
first in right," in favor of "reasonable use."411 Under the common law,
if the shore retreats fifty feet, an owner cannot regain title by filling
the shore back out to its previous location.412 Thus, with a rolling
easement, the location of the public trust boundary does not depend
on whether the erosion or the bulkhead comes first. As sea level rises,
rolling easements prevent riparian owners from indirectly creating
to abandon must be clearly expressed.., and if any interpretation of the statute is reason-
ably possible which would retain the public's interest in tidelands, the court must give the
statute such an interpretation."). By contrast, where people have already erected an ero-
sion control structure, the owner clearly has a property interest in the bulkhead or revet-
ment. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201 ("[A] person may make improvements into the
water in front of the land to... protect the shore of that person against erosion. After an
improvement has been constructed, the improvement is the property of the owner of the
land to which the improvement is attached."). Given the court's distinction between used
and unused riparian rights in Larmar Corp., 277 A.2d at 439, a court might also conclude
that in such a case there is a vested right to hold back the sea.
408. But cf infra Part IV.D (noting that in a few states, under the expansive public trust
doctrine, the government cannot engage in a wholesale transfer of tidelands even by ex-
plicit intention, much less by waiver).
409. See fig.6 (illustrating that the notice provided by rolling easements leads the prop-
erty owner to avoid construction when the easement is likely to take over property soon);
fig.9 (same for one-step easement); see also supra Part II.B.3 (explaining that notice is the
main difference between rolling easements and deferred action).
410. See supra notes 398-399 and accompanying text.
411. See DAVID H. GETCHES, 'WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 7-21, 47-51, 74-82 (2d ed. 1990)
(discussing the "reasonable use" and "prior appropriation" doctrines of water use law).
412. See Larmar Corp., 277 A.2d at 434 (stating that artificial fill was not within the estab-
lished meaning of accretion at common law). Although a Maryland statute recognizes a
right to reclaim land lost to erosion, see MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 16-201, the statute does
not include a guarantee from the Corps of Engineers that it will grant the necessary per-
mit. See Maryland General Permit, supra note 60, cat. III, at 9 (stating that the Corps may
authorize projects undertaken to fill wetlands only "after review by the Corps and coordi-
nation with appropriate federal resource agencies").
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land for themselves at the expense of the public trust, something that
they have never been entitled to do directly with a stable sea level.413
A few states have already enacted rolling easement policies along
the ocean coast. The Texas Open Beaches Act4 14 goes beyond the
rolling easement policy of the state's common law by putting those
who build new houses on notice that the houses must be removed if
they encroach upon or interfere with an area of the beach to which
the public has acquired an easement through prescription, dedica-
tion, or continuous use.4 15 Maine's Coastal Sand Dune Rules4 16 ex-
plicitly presume the mobility of any structures that would interfere
with the landward migration of sand dunes or wetlands with a rise in
sea level.417 South Carolina applies a rolling easement under special
circumstances.418
Although state governments have only applied rolling easements
to the ocean coast, the public trust doctrine does not distinguish the
ocean from the bay.41 9 Thus, rolling easement policies along oceans
and bays would be equally constitutional.
3. Preventing Development: Applying the Doctrine of Waste.-Both
the nuisance and defeasible-estate arguments have less force for ef-
forts to prevent development. The houses themselves are not the nui-
sance-they just raise the possibility that some day in the future the
owners may want to build a bulkhead. The public trust doctrine ap-
plies to tidelands, but not to dry land.42 ° Still, the background princi-
ples of property law might occasionally enable states to curtail
413. See supra note 367 and accompanying text (noting that under the common law in
most states, owners do not get title to extra land created by their own efforts).
414. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-.178 (West 1978 & Supp. 1998).
415. Id. § 61.011 (West 1978 & Supp. 1998) (stating that if the public has acquired a
right of use by prescription, easement, or continuous use, the public shall have un-
restricted access between mean low water and the vegetation line). But cf fig.10.
416. CODE ME. R. ch. 355, § 3(B)(1) (1993).
417. See id. § 3(B)(1)(b) ("If the shoreline recedes such that the coastal wetand
extends to any part of the structure, including support posts, for a period of six months or
more, then the approved structure ... shall be removed and the site shall be restored to
natural conditions within one year.").
418. See supra Part III.A (discussing changes in South Carolina law, prompted by the
decision in Lucas and by Hurricane Hugo, which created a hybrid between a setback and a
rolling easement).
419. See supra Part IV.B.1 (identifying the land owned by the state in trust for the people
under the public trust doctrine in various states, with no distinction made between oceans
and bays).
420. See supra notes 355-360 and accompanying text (explaining that the public trust
doctrine applies to tidal waters and tidelands, with the inland boundary of the public trust
usually being mean high water, but extending up to the vegetation line or highest storm
surge of the average year in some states).
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development under the doctrine of waste, 42 1 if courts are willing to
treat the law of erosion-or the creation of a rolling easement-as
equivalent to a condition on a defeasible estate.422
Private riparian owners retain title to land for only so long as the
land remains above high water, after which time it reverts to the
state.423 In states that recognize a rolling easement,424 land reverts to
the state even if a seawall is built to keep the shore from retreating.
Although this reversion occurs by operation of law rather than the
explicit wording of a conveyance, it is identical to a fee simple deter-
minable.425 When the ownership of land is temporally split between a
current owner and a remainderman who may eventually get title to
the land, the doctrine of waste prevents the current owner from un-
fairly harming the value of the remainderman's interest.426 The cur-
421. The doctrine of waste is an equitable doctrine of property law designed to prevent
someone in temporary possession of a piece of property, such as a life tenant, from using
the property in a way that unfairly harms the value of the estate that will eventually be
transferred to a reversionary interest holder. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY. FUTURE IN-
TERESTS §§ 189, 193 (1936) (detailing the action that the owner of a future interest can
take when the owner of the present estate engages in threatening conduct); see also BER-
GER, supra note 375, at 675-76 (explaining the history of the doctrine of waste).
422. This discussion does not prove that a court would enjoin coastal construction
under the doctrine of waste. Rather, its purpose is to illustrate that the background princi-
ples of property law are consistent with such an injunction, in which case a court faced with
a statute prohibiting the development might be able to avoid a taking.
423. See Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. App. 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) ("The
division between public and private ownership under the common law .. . is the mean
high tide line.").
424. See id. (recognizing that Texas case law approves the "concept of a rolling
easement").
425. A fee simple determinable is an interest in land in which the owner loses title auto-
matically upon the occurrence of a condition. The previous owner's interest is known as a
"possibility of reverter," because the estate reverts back to him if the condition occurs. See
BERGER, supra note 375, at 183-84.
426. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTrY. FUTURE INrERESTS §§ 139, 140, 189 (declaring that
the remainderman of a life estate can obtain an injunction if the life tenant impairs the
property value, accelerates the termination of the remainderman's estate, or breaches any
other duty of the life tenant to the remainderman); id. § 193(c) (declaring that the contin-
gent owner of a defeasible estate can obtain an injunction against waste if it is "wanton or
unconscionable"). The greater the probability that the contingent owner's estate will vest,
the greater the duty of the current estate owner to avoid harming the value of the contin-
gent owner's estate. Id. § 193 cmt. f, accordJ.W. Oler, Annotation, Right of Owner of Contin-
gent or Defeasible Future Interest to Maintain Action for Relief in Respect of Property, 144 A.L.R.
769, 785-90 (1943) (explaining that equity will not allow a wrong to go without a remedy,
but that its readiness to protect contingent estates is tempered by the power to withhold
relief when the interest is unlikely to vest). Because sea level rise is very likely, a court
applying this type of analysis could hold that the duty to the public trust's future interest is
almost as great as a life tenant's duty to the remainderman. But cf Williams v. Ramey, 41
S.E.2d 159, 159 (Ga. 1947) (stating that authorities are split on the issue of whether a
conditional remainderman is able to obtain an injunction to stop waste).
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rent estate holder may not, for example, strip-mine fertile farmland
and leave the remainderman with a barren wasteland.42 7 The doc-
trine of waste has also prevented transitory owners from making im-
provements that would increase a property's value when the
remaindermen objected to an irreversible aesthetic impact.4 28
The case for applying the doctrine of waste would be weakest
along the ocean coast. Experience has shown that as the shore re-
treats, oceanfront homes do not impair the value of the public beach
for long: Houses are moved out of harm's way or destroyed by storms,
but the beach survives.4 29 Without a permanent impact on the beach,
the doctrine of waste would not enable a tideland owner to stop home
construction.43 ' The doctrine seems no more applicable to construc-
tion along estuarine shores, because houses can be removed as sea
level rises.
The doctrine of waste may apply, however, when the develop-
ment truly impairs the value of the reversionary interest. Courts
weigh the harm of an activity to the reversionary interest against the
utility to the current owner 43 1 and require less of a duty when the
contingent interest is remote.432 Thus, if the future interest is likely to
427. See BERGER, supra note 375, at 675 n.5 (explaining that the doctrine of waste usually
applies when the current holder strips the land of its resources).
428. See Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6, 20 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (preventing a life estate
holder from replacing a money-losing historic mansion with a profitable apartment build-
ing), affd per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 402 (App. Div. 1930), affd per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y.
1931).
429. This statement assumes that the beach is not armored with a seawall.
430. Cf Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C.) (rejecting
the notion of a common law basis for preventing the development of coastal land), on
remand from 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
431. The Restatement implies that if the contingent interest is likely to vest, the current
estate holder's duty to the reversionary interest holder is essentially to manage the prop-
erty as if she were the owner of the entire estate. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY:
FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 140, 193 cmt. h (requiring conduct similar to that of the most recent
owner of the entire estate, and encouraging conduct from someone who owned both es-
tates). This standard suggests that in areas where beaches are important, a riparian owner
might not be allowed to eliminate the shore, but that in areas where beaches are not im-
portant, eliminating the shore would be allowed.
432. See supra note 426. Courts occasionally prohibit all productive uses of land if the
productive uses ruin the estate of the remainderman. See, e.g., Brokaw, 237 N.Y.S. at 20
(denying the only proposed profitable use of property to a life tenant who was losing
$70,542 on the property's current use). Nevertheless, an equity court would be more likely
to prevent land from being filled than to prevent all development, because the former
protects the tideland owner's reversionary interest without destroying the value of the dry
land estate.
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vest soon, even a moderate harm may justify an injunction.4 33 If the
harm is relatively remote, it might still be enjoined if it is severe. 43 4
Courts are also suspicious of self-serving conduct that defeats the
intention of the grantor. 43 1 If A has a remainder conditional on A's
outliving B, and A murders B, the murderer generally will not get the
estate any sooner due to B's death, if at all.43 6 For analogous reasons,
a project that bulkheads and fills high marsh or dry land, and thus
prevents the public trust's interest in the land from vesting, may also
be suspect. 43v If the purpose of the law of erosion had been to en-
courage erosion control, such a project would further the granting
sovereign's intention. However, if the purpose of the law is to ensure
that retreating shores do not alter ownership of the beach, it would
defeat the sovereign's intention and could be enjoined.
Even here, however, the devaluation of the public trust could be
avoided by re-levelling the site later.43 8 A court of equity might still
433. For example, filling some land that would otherwise be tideland within five years
may justify an injunction.
434. For example, a hazardous waste site or construction that would subsequently make
tidelands unusable to the public trust due to replacement of natural soils with materials
unsuitable to vegetated wetlands may justify an injunction.
435. Cf., e.g., Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 781 (Cal. 1955) (awarding
a landlord damages when a lease specified that rent was based on a percentage of sales,
and the tenant had no sales because the premises were used as a warehouse after the
tenant relocated the store).
436. See Burton v. Moses (In re Estate of Moses), 300 N.E.2d 473, 480 (I11. App. 1973)
(denying a son who murdered his mother the benefits of premature reversion); Eisenhardt
v. Siegel, 119 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Mo. 1938) (denying reversion to a grantor who murdered
his grantee after having conditioned his reversion on the grantee dying first); RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTITUTION § 188 cmt. c (1937) (declaring that when a remainderman murders a
life tenant, and the murderer's interest is contingent on surviving the life tenant, the re-
mainderman can be compelled to surrender the entire interest). But cf G.H. Fischer,
Annotation, Murder of Life Tenant by Remainderman or Reversioner as Affecting Latter's Rights to
Remainder or Reversion, 24 A.L.R.2n 1120, 1120-22 (1952) (listing cases in which murderers
received early reversions of life estates).
437. Cf RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 135 (1936) (finding a duty to avoid causing or
accelerating the termination of a defeasible estate). Wetlands taking cases have not consid-
ered this argument, because wetlands law prohibits filling high marsh due to the immedi-
ate impact on the wetlands, rather than due to any eventual impact on the public trust low
marsh. Another difficulty is that federal and state programs sometimes encourage develop-
ers to fill dryland to prevent flooding. See, e.g., 44 C.F.R § 60.3(c) (2)-(3) (1997) (requiring
new structures to be elevated above the base flood level). Although houses are usually
elevated on pilings, fill is often brought in as well. The author has observed that in Ocean
City, Maryland, for example, the highest ground on the barrier island is the sewerage treat-
ment plant where fill was brought in to elevate the facility to flood levels.
438. The standard technique for creating coastal wetlands is to excavate coastal land to
bring it down to the elevation necessary for wetlands to form. See NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
290-92 (1992) (providing a comprehensive review of the techniques for creating and re-
storing wetlands); Stephen W. Broome, Creation and Restoration of Tidal Wetlands of the South-
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decide that the future interest holder is entitled to an assurance that
the re-levelling will actually take place. But under these circum-
stances, the court would be ordering a rolling easement, not prevent-
ing development.
D. The Expansive Public Trust Doctrine4 39
1. The Doctrine.-In some states, courts have limited the ability
of even legislatures to sell lands beneath navigable waters. California
courts protect the reliance interest of property owners on past grants
of tidelands, but have held that future sales of tidelands by the legisla-
ture will be void."'4 Illinois law also limits the legislature's power.4" 1
The United States Supreme Court has upheld state court decisions in
which the doctrine allowed a state to recover land that another party
claimed." 2 However, the Court has never directly limited a state's
power to sell tidelands.
Several states recognize this expansive doctrine in principle but
make exceptions for people who filled tidelands in the past.4 4 3 In so
eastern United States, in WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORATION 37, 42-44 (Jon A. Kusler &
Mary E. Kentula eds., 1990) (discussing the grading of upland sites to elevations appropri-
ate for marsh formation in the Southeastern United States); Roy R. Lewis, III, Creation and
Restoration of Coastal Plain Wetlands in Florida, in WETLANDS CREATION AND RESTORATION,
supra, at 73, 83 (discussing similar grading issues for Florida); Joseph K_ Shisler, Creation
and Restoration of Coastal Wetlands of the Northeastern United States, in WETLANDS CREATION AND
RESTORATION, supra, at 143, 152-53 (discussing similar grading issues for the Northeastern
United States); Interview with Dennis King, University of Md. Ctr. for Envtl. & Estuarine
Studies, Solomons Island (Sept. 4, 1997) (on file with author) (asserting that 60% of the
cost of wetland creation is excavation).
439. Joseph L. Sax rekindled scholarly interest in this traditional view of the public trust
doctrine. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970). Sax has never suggested that the
doctrine should be employed to enable a landward migration of wetlands, but he has
recommended that trust funds should buy out riparian owners as the sea rises. See Sax,
supra note 187, at 148-49; see also supra Part IL.C (discussing the risk of backsliding).
440. See City of Berkeley v. Superior Ct., 606 P.2d 362, 373 (Cal. 1980) ("[T] he appropri-
ate resolution is to balance the interests of the public... against... landowners who hold
property under these conveyances.").
441. See, e.g., Lake Mich. Fed'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 742 F. Supp. 441,
445 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (mem.) (applying state law to invalidate a grant by the Illinois legisla-
ture of submerged lands to expand a university located along Chicago's lakefront).
442. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1988) (holding that
the state never gave up tidelands); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 463 (1892)
(holding that a state can renege on a sale of trust lands, because it lacks the power to sell
them).
443. For example, after Phillips Petroleum, Mississippi enacted legislation that awarded
title to those who filled tideland before 1973. SeeM. CaseyJarman & RichardJ. McLauglin,
A Higher Public Purpose? The Constitutionality of Mississippi's Public Trust Tidelands Legislation,
11 Miss. C. L. REv. 5, 13 (1990) (explaining the Mississippi legislature's justification that
the "swift resolution of uncertainty over [land] title served a higher public purpose than
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doing, courts have often said that states can extinguish the trust on a
fraction of lands but not on the majority.4"4 But the opinions have
generally not indicated whether the doctrine would prohibit privatiz-
ing most of the shore, or whether privatizing the shore would be per-
missible because the tidelands constitute a small fraction of the
navigable waters. While the logic of the doctrine suggests the former,
actual practice suggests the latter.4" 5 In other states, courts have been
willing to treat tidal waters like any other state-owned property.4" 6 Fi-
nally, in some states the public trust doctrine allows grants of tide-
lands, but only when a statute expressly indicates that the legislature
intends to do SO." 4 7
2. Takings Implications.-Although the public trust doctrine is
based on a limitation of state power, its most famous application was a
takings case. In 1873, the Illinois legislature decided that it had been
too hasty in 1869 when it sold a three-mile stretch of Chicago's
lakefront to the Illinois Central Railroad." 8 This stretch of coast had
become very valuable, because the Army Corps of Engineers had sub-
sequently decided to build breakwaters to protect it from the waves of
Lake Michigan." 9 The railroad challenged the State's attempt to re-
trieve the waterfront as a taking without compensation."' The
United States Supreme Court was unsympathetic, ruling that the state
holds submerged lands "in trust for the people.""'51 The legislature
could withdraw the conveyance because it never had the authority to
protecting the state's interest in its public trust tidelands"). Courts in Massachusetts,
Maine, and California have employed similar justifications. See supra note 403 and accom-
panying text.
444. See, e.g., Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 ("The control of the State for the purposes
of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the
interests of the public therein . .. ").
445. See fig.9 (showing how shoreline armoring can lead to a privatization of the shore);
supra note 83 (describing estimates by various state officials of the rate of shoreline
armoring).
446. See, e.g., Board of Pub. Works v. Larmar Corp., 277 A.2d 427, 444 (Md. 1971) (ex-
plaining that under Maryland law, the State can sell any property, including the inland
waters and the land beneath those waters).
447. See, e.g., Slade, supra note 383, at 219-21 (listing cases from Alaska, California, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Texas in which courts held that public trust
lands cannot be conveyed to private parties without the authorization of the legislature).
448. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 405-11.
449. Id. at 409-13.
450. Id. at 418.
451. Id. at 452. The state can sell off parcels for wharves and docks, provided that doing
so helps commerce and does not "substantially impair the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining .... But that is .. .very different . . . from .. .the abdication of the
general control of the State over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or
bay." Id. at 452-53.
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permanently grant away the shore that had later become Chicago's
outer harbor.452
Would a resurrection of this doctrine help states protect tide-
lands at common law? Because the doctrine does not apply to dry-
land, it would not justify setbacks.
The expansive doctrine would, however, justify deferred action.
The best argument that these policies are takings under the property
version of the public trust doctrine is that the government may have
signaled to landowners that the shore will be privatized. Under the
expansive doctrine, the government has no power to convey the
shore. Nevertheless, the precise meaning of the restraint on state
power needs further clarification: Does the inability of the state to
give away the shore also mean that it cannot pretend that the forces of
nature placed the shore in private hands?
Like rolling easements, the expansive doctrine is motivated by a
policy of preventing the shore from becoming privatized, so a rolling
easement policy might be viewed in these states as primarily a reaffir-
mation that the expansive doctrine still applies. Thus, a rolling ease-
ment policy may be easier to implement in a state with the expansive
public trust doctrine. Once the state declares that it will not allow the
shore to be privatized (i.e., enacts a rolling easement policy), a doc-
trine holding that the state has no power to privatize the shore is un-
necessary. Nevertheless, this doctrine might imply that in those areas
where bulkheads have been or will be constructed, the public still has
a right to access along the shore.45
V. THE ACQUISITION ALTERNATIVE: JUST COMPENSATION AND A
POSSIBLE ROLE FOR THE FEDERAL AND PRIVATE SECTORS
Parts III and IV showed that many of the policies for allowing
wetlands and beaches to survive rising sea level, particularly rolling
easements, would not be takings under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. Nevertheless, govern-
ments may choose to bypass the takings issue through eminent do-
main purchases of property or rolling easements. How much would
this cost?
452. See id. at 460 ("There can be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance of property
by a grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was bound to hold and manage
it.").
453. See supra Part IV.B.5 and fig.9., which describe ways to retain public access along
armored shores.
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The formula for just compensation is usually the impact on the
fair market value454 of what the government takes.455 Under a policy
of preventing development, this impact would approach or equal the
current land value in those cases that would be ruled a taking.4 56 In
cases that would not be ruled a taking, by contrast, the impact would
be the reduction in the land value resulting from the development
restriction.45 7 Similarly, just compensation would be the value of the
land plus the net cost of moving the structure458 under deferred ac-
tion. For rolling easements, the fair market value is the value of the
land plus the net cost of moving the structure, discounted by both the
probability of the sea rising and by the rate of return compounded
over many decades.459
The greatly reduced cost of just compensation for rolling ease-
ments has several implications. Perhaps most important, these lower
costs suggest that at least in some areas, states that want to retain natu-
ral shores should simply purchase the rolling easements necessary to
do so. Such an approach would be fair to coastal landowners, and it
would solve an environmental problem at a modest cost.4 60 An acqui-
sition would increase the certainty that the policy would succeed com-
pared with other means of obtaining rolling easements: The fact that
the state had paid for the easement would make the public less likely
to tolerate backsliding, and it would almost totally eliminate the risk
that a future court might find a regulatory taking to have occurred.
The modest cost may also enable the federal government to pro-
tect wetlands of national importance without having to wait for states
454. Part II.D and Appendix I discuss the cost of a rolling easement.
455. Courts have generally found that no compensation is due for eminent domain tak-
ings of a reversionary interest. See Glenn, supra note 274, at 570-76. In those cases, the
government bought the entire estate, and the beneficiaries of the rule were the current
estate holders. Id. Lacking a way to value the contingency, courts have assigned a value of
zero. Id. But when the government purchases only the reversionary interest, such action
demonstrates that the value is greater than zero.
456. This is true because a regulation is a taking only if it essentially destroys the ability
of the owner to put the land to beneficial use. See supra Part III.
457. See supra Part III (explaining that, as a general rule, a reduction in land value is not
considered a taking).
458. The net cost of moving the structure would be (1) the value of the structure or the
cost of moving it to another location, whichever is less, minus (2) the cost of the bulkhead
that is avoided by not holding back the sea. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
459. See supra Part II.C (discussing how the cost to property owners would generally be
less than one percent of the current property value for any property that would not be
threatened until the sea rises at least two feet).
460. Such a policy would be a "Pareto improvement": It would be fair to everyone be-
cause the public's interest would be better off-without the private landowners being
worse off-than if no policy was enacted. See supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text.
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to act. The federal government has the power to buy rolling ease-
ments by eminent domain, whether or not the property law in a par-
ticular state recognizes the rolling easement.461  Purchasing
easements may be more appropriate for the national government
than relying on the federal navigation servitude: Principles of federal-
ism argue strongly against extending wetland regulation to include
dry land, whose regulation is traditionally a state and local matter.462
Moreover, the nation as a whole contributed to the causes of green-
house warming, and compared to the cost of decreasing carbon diox-
ide emissions,463 the cost of purchasing wetland easements would be
small.464
Rolling easements also provide a unique opportunity for private
sector actions. Developers seeking permits-for shorefront develop-
ment or even projects a few miles inland-can "sweeten the pie" by
reserving rolling easements and turning them over to conservation
groups. The theoretical reasons for viewing rolling easements as eco-
nomically efficient 465 suggest that this approach would often be an
inexpensive way to guarantee that the net long-term impact of a proj-
ect will be beneficial. Environmental organizations and land trusts
461. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 603 (1973) (ruling
that federal land purchases for wildlife refuge purposes need not be defined according to
state law); United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that 16
U.S.C. § 718d(c) (1958) allowed the United States to acquire wetland areas and interests
therein, because easements against draining wetlands "effectuate[ ] an important national
concern," and holding that the easement is thus a valid conveyance under federal law even
if such an easement is prohibited under state law).
462. See, e.g., BOYER ET AL., supra note 14, § 1201, at 430.
463. See, e.g., WORKING GROUP III, supra note 180, at 306-07, tbl.9.4 (summarizing ex-
isting studies, which suggest that reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 20% would reduce
Gross Domestic Product by 0.9% to 1.7%).
464. See Appendix 1. A suit at common law by the federal government to enjoin a bulk-
head would be more likely to fail than a suit by a state for two reasons. First, the state is the
owner of the tidelands whose inland migration is thwarted by the bulkhead. Second, prop-
erty owners would have a defense that the erosion was caused partly by the same nation
that now seeks the riparian owner's land.
465. Such mitigation in the cost would be essentially the public sector equivalent of what
Wall Street traders call "arbitrage." Environmentalists have lower discount rates and are
more likely to believe that the sea will rise three feet. Accordingly, they would place a
higher value (than would a developer) on the right to decide whether to eliminate the
tidelands if, and when, the sea rises. See supra note 180 (explaining that the private sector
requires a discount rate of 7% to 10%, while environmental protection typically requires a
rate of about 2%). Moreover, the law of erosion and public trust doctrine may already give
the state ownership of a rolling easement, see supra Part IV.B, but environmentalists fear
that the state will choose not to enforce it, see supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
Turning the easements over to a conservancy group would substantially reduce the risk of
backsliding, and hence would have a higher present value to environmentalists than turn-
ing them over to the state. See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
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are sometimes given coastal land that does not fit in with their man-
agement objectives.466 If they sell this land to a developer, they could
reserve a rolling easement and thereby not totally forsake the inten-
tions of the party that donated the land. Both developers and envi-
ronmental groups can seek to purchase rolling easements467 from
riparian farmers who have no intention of developing the land any-
way. Concerned citizens with shorefront property who donate a roll-
ing easement to a conservancy may be eligible for a tax deduction.46
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Development and rising sea levels are eliminating tidelands, but
the loss is slow, almost imperceptible.469 There is no crisis. Address-
ing the issue is urgent only because there are inexpensive opportuni-
ties to solve the problem now,-opportunities that will be prohibitively
costly if we wait until housing developments replace our shorefront
farms and forests.
The common law has long assumed that, except for extraordinary
circumstances, states will keep their tidal shores in the hands of the
public.47 This policy has been reaffirmed in the last few decades by
state and federal laws prohibiting the filling of wetlands both above
and below the mean high water mark.471 The failure to consider ris-
ing sea level and coastal erosion would frustrate these policies.
Part II presented three general approaches for protecting tide-
lands as shores retreat: preventing development, rolling easements,
and deferring action. Because history provides little or no evidence
that the tidelands will be protected by a policy of deferring action, the
real choice is among rolling easements, preventing development, and
466. See Melissa Waller Baldwin, Conservation Easements: A Viable Tool for Land Preserva-
tion, 32 LAND & WATER L. Rav. 89, 98 (1997) (cautioning property owners who donate land
to choose a land trust with compatible "conservation goals and projects").
467. Some care is necessary to avoid the common law "rule against perpetuities," which
holds that a contingent interest is void if it is not guaranteed to vest within 21 years of the
death of someone currently alive. BERGER, supra note 375, at 161-62. As long as the rolling
easement is implemented as an easement, the rule does not apply. However, if it is viewed
as a defeasible estate, where the land changes hands upon the occurrence of a condition,
then the rule might apply. Because reversionary interests are generally exempt from the
rule, see id. at 164-68, the rule would not apply if a developer reserves a rolling easement
and then donates it. But when the interest is obtained from a third party, it is void unless it
either fits into a statutory exemption, or is viewed as something other than a defeasible
estate. Id.
468. See I.R.C. § 170(f) (3) (B) (1994) (allowing landowners to deduct the value of deed
restrictions or donations of contingent interests in land for conservation purposes).
469. See supra notes 64-89 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 350-365 and accompanying text.
471. See supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
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losing the tidelands. But even where shores are bulkheaded and our
bay beaches and wetlands are lost, states need not automatically termi-
nate the public's right to access along the shore.
The rising sea has put two legal interests on a collision course.
Advancing inland is the public interest in access for navigation, fish-
ing, and hunting, as well as the environmental, recreational, and aes-
thetic benefits of tidal marshes, swamps, and sandy beaches.472 In the
past, as these interests migrated inland, they met little resistance as
long as most of the land was undeveloped. But as land is developed,
homeowners increasingly assert a commonly assumed (if legally un-
proven) right to defend their property.4 71 In doing so, they cannot
help but assert that their interest is superior to that of the public.
This conflict could be settled piecemeal under various common
law doctrines, but unless policy makers confront the issue directly,
current trends suggest that some ocean shores and the overwhelming
majority of estuarine shores will be eliminated.4 74 The type of com-
prehensive shoreline plan necessary to protect natural shores in
perpetuity would probably involve a combination of setbacks, density
restrictions, building codes, and rolling easements. In many cases,
states may prefer to compensate coastal landowners for the impact of
these policies. Nevertheless, any legislative or regulatory response is
likely to raise the question: Is the policy a taking?
A. Rolling Easements Will Rarely Be Takings, but Setbacks and Deferred
Action Will Often Require Compensation
1. Setbacks and Other Immediate Limitations.--Setbacks will not re-
quire compensation in areas where the setback line is fairly close to
today's high water mark, compared with the size of coastal lots, i.e.,
where erosion is slow and the land is steep. Moreover, if farming,
forestry, and other uses are profitable, the existence of an alternative
use may defeat a takings claim.475
A taking is more likely in areas where land is held for speculation
or lots have been subdivided, because setbacks are more likely to
render the property economically unusable. Still, the likelihood of a
taking can be minimized if setbacks are incorporated into the subdivi-
sion process, because large parcels are more likely to have enough
land to develop inland of the setback line.4 76
472. See supra notes 356-361 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 394-401 and accompanying text.
474. See supra notes 64-113 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 261-291 and accompanying text.
476. See supra notes 267-268 and accompanying text.
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2. Deferred Action.-In general, the government may not evict
people from their homes if they are willing and able to cure any
threats to health and safety that their dwellings may pose. The law on
the coast is different: Land has always changed hands as the shore
eroded, and in at least a few states governments have required the
removal of private seawalls that impair public access along the ocean
coast. Along bay shores, however, the demand for public access is less,
and states have not prohibited shore protection.4 77
The public trust doctrine holds that the state has not given away
its tidelands unless it explicitly decided to do so. Would this doctrine
allow people to be evicted if the alternative were an unintended priva-
tization of the public shoreline? Because courts have stretched and
squeezed the doctrine, this question will probably remain unclear in
most states until the problems of the rising sea level are upon us. Re-
gardless of what old cases and statutes say, would a court really resur-
rect an ancient common law doctrine in order to allow the
government to evict people from their homes?
3. Rolling Easements.-The uncertainties regarding the public
trust doctrine cut the other way for rolling easements. Because the
law of erosion has long held that the public tidelands migrate inland
as sea level rises, legislation saying that this law will apply in the future
takes nothing. Even without the public trust doctrine and the law of
erosion, rolling easements would rarely be takings. They are inexpen-
sive conditions that counteract an inevitable problem caused by
coastal development. Rolling easements do not render property eco-
nomically useless-they merely warn the owner that some day, envi-
ronmental conditions may render the property useless, and that if this
occurs, the state will not allow the owner to protect her investment at
the expense of the public. By the time the sea threatens the property,
owners will have had decades and perhaps centuries to factor this ex-
pectation into their plans-and into the price they paid for their
property.4 78
Rolling easements do not interfere with private economic activi-
ties. Instead, they merely allocate the risk of shoreline retreat to the
riparian owner. They would be constitutional in most cases even with-
out the public trust doctrine.4 79 With that doctrine, 48 0 a rolling ease-
477. See supra notes 402-406 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
479. See supra Part III.
480. See supra Part IV.
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ment policy with a reasonable advance warning is unlikely to be a
taking anywhere.
B. Good Policy Is Also Consistent with the Constitution
Setbacks have been the most popular technique to address ero-
sion along the ocean coast. But along bay shores, they seem advisable
only in some circumstances. If the land is steep enough for the ten- or
twenty-foot contour to be within a hundred feet or so of the high
water mark, and if the typical riparian parcel has substantial land
above this elevation, setbacks may suffice for two reasons. First, land-
owners could still develop their property. Second, there would be no
need to quibble about how fast the sea will rise or how far into the
future the tidelands should be protected.4".
In many areas, however, the land is too flat for even a one-thou-
sand-foot setback to protect the tidelands into the distant future.4"'
The government would have to weigh risks and benefits in locating
the setback line. But where should that line be? Landowners would
have a strong incentive to dispute the government's scientific projec-
tions. Even if everyone agreed to assume, for example, a three-foot
rise, purchasing all of that land-or forcing property owners to bear
the cost-would be very expensive. Furthermore, eventually the shore
would erode up to that line and the tidelands would be eliminated
anyway. 483
Rolling easements, by contrast, face none of these limitations.
Landowners are not prevented from using their property; they simply
are prevented from protecting it when doing so eliminates tidelands.
Thus, there is no need to draw a particular line on the map. Property
owners do not suffer large economic deprivations, and the many dec-
ades that will pass before the property is lost imply a small present
discounted value for whatever future loss one expects. Rolling ease-
ments also foster consensus, because only landowners who expect a
significant rise in sea level would have a reason to be concerned about
their cost. Perhaps most importantly, however, the government could
acquire rolling easements through eminent domain for less than one
percent of current land values. This makes it possible for govern-
ments to avoid hurting property owners and, thus, avoid the takings
484issue.
481. See supra notes 129-133.
482. See fig.5 (map of Chesapeake and Delaware Bays).
483. See supra notes 129-133.
484. See supra Part II.
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Setbacks and rolling easements are not mutually exclusive. In
some cases, setbacks may be useful for protecting tidelands
threatened over the next forty to seventy-five years, while rolling ease-
ments could be employed to ensure that bulkheads are not subse-
quently built at the setback line. It would be premature to conclude
that any single approach will be appropriate everywhere. The analysis
supporting rolling easements demonstrates, however, that the long-
term and uncertain nature of sea level rise need not prevent policy
makers from laying out the rules of the game so that social and polit-
ical institutions will be prepared for a rising sea.485
C. Recommendations
The fact that society decided not to eliminate its tidelands during
the last part of the twentieth century does not automatically imply that
they should be retained during the twenty-first century. But it does
imply that their resources are valuable enough to (1) decide where
tidelands should be eliminated and where they should be retained,
and (2) retain them wherever the cost of doing so is a tiny fraction of
what it would cost to prevent their immediate elimination. Toward
those ends, the author presents the following ten recommendations
for states, local governments, and the private sector.
States
1. State legislatures should direct the appropriate cabinet officers
to undertake long-term public trust tideland planning studies that de-
velop legislative recommendations on which shorelines should be
privatized and which should remain in their natural condition as
shores erode. These studies should produce maps showing the likely
loss of natural shorelines over the next hundred years given current
development trends, alternative scenarios of future sea level rise, and
alternative policies of coastal management, such as setbacks, rolling
easements, various engineering strategies, and existing policies. They
also should examine implementation issues and estimate the costs as-
sociated with each policy. Special attention should be given to unique
cultural resources, including inhabited islands, lighthouses, forts, and
archaeological sites, as well as environmental resources.
In Maryland, a planning study would be particularly useful along
Chesapeake Bay. The legislatively recognized right to bulkhead,
along with the Critical Area Act's limitation of development along ru-
ral bay shores, already provides a skeletal structure for deciding which
485. See supra notes 167-168.
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shores to privatize. But the state's Tidal Wetlands Act contains a statu-
tory right to hold back the sea, a right that could be read as approving
an eventual elimination of all wetlands and beaches other than those
adjacent to conservation areas.
2. State coastal zone agencies should develop access policies for
new development along bay shores and otherwise expand the portion
of the bay beaches to which the public has access. The constituency
for protecting shores will grow if people can reach the water, but it
will wither if they cannot. Both the layout of roads and the existence
of public paths to the shore could have important long-term implica-
tions for coastal access.
Along the ocean coast, roads leading to the sea provide access to
the shore, and they ensure that as the beach erodes, all houses will still
have road access. Along estuarine shores, by contrast, roads parallel
to the shore limit access and may make retreat impossible if they pro-
vide the sole access to some properties.
In theory, Maryland has a policy to promote access to the waters
of Chesapeake Bay. It does not, however, have a policy to increase
substantially the portion of the shore to which the public has access.
Nor does it have a policy of retaining public access along the shore
when issuing permits for erosion control structures.
3. State legislatures should ask their attorneys general to analyze
which tidelands policies can be implemented under state law and
whether current development and bulkhead policies are likely to fore-
close any options. The success and takings implications of tidelands
policies will depend ultimately on the quality of legal advice provided
before the policy development. Even in areas that are developed, re-
taining public access along the shore may be worthwhile.
Local Governments
4. Local governments should modify their master plans to indi-
cate explicitly which shorelines will eventually be armored and which
will remain natural. A good initial plan would be to assume that previ-
ously developed or subdivided areas will eventually be protected, and
areas zoned for agriculture, resource conservation, or otherwise not
yet subdivided will retain natural shorelines forever even if rezoned.
A possible compromise for undeveloped residential areas would be to
maintain access along the shore in perpetuity, even if the shore is
eventually armored.
5. Zoning regulations should also specify which shorelines will
remain armored and which will remain natural. Because the desig-
nated natural shorelines are often agricultural and are not likely to be
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developed for several decades, local development interests may find
these changes to be reasonable. While the natural shoreline designa-
tion might be revoked if and when the agricultural lands are rezoned,
the inevitable compromises involved in rezoning might lead to their
retention. Moreover, the designation would eventually become one
of the background principles of land ownership in the county and
would alert out-of-town developers about the need to consider tide-
land preservation.
6. Local governments should factor sea level rise and erosion
trends into their guidelines for subdividing coastal property. Setbacks
are less costly and less likely to be takings when the coastal lot is rela-
tively deep. Even in areas where shorelines will eventually be ar-
mored, a deeper lot will lengthen the life of the natural shoreline
environment. In areas where the public wants shorelines to remain
natural, subdivision presents a realistic opportunity to warn the prop-
erty owner of the requirements to protect natural shorelines. Where
state law permits, it may be the last opportunity to add covenants or
easements to the deed without compensation.
7. In areas likely to be protected, local governments should de-
cide how the shore would be protected, even if erosion will not
threaten developed areas for several decades. If the area would be
protected by a levee, then setbacks along the shore should be in-
creased to make room for that eventuality. If the area would be raised
with fill, the proper height for roads, utilities, and building lots may
be different. Environmental officials desiring to protect the tidelands
must take an active interest in these related issues. Otherwise, they
risk losing credibility among the moderate elements of the
community.
Private Sector
8. Builders should reserve or purchase rolling easements when
seeking permits for development in coastal counties and donate those
easements to conservancies. This temporal extension of wetland miti-
gation is a cost-effective way to guarantee that a project will have a
positive net impact on the environment. It need not be limited to
those who seek to fill a wetland. Privately created rolling easements
could also include non-development buffers above the high water
mark to limit pollution runoff.
9. Conservancies should reserve rolling easements from lands
they sell and consider purchasing rolling easements from farmers who
own land along the shore. In addition to the direct benefits, private
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activities can help to flush out the legal issues and thereby reduce in-
stitutional inertia elsewhere.
10. Activists should take regular walks along estuarine shores.
The public's failure to visit these often-inaccessible tidelands leads
many private property owners to assume incorrectly that they own the
shore. This failure also leads many officials to conclude that, as with
an abandoned roadway, there is no harm to privatizing the shore.
This Article has focused on state, local, and private arrangements
for protecting tidelands. The federal Clean Water Act was the primary
motivator for protecting wetlands,486 and amending the Act to protect
these wetlands as sea level rises would be a logical extension. But the
federal government's role in wetlands protection was justified by its
traditional power to regulate the waters of the United States.48 7
Although wetlands are part of those waters, setbacks and rolling ease-
ments involve land use, which has always been a matter for state and
local government.4"" Certainly the Army Corps of Engineers and the
Environmental Protection Agency should reexamine existing pro-
grams so that they are less vulnerable to rising sea level. Environmen-
tal Impact Statements associated with expanding access to sewage
treatment plants in low areas should acknowledge that these projects
will cause a large long-term net loss of wetlands, both because the
projects encourage development in low areas and because flooded
septic systems will no longer force people to abandon homes as the
sea rises. A federal regulatory solution to this problem, on the other
hand, is probably impractical and definitely premature.
Although a federal regulatory role seems premature, the national
government could help the process in its role as a property owner. The
National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and other agen-
cies that purchase lands for conservation purposes in coastal areas
could keep shorelines natural through the purchase of rolling ease-
ments. Undeveloped farmland is still found along the mainland
shores of many bays that lie behind federally owned barrier islands,
such as Assateague Island National Seashore along the Atlantic Coast
of Maryland. For less than one percent of the cost of buying the land,
the federal government could ensure that even if these areas become
486. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
487. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 217-18 (1824) (holding that the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over commerce of the coastal waters).
488. See supra note 462 and accompanying text.
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developed some day, the shore will still be composed of wetlands and
beaches.489
It is difficult to get people to even think about the next century.
Congress and the President, however, have broken that barrier in
their efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.490 So far, this
enthusiasm has not extended to addressing the impacts of a green-
house warming. By purchasing rolling easements in critical areas, the
nation's largest property owner could motivate states to consider the
long-term fates of their coastal zones, while avoiding the harm to
property owners that has often accompanied the laws that protect our
coastal environment.
489. See supra Part II.
490. See 1 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 118, at 109-52 (detailing federal ef-
forts to alleviate global warming problems).
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APPENDIX 1
ROUGH CALCULATION OF THE NATIONWIDE COST OF PROTECTING
TIDELANDS WITH ROLLING EASEMENTS
National assessments of the costs of sea level rise have not sought
to estimate the cost of protecting shores with rolling easements. Nev-
ertheless, the published research is sufficient to generate a rough
estimate.
Part II presents a numerical example in which a coastal lot (1)
would become tideland if the sea level rises three feet, (2) is worth
$20,000 as a site for a $180,000 house and $10,000 in an alternative
use, and (3) where the cost of moving the house (and cleaning up the
site) would be $30,000, (4) while the cost of a bulkhead would be
$10,000. Given these assumptions, the bulkhead restriction would
cost the property owner a total of $40,000 when the sea rises three
feet. (The owner would lose the land worth $20,000 and would have
to pay the $30,000 to move the house, but a bulkhead would have cost
$10,000.) At a 5% discount rate, the present value of $40,000 in 100
years is $300. Thus, given a 5% interest rate, the impact on the mar-
ket value of a rolling easement would be $300 if a three-foot rise were
certain to occur in 100 years. But given the EPA's estimate that such a
rise is only 5% likely,4 9 1 the expected cost would be $15, which is
0.075% times the value of the land. Given the EPA's estimated 1%
chance of a four-foot rise along most of the U.S. coast, the cost of a
rolling easement for property four feet above high water would only
be $3-that is, 0.015% of the land value.
Following the previous logic, a rolling easement for land that
would be inundated with a five-, six-, or seven-foot rise in sea level
would be worth $5.30, $2.65, and $1.30 respectively. These estimates
are derived based on the fact that a five-foot rise has a 10% chance by
2150, a six-foot rise has a 5% chance by 2150, and a seven-foot rise has
a 2.5% chance by 2150. Discounting $1 over 160 years yields
$0.000407. Discounting by the probabilities implies that the $40,000
that will eventually be lost has present values of $1.62, $0.80, and
$0.40, which are 0.008%, 0.004%, and 0.002% of the initial $20,000
land values.
For nearer term considerations, a more accurate first-cut estimate
is based on the most likely date by which the sea will rise sufficiently to
inundate a property. A rolling easement that vests when sea level rises
six inches, one foot, or two feet would be worth 28%, 10%, and 1% of
491. See Table 1, which appears in supra Part II.
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the current land values. The basis for that calculation is that a rise of
six inches, one foot, and two feet are most likely to occur within 40,
60, and 110 years, respectively. Discounting at a 5% rate and multiply-
ing by two (to reflect the assumption that the net cost of moving the
house is the land value), rolling easements for properties that vest
with a six-inch, one-foot, and two-foot rise could be valued at 28%,
10%, and 1% of the current land value.
Table A-1 summarizes these calculations along with the results of
an EPA study, which estimated the values of the undeveloped land
threatened by sea level rise.4 92
TABLE A-i
CALCULATING THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF ROLLING EASEMENTS FOR
THE UNDEVELOPED LAND ERODED OR INUNDATED BY VARIOUS
AMOUNTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE
Value of Lost
Rise in Undeveloped Present Value Cost of Rolling
Sea Land of $1 When Easements
Level ($ billion) 493  Increment 494  Sea Rises ($ million)
6 inches - 3-9 28 -
1 foot 6-19 3-10 10 300-1000
2 feet 13-34 7-15 1 70-150
3 feet - 3.5-18.5 0.075 2.6-14
4 feet 21-71 3.5-18.5 0.015 0.5-2.7
5 feet - 2.7-17 0.008 0.2-1.4
6 feet - 2.7-17 0.004 0.1-0.7
7 feet 29-121 2.7-17 0.002 0.05-0.4
TOTAL 373-1170
We might reasonably expect that the land that will be lost from
the first six inches will not be affected by a rolling easement policy-
that is, that people, for the most part, will not be building houses in
areas that are likely to erode away in the next fifty years.
It is also reasonable to assume that the rolling easements for the
land that will be inundated with a rise between six and twelve inches
will not vest until the sea rises at least one foot. This is because the
EPA study reported the amount of land that would be flooded by
mean spring high water, i.e., the land that would become high marsh
with a rise of a given magnitude. Spring high water is often six inches
to two feet above mean high water, and the rolling easements are as-
492. See generally Holding Back the Sea, supra note 32.
493. See generally id.
494. The estimates of the increments are based on linear interpolations of four
estimates used throughout Holding Back the Sea, supra note 32.
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sumed only to require an abandonment of the property when it is
flooded by mean low water. Thus, by assuming no abandonment will
occur until a one-foot rise, one effectively presupposes that mean
spring high water is zero to six inches above mean high water; how-
ever, this probably overstates how soon mean low water invades most
property. All the same, given the assumption above, the present value
would be ten cents on the dollar, a value that implies a total cost of
$300 million to $1 billion to buy rolling easements on this land, which
has a current value of $3 to 10 billion.
Similarly, one can assume in each case that the rolling easements
for the land that would be inundated by a rise in sea level between X-1
and X feet would not require the lot to be abandoned until the sea
rises Xfeet. The table completes this calculation for the various eleva-
tions. What is noteworthy is how much less the rolling easements
would cost for the higher land. Because inundation of higher ground
is less likely to occur and more remote in time, the fair market value
of an interest in land based on that contingency is minuscule after the
first four feet.
Thus, estimated cost ranges between $373 million and $1170 mil-
lion. Ninety percent of the cost can be attributed to purchasing roll-
ing easements on the land threatened by a rise in sea level of six to
twelve inches; 9% of the cost applies to the land inundated or eroded
with a rise of one to two feet; and 1% of the total cost would protect
all of the land in the coastal zone that would not be threatened until
the sea rose by more than two feet.
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APPENDIX 2
ANNUAL SHORELINE ARMORING IN MARYLAND
(miles)
State Permits Issued, 1978-1994
New
Bulkhead
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988*
1989*
1990*
1991*
1992
1993
1994
Total
1979-1994 100.0
New
Revetment
6.5
6.5
8.4
9.7
5.8
11.8
8.6
11.8
16.3
12.4
10.4
13.3
10.9
9.9
9.8
12.4
13.4
177.0
Total New
Shore
Armoring
Replacement
Bulkheads
277.9
Permits Issued by the Board of Public Works Only
1995 0.1 2.4 2.5 3.0
1996 0.2 4.6 4.8 0.4
1997 0.1 3.9 4.0 0.5
Sources: Report to the Board of Public Works on Activities Under the Maryland Wetlands
Act (1978 through 1987). Maryland Board of Public Works, April 1988. Report on Tidal
Wetlands Activities and Licenses for Fiscal Year 1989 (and same reports for years 1990-
1997). For years marked with an asterisk, the report provides total miles of bulkheads and
the fraction of permits that were for new and replacement bulkheads; the number
provided here assumes that percentage of total miles for new and replacement bulkheads
is equal to the percentage of permits for new and replacement bulkheads.
Note: Since 1995, wetland permitting has been divided between the Tidal Wetlands
Division of the Maryland Department for the Environment (MDE) and the Board of Public
Works. From 1995 to the present, the Board of Public Works has only kept track of the
shoreline armoring resulting from its own permits; MDE published no comparable report.
Interview with Harold Cassell, State Wetlands Administrator (Mar. 25, 1997).
